Debris Removal Programs
https://www2.peterson.af.mil/nssi
Boeing Gas Solution
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-10/boeings-new-space-junk-scheme-clears-debris-cloud-ballistic-gas
Boeing Gas Solution
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-10/boeings-new-space-junk-scheme-clears-debris-cloud-ballistic-gas
White Papers
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Space Team Project Final Technical Report
Removing Orbital Debris:
A Global Space Challenge
Technical Report Authored By:
Lucy Rogers and Franz Gayl
Space Team Member Roster:
Lucy Rogers, Eric Chiang, Yasemin Baydaroglu, and Franz Gayl
Team Project Advisors:
Yvonne Cagle, Marco Chacin, and Mona Hammoudeh
Singularity University
Graduate Studies Program 2011
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Chapter 1: Introduction, Purpose, and Background
Chapter 2: Space Debris: An Exponentially Growing Threat
Chapter 3: The Proposed Sustainable Organization
Bibliography
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Executive Summary
Satellites are in danger from catastrophic impact by space debris. This means that
infrastructure critical to modern society is under threat – from power and water supplies, to
military security and global navigation, from the conduct of global communications to
commerce. This could affect billions of people.
The rate of increase in debris is exponential, and left unaddressed, will lead to a runaway
debris proliferation phenomena known as the “Kessler Syndrome.” The resulting density of
debris will threaten all space activities.
Improved tracking and prediction of the path of debris can be enhanced through shared,
accurate, and real time global space situational awareness. However, national security and
military concerns of major space faring powers currently limits this ability.
Mature NASA and industry orbital debris removal concepts, such as tethers and lasers
remain underfunded and mainly untested.
The aim of the Project is to develop a sustainable capability to develop and test
technology, and to ultimately remove all dangerous debris from Earth orbital space by using
mitigation, collision avoidance and debris removal techniques.
We are looking to found an international organization dedicated to addressing threats to
spacecraft, satellites and to the Earth, such as from space debris and asteroids. We will do this by
influencing governments, businesses, and the public to seek and achieve better space situational
awareness. We will also work with those space stakeholders to improve mitigation and removal
capabilities to improve the space environment upon which we have all come to depend. We will
use practical experience, new technologies, knowledge and credibility to create long-term
solutions for the Earth’s space environment and keeping corridors to Earth orbital space open.
The potential stakeholders include space systems insurers and operators, but may also
include cash rich countries that value involvement with cutting edge technologies and have the
desire to help solve environmental issues, and also other countries who may wish to become
space farers.
We are uniquely placed to form this organization, as we are completely objective, with no
national or industrial agenda. We are an international team, with experience in the private and
public space industries, the military, and larger research communities.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction, Purpose, and Background
1. Introduction
The Singularity University Graduate Studies Program of 2011 (SU GSP-11) Space Team
selected a topic that met the following SU criteria: 1) the team project must employ exponential
technologies and be dependent on them for success; 2) the product resulting from the team effort
must benefit a billion people over a time span of ten years; 3) the selected topic must fit within
the category of one of the SU’s six Grand Challenge problem areas, namely space, poverty,
energy, global health, security or energy; 4) the team product must exhibit scalable and
sustainable economics commensurate with the exponentially growing challenge it addresses; and
5) the topic must present a compelling business case founded on a competitive concept of
operations. Following discussion the Space Team proposed a research-founded product focused
on solving the dilemma of Earth orbital space debris. The project was found to meet the
requisite criteria and approved by the SU faculty and staff.
The team evolved into two subsections. One section was focused on the physical quantification
of, and technological solutions to the growing problem of orbital space debris. The other section
was focused on policy-related issues that impact space generally, and space debris specifically.
The findings of the non-technical and policy-related Space Team section composed of Eric
Chiang and Yasemin Baydaroglu was published in a separate document. What follows in this
document is a report of the technical research findings and conclusions of Lucy Rogers and
Franz Gayl who formed the technical section of the Space Team.
2. Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to define the specific ideas that the GSP-11 Space Team has
developed in support of the debris related Space Team Project (TP). The title of the GSP-11 TP
research proposal is “Orbital Debris: A Global Space Challenge.” The objective of the Space
Team coming out of GSP-11 is to launch a sustainable organization dedicated to making orbital
space safe for all of humankind. This technology-intensive effort begins with a specific focus on
mitigating and solving the growing threat from orbital debris.
3. Background
In his article titled Overview of the legal and policy challenges of orbital debris removal [tt]
published in the February 2011 edition of Space Policy, author Brian Weeden states:
Since the launch of the first satellite in 1957 humans have been placing an increasing
number of objects in orbit around the Earth. This trend has accelerated in recent years
thanks to the increase in number of states which have the capability to launch satellites
and the recognition of the many socioeconomic and national security benefits that can be
derived from space. There are currently close to 1000 active satellites on orbit, operated
by dozens of state and international organizations. More importantly, each satellite that is
placed into orbit is accompanied by one or more pieces of non-functional objects, known
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as space debris. More than 20,000 pieces of space debris larger than 10 cm are regularly
tracked in Earth orbit, and scientific research shows that there are roughly 500,000
additional pieces between 1 and 10 cm in size that are not regularly tracked. Although
the average amount of space debris per cubic kilometer is small, it is concentrated in the
regions of Earth orbit that are most heavily utilized...and thus poses a significant hazard
to operational spacecraft.
The sobering statistics documented by Weeden and many others prompted the GSP-11 Space
Team to take a closer look at the orbital space debris threat. Sharing an enthusiasm and
professional backgrounds related to space, the team members united around a sense of mission to
solve the problem rather than a business case. The urgency of taking action to preserve the
freedom to operate in and transport through Earth orbital space was clear to all members.
Even in the absence of debris, humankind’s dependence on the Earth orbital space extends to
military security of nations, position, navigation, and timing (PNT), and the conduct of global
communications and commerce. Satellite-enabled capabilities expose their vulnerability, as they
constitute critical infrastructure for modern societies. Humankind’s dependency leads to a
bottleneck as nations compete for limited orbital real estate. If unanticipated problems, man-
made or natural, threaten key satellite constellation enabled capabilities such as PNT, serious
civil and social disruptions can be predicted. Preserving the conditions that permit space
dependency represents a benefit that extends to all humankind. Unfortunately, we continue to
pollute the orbital space environment and threaten to initiate a devastating uncontrolled runaway
proliferation of debris creation. Author Brian Weeden continues [tt]:
In the late 1970s, two influential NASA scientists, Burt Cour-Palais and Donald Kessler,
laid the scientific groundwork for what became to be known as the “Kessler Syndrome.”
They predicted that at some point in the future the population of artificial space debris
would hit a critical point where it grew at a rate faster than the rate at which debris is
removed from orbit through natural decay into the Earth’s atmosphere. According to their
models, large pieces of space debris would get hit by smaller pieces of debris, creating
hundreds or thousands of new pieces of small debris which could then collide with other
large pieces. This “collisional cascading” process would increase the population of space
debris at an exponential rate and significantly increase the risks and costs of operating in
space.
Efforts at mitigation through better launch vehicle and satellite design and operations have
proven successful. But accidents still happen and debris growth outpaces natural reentry. Also,
efforts at better characterizing the environment through shared, accurate, and real time global
space situational awareness (SSA) are stymied by national security concerns of major military
powers. Finally, mature orbital debris removal (ODR) concepts remain dormant. Security
parochialism and resource scarcity invite a catastrophe that will force the world into action.
With this confirmation of Space Team concern in the background the GSP-11 Space Team
researched: 1) if nations aspiring to go to space in the future should be invited to join space
faring nations earlier in resolving orbital debris; 2) can more accurate SSA data be obtained from
the U.S., Russia, and France for better global collision avoidance; and 3) what ODR technologies
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are most hopeful in the near term to prevent the Kessler Syndrome. The best vehicle for sharing
team conclusions and recommendations was determined to be the inclusion of this report as an
additional chapter in the Space Transportation Technology Roadmap, since New Space and
space tourism would greatly benefit from orbital debris reduction and elimination.
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Chapter 2:
Space Debris: An Exponentially Growing Threat
Chapter 3 is organized into three sections. In the first the Space Team defines the problem of the
exponential growth in space debris, to portray it as an urgent global need that calls for immediate
solution. The second section presents the state of the art in orbital debris mitigation, space
situational awareness / collision avoidance, and debris removal concepts, followed by
discussions of the gaps that remain as conclusions. The third section restates the Space Team
conclusions concisely in preparation for the final report chapter titled “Recommendations.”
2.1 Defining the Problem: Space Debris is an Exponentially Growing Threat
Orbital space debris is any man-made object in Earth orbit which no longer serves a useful
purpose. Examples are derelict spacecraft, launch vehicle upper stages, payload fairings, debris
from launch vehicle separation, debris from explosions or collisions, solid rocket motor
effluents, paint flecks from thermal stress or particle impacts, and coolant droplets.
Figure 1. Popular Science infographic depiction of satellite and debris populations.
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In a 2010 report by the RAND National Defense Research Institute titled Confronting Space
Debris - Strategies and Warnings from Comparable Examples Including Deepwater Horizon
RAND observed [hh]:
Moving to remediation...may require a “catastrophic” event that lowers the community’s
risk tolerance, as has happened in other fields—which suggests the problem of orbital
space debris may get worse before it gets better.
The damage caused by debris to operational space systems can be catastrophic. The impacts of
small particles cause erosive damage to operational satellites, similar to sandblasting. This
damage can be partly mitigated through the use of a protective "meteor bumper" which is widely
used on spacecraft such as the International Space Station (ISS). However, not all parts of a
spacecraft may be protected in this manner. Solar panels and the optical components of
telescopes, star trackers, and even portals and windshields are subject to constant wear by debris,
and to a lesser extent, micrometeorites. However, even a 1 cm object can prove catastrophic for
a satellite:
Figures 2-3. NASA test target (L), and debris after 7 km/sec impact with 1 cm Al object (R).
A smaller number of the debris objects are larger, measuring over ten centimeters (3.9 in), and
are far deadlier. Against larger debris, the only protection is provided by maneuvering the
spacecraft out of the way in order to avoid a collision. Shielding against such hypervelocity
debris is ineffective. For example, a one kilogram object impacting at 10 kilometers per second,
for example, is probably capable of catastrophically breaking up a 1,000-kg spacecraft if it
strikes a high-density element in the spacecraft. In such a breakup, numerous fragments larger
than 1 kg would be created.
If such a collision with larger debris occurs, many of the resulting fragments from the damaged
spacecraft will themselves be in the one kilogram (2.2 lb) mass range or larger. These then
become an additional source of additional collision risk. As the chance of collision is a function
of the number of objects in space, proliferation leads to a critical density where the creation of
new debris occurs faster than the various natural forces that remove these objects from orbit.
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Beyond this threshold a runaway chain reaction can occur that reduces all objects in orbit to
debris in a period of years or months.
Currently, over 18,000 objects larger than 10 cm are known to exist. The estimated population of
particles between 1 and 10 cm in diameter is approximately 500,000 [tt]. The number of
particles smaller than 1 cm probably exceeds tens of millions. In order to determine the number
of orbital debris, large orbital debris (>10 cm) are tracked routinely by the U.S. Air Force Space
Surveillance Network (SSN), the Russian Space Surveillance System (SSS), and the French
Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial (GRAVES). In fact, objects as small as 3 mm can be
detected by ground-based radars today, providing a basis for a statistical estimate of their
numbers. Assessments of the population of orbital debris smaller than 1 mm can be made by
examining impact features on the surfaces of returned spacecraft, although to date this has been
limited to spacecraft operating in altitudes below 600 km.
The principal sources of large orbital debris are satellite explosions and collisions. Prior to 2007,
the principal source of debris was old upper launch vehicle stages left in orbit containing residual
stored energy sources in the form of propellants and high pressure fluids. Recently however, the
major source of large debris has shifted to intentional and unintentional catastrophic events. In
January 2007 China employed a land-based missile to destroy the 2,200-pound Fengyun-1C
weather satellite while it was orbiting 528 miles above the Earth. The impact left more than
100,000 new pieces of debris orbiting the planet, NASA estimated, with 2,600 of them more than
7 centimeters across. Similarly, in 2008 the U.S. Navy shot down an inoperable spy satellite.
The U.S. Navy AEGIS warship fired a single modified tactical missile, hitting the satellite
approximately 247 kilometers over the Pacific Ocean as it traveled in space at more than 17,000
mph. Finally, an accidental collision between an American Iridium satellite and a Russian
Cosmos satellite in 2009 greatly increased the number of large debris in orbit.
The relatively small sum of rocket bodies (approximately 2,000), non-operational spacecraft
(approximately 3,000), and other debris measuring over 10 centimeters across (approximately
5,000) is eclipsed by the estimated tens of millions of pieces of space debris that are composed
of small particles, less than one centimeter in any dimension. For example, smaller pieces
include dust from solid rocket motors, surface degradation products such as paint flakes, and
coolant released by the notoriously polluting past Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite
(RORSAT) nuclear powered satellites.
Figures 4-6. Artistic depictions of RORSAT (L & C), and coolant debris discharge (R).
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RORSATs were launched between 1967 and 1988 to monitor North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and merchant vessels using active radar. Because a return signal from a target
illuminated by a radar transmitter diminishes as the inverse of the fourth power of the distance,
to operate effectively, RORSATs had to be placed in lower LEO. RORSAT also required higher
power radar and aerodynamic profile to compensate for those losses. Large solar panels were
ruled out in design because the low altitude orbit would have rapidly decayed due to drag
through the upper atmosphere. Further, the satellite would have been useless in the shadow of
earth. As a consequence, the majority of RORSATs were powered by nuclear reactors fuelled
by uranium-235. At the end of their useful lives most of the nuclear reactor cores were ejected
into a higher “disposal orbit." Unfortunately, there were several failure incidents, some of which
resulted in radioactive material re-entering the Earth's atmosphere. Although most nuclear cores
were successfully ejected into high orbits, they will only decay after several hundred years.
RORSATs were a major source of space debris in LEO. During 16 reactor core ejections,
approximately 128 kg of Sodium- Potassium Alloy (NaK-78) escaped from the primary coolant
systems of the reactors. The smaller droplets have already decayed, but larger droplets of up to
5.5 cm in diameter are still in orbit. The droplets will burn up completely in the upper
atmosphere on re-entry but in the interim the major risk is impact with operational satellites. The
problems posed by RORSAT debris are diminishing with time as they reenter. However, this
single example of natural mitigation over time pales with many other flawed designs, outright
failures, and careless operations that have caused the rate of debris growth to approach an
exponential today, as graphically displayed below:
Figure 7. Tracked orbital debris population catalogued by U.S. Air Force as of 2010.
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As for reentering debris, on average, reentering spacecraft break up at altitudes between 84-72
km due to aerodynamic forces that cause the allowable structural loads to be exceeded. Large,
sturdy, and/or densely constructed satellites generally break up at lower altitudes. Solar arrays
frequently break off the spacecraft parent body around 90-95 km because of the aerodynamic
forces causing the allowable bending moment to be exceeded at the array/spacecraft attach point.
Once the spacecraft body disintegrates, individual components that were housed in that parent
body will continue earthward as fragments and receive aero-heating until they either demise or
survive to impact the surface. Spacecraft components that are made of low melting-point
materials such as aluminum will usually evaporate at higher altitudes than objects that are made
of dense materials with higher melting points such as titanium, stainless steel, and beryllium.
Figures 8-11. Various debris seen from within spacecraft, aircraft, and from the ground.
If an object is enclosed in a substructure, the housing must first disintegrate before the internal
component is exposed to destructive heating. Many objects have such a high melt temperature
that they are able to survive reentry intact, although some of those are so light that they impact
the surface with a very low velocity. NASA has noted that as a result, the kinetic energy of such
light dense objects at impact is often under 15 Joules, a threshold below which the probability of
causing a human casualty is negligible. During the past 40 years an average of one catalogued
piece of debris fell back to Earth each day without causing serious injury or property damage. On
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average, of those satellites that do reenter, approximately 10-40% of the mass of the object is
likely to reach the surface of the Earth.
Due to the Earth's surface being primarily water, most objects that survive reentry land in one of
the world's oceans. In fact, the chances that a given person will get hit and injured during his/her
one lifetime is estimated to be one in a trillion. Prominent cases of uncontrolled reentry include:
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n 1978, Cosmos 954 reentered uncontrolled and crashed near Great Slave Lake in the Northwest
Territories of Canada. Cosmos 954 was nuclear powered and left radioactive debris near its
impact site. In 1979, Skylab reentered uncontrolled, spreading debris across the Australian
Outback, damaging several buildings and killing a cow. The re-entry was a major media event
largely due to the Cosmos 954 incident, but not viewed as much as a potential disaster since it
did not carry nuclear fuel. NASA had originally hoped to use a Space Shuttle mission to either
extend Skylab’s life or enable a controlled reentry, but delays in the program combined with
unexpectedly high solar activity made this impossible.
Figures 12-15. Orbital debris that have survived reentry and reached the Earth’s surface.
Debris distribution is not uniform in Earth orbit. Most orbital debris orbit within 2,000 km of the
Earth's surface, as this realm has hosted the preponderance of orbiting satellites since the dawn
of the space age. Likewise, within this spherical shell volume the amount of debris varies
significantly with altitude. The greatest concentrations of debris are found near 800-850 km. In
LEO (below 2,000 km), orbital debris circle the Earth at speeds of 7 km to 8 km per second.
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However, the average impact speed of orbital debris in LEO with another space object will be
approximately 10 km per second as there will be an angle of convergence in a collision.
Consequently, collisions with even a small piece of debris will involve considerable energy.
Figure 16. Disproportionate object distribution across a random 180 degree panorama of LEO.
While the U.S. Space Shuttle was still operational, when it was in orbit U.S. Air Force Space
Surveillance Network (SSN) personnel regularly examined the trajectories of orbital debris to
identify possible close encounters. The same warning service is provided to the International
Space Station (ISS). If another object was projected to come within a few kilometers of the
Space Shuttle, the spacecraft normally maneuvered away from the object if the chance of a
collision exceeded 1 in 10,000. The ISS has been required to do the same.
Past on-orbit photographs of the now-deorbited Mir Space Station's exterior revealed evidence of
large numbers of impacts from small orbital debris and meteoroids. The most significant
damage was evidenced on the large, fragile solar arrays which could not be protected from small
particles. To date orbital debris have caused no loss of mission or capability on the ISS. This is
in no small part due to the fact that the ISS is the most heavily shielded spacecraft ever flown.
Critical components, such as habitable compartments and high pressure tanks, are designed to
withstand the impact of debris as large as 1 cm in diameter. Like the Space Shuttle, the ISS also
has the capability of maneuvering to avoid tracked objects. The risk of a critical ISS component
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being struck by debris 1 to 10 cm in diameter is slight and ways to reduce this risk are being
investigated. Still, a rise in the rate of ISS maneuvers to avoid collisions is notable.
Exceptionally low altitude LEO systems such as Iridium, Orbcomm, and Globalstar do not
encounter debris problems. This is because debris at low LEO altitudes, whether caused by
others or themselves, tends to slow due to atmospheric drag and deorbit relatively quickly.
Often, upper stages and spacecraft are purposely placed in lower LEO after their missions have
been completed in order to insure that higher drag forces will accelerate their fall back to Earth.
As a general rule, the higher the altitude, the longer the orbital debris will remain in Earth orbit.
Debris left in orbits below 600 km normally fall back to Earth within several years. At altitudes
of 800 km, the time for orbital decay is often measured in decades. Above 1,000 km, orbital
debris will normally continue circling the Earth for a century or more.
As for geostationary orbit (GEO), our ability to detect orbital debris at near 36,000 km altitude
where many telecommunications and meteorological spacecraft operate is still somewhat limited.
However, studies indicate that the orbital debris population is probably less severe there than in
the aforementioned LEO altitudes. Since GEO is a special natural resource having limited real
estate and available “slots,” many spacecraft operators boost their old spacecraft into higher,
disposal orbits at the end of their mission. That orbit is said to be supersynchronous, and located
at an altitude approximately 300 km higher than GEO. Even without a debris problem at GEO,
the limited and therefore crowded real estate that so many satellites share in GEO can still lead to
collisions during maneuvers and the natural figure eight paths of satellites as they maintain
position. Such collisions can lead to loss of capability and new debris.
Because they share an identical orbital inclination, eccentricity, and altitude in order to remain
stationary with respect to terrestrial Earth, operational GEO spacecraft are rarely struck by
anything but very small debris and micrometeoroids, with little to no mission effect. Adding
debris shields can further protect spacecraft components from particles as large as 1 cm in
diameter. The probability of two large objects >10 cm in diameter accidentally colliding in GEO
is low.
LEO is a more hazardous regime, and collisions do occur. The worst such incident occurred on
10 February 2009 when an operational U.S. Iridium satellite and a derelict Russian Cosmos
satellite collided in which thousands of new debris were created, thousands large enough for
SSN detection. Viewed linearly, intuition dictates that in order to control the debris problem it is
merely necessary to stop the production of new debris. U.S. national policy recognizes this as a
requirement since 1988, and the most recent National Space Policy (31 August 2006) includes
the following statements concerning orbital debris:
Orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and
operations and to the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth. The United
States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-
government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for future
generations.
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2.2 Kessler Syndrome
Unfortunately, there is a non-linear component to debris growth that calls for urgent international
action. In spite of significant improvements in spacecraft design and operations, there is a near
term threat that existing debris densities may lead automatically to an uncontrolled chain of
further collisions causing an exponential growth in debris density, even in the absence of further
contributions. This possibility is defined as the Kessler Syndrome.
In 1978 NASA scientist Donald J. Kessler proposed a scenario in which the density of objects
in LEO becomes high enough that collisions between objects could cause a cascade, with each
ensuing collision generating new debris, thereby increasing the likelihood of further collisions.
The theoretical scenario came to be called the Kessler Syndrome or Kessler Effect, brought on
by collisional cascading or an ablation cascade. One implication was and is that the distribution
of debris in orbit could render space exploration, and even the use of satellites, unfeasible for
many generations.
Kessler held that every satellite, space probe, and manned mission has the potential to create
space debris. As the number of satellites in orbit grows and old satellites become obsolete, the
risk of a cascading Kessler syndrome becomes greater. Fortunately, at the most commonly-used
orbits in low LEO, residual air drag helps keep the orbital zones free of debris. Collisions that
occur below this altitude are even less of an issue, since the energy lost in the collision results in
fragment orbits having perigee below this altitude.
At higher altitudes where atmospheric drag is insignificant, the time required for orbital
decay and reentry is much longer. Slight atmospheric drag, lunar perturbation, and solar
wind drag can bring debris down to lower altitudes over time where fragments finally re-enter,
but at very high altitudes this degradation can take millennia.
The Kessler Syndrome is especially insidious because of the "domino effect" and associated
"feedback runaway." Any impact between two objects of sizable mass spalls off shrapnel debris
from the force of the collision. Each piece of shrapnel now has the potential to cause further
damage, creating even more space debris. With a large enough collision or explosion such as one
between an active operational satellite and a defunct satellite, or the result of hostile actions in
space, the amount of cascading debris could be enough to render LEO effectively impassable.
There is growing consensus that this critical density has already been reached in certain orbital
bands, especially polar LEO orbits where orbiting objects of high inclination converge at the
poles dramatically increasing object density. A runaway Kessler Syndrome would render the
useful polar-orbiting bands difficult to use, and greatly increase the cost of space launches and
missions.
Richard Crowther of Britain's Defense Evaluation and Research Agency stated that he believes
the cascade predicted by Kessler will begin around 2015. The National Academy of Sciences,
summarizing the view among professionals, noted that there was widespread agreement that two
bands of LEO space, those at altitudes of 900 to 1,000 km (620 mi) and 1,500 km (930 mi), are
already past the critical density.
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Figure 17. Kessler’s 1978 collision prediction curves superimposed with actual collisions.
In the 2009 European Air and Space Conference, University of Southampton, UK researcher,
Hugh Lewis predicted that the threat from space debris would rise 50 percent in the coming
decade and quadruple in the next 50 years. Currently more than 13,000 collision close calls are
tracked weekly.
Because of the power-law size distribution, debris in the 5-mm-to-1-cm regime are estimated to
represent about 80% of all objects larger than 5 mm. Therefore, if the objective of space faring
nations is to reduce the most significant mission-ending threat for most operational spacecraft,
efforts need to focus on the 5mm- to 1 cm debris, as well as more massive debris and objects
having greater cross-sections.
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Figures 18-19. Depiction of Kessler Syndrome (L), and Iridium-Cosmos collision (R).
2.3 Comets, Asteroids, and Meteorites
Meteoroids are thought to originate from the asteroid belt. Meteoroids can range in size from
micrometers to about a meter in diameter, well within the dimensional and mass parameters of
man-made space debris. In terms of material constituency and velocity meteoroids and asteroids
are similar, with the exception that asteroids are larger, sometimes much larger. If a meteoroid
passes through the Earth’s atmosphere it is heated by friction, light, and perhaps an above ground
detonation. This object is called a meteor if it burns up above the surface of the Earth. However,
if a solid object lands on the Earth, it is classified as a meteorite.
Meteoroids, asteroids and comets are in orbits about the Sun and fly past the Earth at high
velocities. Individual meteoroids are generally too small to be tracked and designated, a problem
for smaller pieces of space debris as well. However, the arrival time of meteor streams, such as
the Leonids in November, can be predicted, and in the past NASA did not launch the Space
Shuttle or plan spacewalk during such meteor showers.
NASA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and other foreign space faring nations have long
acknowledged that near earth objects (NEO) such as asteroids and comets can pose localized,
broad geographic, or even global existential threats. It has also not escaped their attention that in
recent years the number of discoveries of new objects in both the professional and amateur
astronomy communities has increased dramatically. The increase is enabled primarily through
improvements in the quality and numbers of optical instruments and information technology (IT)
tools available to the science community and amateurs. The proliferation of discoveries of so-
called “minor planets” indicate that a larger number of natural objects exist, and potentially
threaten Earth’s orbital space, if not our planet itself.
Currently, naturally existent comets, asteroids and meteoroids are not classified as space debris,
since they are not man-made and are both omnipresent in the near Earth and outer space
environments. From a scientific standpoint the separate classification is justifiable. However
from a practical standpoint in the so-called “space age” the threat they pose to spacecraft and
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terrestrial Earth is indistinguishable from the threats posed by man-made space debris. For the
intended purposes of the Space Team project meteoroids, asteroids, and man-made objects are all
classified as “debris” that contribute to the increasing density of objects in earth orbital space. In
the final analysis any improved space situational awareness, avoidance techniques, and kinetic or
electromagnetic techniques used to dispose of hazardous man-made objects be equally useful in
dealing with natural objects.
Figures 20-21. Asteroid (L) and meteoroid (R), both constitute spacecraft-threatening debris.
Gaps and Proposing Solutions: Orbital Space Debris Mitigation, Avoidance, and Removal
NASA has concluded that controlling growth of the orbital debris population must be a high
priority for the U.S., all major space-faring nations, and all nations that share an interest in
preserving the near-Earth space global commons for all humankind. Measures can take the form
of better space situational awareness to enable collision avoidance in the presence of debris,
mitigating the threat of creating new debris through careful spacecraft design and operational
procedures, and the development and employment of kinetic and electromagnetic tools for
orbital debris removal (ODR).
The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office [http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/] is the lead
U.S. center for orbital debris research, and is recognized world-wide for its initiative in
addressing orbital debris issues by taking the international lead in debris characterization and
mitigation. This includes conducting measurements of the environment and in developing the
technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment.
Concurrently, the NASA Ames Research Center space debris research activities are making
significant contributions to the larger NASA effort. These activities are being led and
coordinated by Chris Henze, Will Marshall, James Mason, Jan Stupl, and Creon Levit.
NASA has confirmed a general international consensus that Kessler’s predictions were correct,
and the conclusion that action must be taken is not controversial. In this light, it can be argued
that there are three general areas that must be addressed in order to interrupt or prevent the
Kessler Syndrome problem, namely: 1) space debris mitigation; 2), collision avoidance, and 3)
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orbital debris removal (ODR). Each technique is clearly complementary of the others, and all
will need to play a part in preserving the safe traficability of the near-Earth space environment in
some fashion. Furthermore, it can be argued that these efforts should be a shared international
responsibility for all nations who have an interest in preserving the continued viability of the
orbital space global commons. Each area will be discussed in turn in the sections that follow.
2.4 Space Debris Mitigation
NASA defines space debris mitigation as “measures [that] can take the form of curtailing or
preventing the creation of new debris, designing satellites to withstand impacts by small debris,
and implementing operational procedures such as using orbital regimes with less debris, adopting
specific spacecraft attitudes, and even maneuvering to avoid collisions with debris.” Leading
from the front, NASA in 1995 was the first space agency in the world to issue a comprehensive
set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines. Two years later, the U.S. Government developed a set
of Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices based on the NASA guidelines.
In response to the global space environmental threat, in 1993 the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC) inter-governmental agency was formed with the specific aim of
coordinating international efforts to deal with Earth orbital debris. The IADC is comprised of 10
countries as well as ESA, IADC members today include: 1) Italy (ASI), 2) France (CNES), 3)
China (CNSA), 4) Canada (CSA), 5) Germany (DLR), 6) the European Space Agency (ESA), 7)
India (ISRO), 8) Japan (JAXA), 9) U.S. (NASA), 10) Ukraine (NSAU), 11) Russia
(ROSCOSMOS), 12) and England (UK Space Agency). Other countries in the IADC followed
NASA’s lead and created their own orbital debris mitigation guidelines. In 2002, after a multi-
year effort, the entire IADC adopted a consensus set of guidelines designed to mitigate the
growth of the orbital debris population.
In February 2007, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the United Nations'
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) completed a multi-year work plan
with the adoption of a consensus set of space debris mitigation guidelines very similar to the
IADC guidelines. The guidelines were accepted by the COPUOS in June 2007 and endorsed by
the United Nations in January 2008.
Manufacturers and operators of spacecraft and upper stages are generally aware of the hazards of
orbital debris and the need to mitigate their growth. Many global firms voluntarily adhere to
measures designed to limit the growth of orbital debris. The U.S. Government, NASA and the
Department of Defense (DoD) have also issued requirements governing the design and operation
of spacecraft and upper stages to mitigate the growth of the orbital debris population. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also consider orbital debris
issues in the licensing process for spacecraft under their auspices. While the U.S. was at the
forefront of these self-disciplining initiatives space faring nations have incorporated the same
standards voluntarily or as a function of the IDAC.
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2.5 Spacecraft Kinetic Protection
In acknowledgement that orbital debris will continue to pose a threat to the spacecraft
functionality, kinetic protection is generally being built into new spacecraft. Hypervelocity
impact measurements at NASA and other facilities worldwide are employed to assess the risk
presented by orbital debris to new spacecraft. New materials providing better protection such as
the “bumpers” can be integrated in designs with less weight penalty. Modeling and simulation as
well as hypervelocity impact testing data also help in the analysis and interpretation of impact
features on returned spacecraft surfaces. Clearly, physical protection can only be effective
against very small debris. Centimeter size fragments will devastate most spacecraft (see Figure
3), and fragments greater than 1 centimeter will threaten the habitability of the most heavily
protected spacecraft, namely the ISS. So, in the near-term protection represents a risk-accepting
band aid solution to the growing debris problem.
2.6 Controlled End of Life Satellite Disposal Practices
Part of NASA’s efforts focus specifically on reducing the number of large objects, such as non-
operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages orbiting the Earth. One method of post-
mission disposal is to allow the reentry of these spacecraft, either from natural orbital decay
(uncontrolled) or a deliberate controlled entry. Orbital decay can be accelerated artificially in
order to lower the perigee altitude of an eccentric orbit so that atmospheric drag will cause the
spacecraft to enter the earth’s atmosphere sooner. However, left to natural decay friction the
surviving debris impact footprint on Earth often cannot be guaranteed. To minimize
uncertainties, controlled entry is normally achieved by the burning of more propellant through a
larger propulsion system to cause the spacecraft to reenter the atmosphere at a steeper flight path
angle. The vehicle will then impact at a more precise latitude and longitude, and the debris
footprint can be positioned over an uninhabited region, generally into the oceans or other bodies
of water or onto sparsely populated regions like the Canadian Tundra, the Australian Outback, or
Siberia in the Russian Federation.
To minimize the chances of damage to other vehicles, designers of new vehicles or satellites are
frequently required to demonstrate that they can be safely disposed of at the end of their lives by
use of a controlled atmospheric reentry system or a boost into a graveyard orbit. In recognition
of the increasing number of objects in space, NASA has adopted guidelines and assessment
procedures to minimize the number of non-operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages
orbiting the Earth. One method of post-mission disposal is reentry of these spacecraft and upper
stage launch systems, either from orbital decay (uncontrolled entry) or with a controlled entry.
In order to preserve reentry options, launch and payload developers include reentry capabilities
in the designs and margins of new systems. Today these self termination capabilities include
sufficient fuel, larger propulsion, and system flexibility to insure that the means to fire engines
remain to achieve a lower altitude perigee. Once there repeated exposure to higher atmospheric
drag will accelerate the process of spacecraft reentry. Controlled entry normally occurs by
driving the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere at a steeper flight path angle. The object will then
enter at a more precise latitude and longitude, and the impact footprint will predictably occur in a
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nearly uninhabited region or in the ocean.
The so-called Spacecraft Cemetery is an area in the southern Pacific Ocean 3,900 km southeast
of Wellington, New Zealand where spacecraft such as the now defunct Mir Space Station and
waste-filled Progress cargo ships are and have been routinely deposited. While it is not the only
controlled reentry impact footprint, it has been chosen for its remoteness so as not to endanger or
harm human life.
Similarly, at an altitude approximately 300 km above GEO there exists a so-called GEO
“graveyard orbit.” Alternatively referred to as supersynchronous orbit, junk orbit, or disposal
orbit, it is an orbit significantly above GEO where many spacecraft are intentionally placed at the
end of their operational life. Graveyard orbit placement is a measure performed in order to lower
the probability of collisions with operational spacecraft which are tightly packed into GEO slots.
Otherwise the likelihood of collisions, failures and generation of new debris would be high. A
graveyard orbit is used when the delta-v required to perform a terrestrial de-orbit maneuver is too
high. Specifically, de-orbiting a GEO satellite requires a delta-v of about 1,500 m/s while re-
orbiting it to a graveyard orbit only requires about 11 m/s. One significant advantage of placing
defunct satellites in the GEO graveyard is that future salvage operations may be capable of
recycling and reusing old materials already preexistent on orbit. Considering the energy saved in
not needing to escape the Earth’s gravity well, salvaged materials will have significant value.
Figures 22-23. South Pacific Spacecraft Cemetery (L), and GEO Graveyard Orbit (R).
These space systems developer best practices of planning for termination will benefit future end
of life disposal. In the meantime, with many older systems and subsystems such capabilities
were not built in and those objects are subjected to uncontrolled decay rates and reentry
trajectories. Since the surviving debris impact footprint cannot be guaranteed to avoid inhabited
landmasses there can be risks to life and property. Fortunately, to date no instance of significant
damage or injury has been reported from an uncontrolled reentry.
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Space Debris Mitigation Conclusions
Considering the definition of space debris mitigation, the impact of ongoing international efforts
to curtail or prevent the creation of new debris will certainly bear fruits in the future. However,
new launch vehicles and satellites designed and operated to both minimize new debris creation
and withstand impacts by small debris will not help avoid collisions with or remove preexisting
debris. While debris mitigation measures can assume to be resourced by space faring members
of the IADC, removal cannot. This raises the issue of the limited membership of the IADC.
Non-member nations may not have had space faring ambitions when the IADC was first
convened, and may not even have active space programs today. Yet every nation shares a future
interest and stake in the space global commons. In this regard orbital and outer space are no
different than international terrestrial airspace and waters. In fact the orbital mechanics laws that
define operation in the domain lead to a ubiquitous and geographically non-specific shared
ownership of each and every region of the Earth orbital domain. Like Antarctica and the open
seas, all nations and peoples have rights and responsibilities in space even before they launch
indigenous space programs.
This presents an argument for opening up IADC membership to nations that aspire to found their
own formal space programs now or in the near future. At a minimum, potential aspirants might
include Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). Even before embarking on national space initiatives, space aspirants
could assist with currently unfunded and urgent near term aspects of the debris problem. For
example, a nation could resource the development and demonstration of enabling technologies in
support of orbital debris removal (ODR) (presented later in this paper). In addition to the global
prestige of developing such advancements in support of solving a vexing international threat,
such contributions could be exchanged for valuable space guarantees in the future.
For example, a space aspirant who develops an effective ODR capability could take the initiative
to clear particularly polluted LEO altitude regimes such as 800 km – 1,000 km or 1,400 km –
1,600 km. In exchange for cleaning those altitudes the contributing nation would be provided
U.N. enforceable rights to use the cleaned orbit that are at least proportional to the ODR
investment. This approach would over the longer term prove economical for the aspirant while
demonstrating a global commitment to interrupt the Kessler Syndrome in its infancy. Again, the
technological and international prestige gained for that space aspirant is immeasurable.
2.7 Space Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance
Global orbital space situation awareness (SSA) is a critical prerequisite to fully understanding
the advancing maturity of the Kessler Syndrome. Real time global SSA is also a critical
prerequisite for satellite and debris collision avoidance in all space systems operations. It is
intuitive that global SSA suggests a penetrating understanding of the three dimensional spherical
shell of Earth orbital space from the 100 km threshold of space to beyond GEO. However, SSA
also requires a precise understanding for the sake of planning and prediction. The ability to
precisely characterize our orbital space shell currently remains limited to a few nations. Those
nations are effectively limited to the U.S., Russia, and France, and to a lesser extent the ESA.
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The SSA data sets of nation states are neither synthesized nor available to the global community
at a degree of precision at which they were collected.
Figure 24. High resolution-accuracy data provided earlier leads to superior collision avoidance.
Lacking SSA synthesis and precision is due to the fact that the most capable SSA systems are
compartmented national security systems of the U.S., Russia, and France. In the end, the
development of a globally accessible SSA common operating picture so urgently needed for
collision avoidance in a high density debris environment is stymied. This lack of integration and
cooperation is unfortunate and does not help the IADC to address the issues of space debris and
exchange information on research activities to identify debris mitigation options. Guidelines are
under development, which will forbid the intentional explosion of satellites such as the Chinese
ASAT test, and state that precautions must be taken against accidental events that may produce
space debris. IDAC guidelines will also suggest that decommissioned satellites must be de-
orbited and destroyed in the atmosphere, if this is impossible. This is usually the case for
defunct satellites in GEO, and increasingly for newer systems in LEO and MEO. Still, even the
IADC cannot compel higher accuracy data to be provided by the U.S. or any other space
surveillance capable nations for collision prediction and avoidance.
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Figure 25. Accurate data leads to superior collision avoidance decisions.
The foundation of global SSA goes back to the birth of the space age, during which the first
man-made space objects began to be numbered and catalogued. Today there are nearly 20,000
large objects in our Earth orbital system that are tracked, but only about 700 are operational
satellites. The rest constitute large, trackable debris at least 10 centimeters in one dimension of
the sort discussed throughout this paper. For all space users it is important to know the location
of all working satellites so that information, commands and other data can be transferred
between them and ground stations effectively. By the same token it is important to know where
the dead satellites and larger debris are so that collisions with working systems can be avoided.
Since the beginning of the space age, there have only been a handful of collisions between
tracked items (see Figure 17), however the rate of collisions is increasing with time, as Kessler
predicted. Even though the probability of a collision between two objects larger than about 10
centimeter diameter remains low, manned systems such as the ISS are directed to execute
avoidance maneuvers if there is a 1 in 10,000 possibility of hitting another object. Just as
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important as mitigating new debris creation and ultimately removing it from orbit, so too is
awareness of the environment to avoid collisions given debris pollution. Accurate numbering
and cataloguing orbiting objects for accountability is critical in this regard.
At the visibility level of the IADC, each man-made object that is known to be tracked in space is
assigned a unique International Identification Number (IIN), also called the International
Designator. Today, the international designation now consists of three parts consisting of the
year of the launch, the number of the launch in that year and a letter or letters for each object
resulting from that launch. The payload is often assigned the letter A. Any subsidiary scientific
payloads in separate orbits will be labeled B, C, etc. and then inert components, for example, the
burnt out rocket casing, are designated D, E, etc. The letters I and O are not used, to avoid
confusion with numbers. If there are not sufficient letters to label every piece of debris resulting
from a particular launch – such as from an explosion in orbit - then double letters are used
starting with AA–AZ, followed by BA–BZ, and so on, until ZZ is reached. For example, the
Vanguard 1 which was launched in 1958 is the oldest artificial satellite still in orbit, and has the
IIN 1958-002B, while the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) which was launched from a Space
Shuttle in April 1990, has the IIN 1990-037B.
A space catalogue is another comprehensive list of man-made objects in space. A catalogue list
includes the type of object, its orbit, and where it originated so that even larger objects whose
origin cannot be determined are accounted for and tracked. Catalogues are clearly more useful
for nations than IINs. The IIN of an object is useful in building a catalogue, but just as an input.
Recall that any object in the international catalogue will only benefit from the currency and
accuracy that nations are willing to share. Catalogues are real time comprehensive pictures of
space objects defined to the resolution of the sensors owned by the organizations that populate
the catalogues. The space faring nations that consider space a national security and potential
warfighting domain have their own compartmented catalogues. The currency and accuracy of
those catalogues will naturally remain privy to the owning nation’s defense network. As noted
earlier, what is provided to the IDAC catalogue is dumbed down and incomplete. In order to
understand existing capabilities the capabilities and limitations of the world’s most robust SSA
systems are introduced below.
2.7.1 U.S. Space Situational Awareness Capabilities
The U.S. collects the most comprehensive and accurate measurements of near-Earth orbital
space. Debris characterization using ground-based radars and optical telescopes, space-based
telescopes, and analysis of selected spacecraft surfaces that are returned from space intact
contribute to U.S. SSA. The set of sensors used for these measurements are primarily owned and
operated by the Department of Defense (DoD). The sensor system of systems is known as the
U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The SSN will be described later. Some
platforms and systems are primarily dedicated to the debris characterization task. They include
specialized radars such as the Haystack, and examination of returned surfaces from the Solar
Max, the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), and the
now-retired Space Shuttle fleet. However, all of the systems that are owned and operated by the
U.S. DoD have as their primary mission the production of real time SSA for U.S. national
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security, severely restricting public data sharing.
Accordingly, U.S. national security space sensors capture the global debris picture. They permit
collision prediction and space traffic management that is superior to any other network in
existence. Yet, the high levels of object resolution, position accuracy, and orbital parameters are
not available to the public, commercial space entities, and much less the international
community. The data that is provided to users outside of the U.S. national security space
community is deliberately “dumbed down” to an inferior resolution and accuracy so that the
actual capabilities of U.S. systems are not compromised. While this is understandable from the
standpoint of protecting state secrets, it presents a vexing frustration for an international
community collectively threatened by the runaway proliferation of orbital debris.
2.7.1.1 U.S. Tracking and Monitoring of Launch Vehicles
Ideally, the tracking, identifying, and cataloguing of space debris should be an end-to-end life-
long object record that begins at the launch of a satellite into space and terminates with its
reentry or graveyard orbit storage. National security restrictions, deliberate events, and
unexpected accidents prevent and/or complicate this ideal degree of international debris
transparency. Nevertheless, many less sensitive commercial and scientific missions have utilized
cameras to track and monitor initial mission progress.
The now-retired Space Shuttle serves as a good example of superior initial tracking and
monitoring. Following the return-to-flight of the Space Shuttle in July 2005, the number of short
range tracking cameras based on the launch pad at the John F. Kennedy Space Centre in Florida
was increased to six. The images from those cameras were thoroughly examined after each
subsequent launch to ensure no damage occurred to the Shuttle. There were also separate
dedicated cameras for the top and bottom halves of the Shuttle and also for the hydrogen vent
arm above the external tank, the underside of the Shuttle’s left and right wings and also the area
between the external tank and the Shuttle. The short range cameras covered the launch from T-10
through to T + 57 seconds, after which the Shuttle was too far away for good quality images to
be produced. Seven medium range trackers were located outside of the launch pad and provided
data points for the calculation of the flight paths and also multiple views of the Shuttle during
launch, which were also examined later for possible damage. These cameras recorded everything
from T – 7 through to T + 110 seconds. Long range trackers recorded between T − 7 and T + 165
seconds and provided data points to track the Shuttle as it climbed into orbit. While the Shuttle
is retired, the best launch tracking practices continue to be followed in the U.S..
Following orbital insertion the depleted launch components of the Shuttle were designed to fall
back to Earth quickly. Once in orbit the Shuttle commenced to be tracked by the world-wide
NASA sensors and more significantly the distributed Space Surveillance Network (SSN) run by
the U.S. Air Force. This sensor hand-off is also done with all other U.S. satellites, and given
cues from other sensors also with SSN observations of foreign satellite launches. Conversely,
foreign surveillance systems such as those of Russia and France likewise track and monitor not
just their own launches but also those of others, such as the U.S. Unfortunately, the
27
comprehensive data sets available to select nations are not made available to the international
effort to track and monitor debris.
The methods used to track all objects orbiting the Earth, both manmade and natural, include
optical, radio, and radar techniques. For objects in LEO between about 200 and 2,000 kilometers
above the Earth radar is a useful method. At Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and out to and
including GEO at 35,880 kilometers altitude, optical telescope observations are able to detect
much smaller objects than radars, and so are the preferred ground to space sensors. For example,
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites fill a MEO constellation located at approximately
20,000 km altitude.
The sensors used by ground-based systems are categorized as either active or passive. Active
sensors, such as radar, send out energy and read the returned signal. Satellites or spacecraft that
include equipment that make them easily tracked by a specific method are called cooperative
objects. Dead satellites whose attitudes are no longer correct, and space debris are called non-
cooperative objects. Passive sensors are usually used to detect non-cooperative objects, although
if their geometry is suitable (10 cm today, <10 cm in the future) to reflect a signal, an active
radar sensor can still be used to track it so long as the object is in LEO. Passive sensors include
optical telescopes that detect the sunlight reflected from the satellite.
Due to non-periodic perturbations, orbits of satellites and space debris must be recalculated and
checked periodically. These perturbations result from gravitational variations of the moving 3
body Sun-Moon-Earth system and unpredictable changes in atmospheric drag due to
spontaneous ultraviolet light (UV) and particle flux from solar storm activity, and the effects of
high altitude winds on low altitude LEO orbits. To keep track of all that humankind has put into
space in real time, large portions of the sky must be observed in detail continuously. In fact, most
objects are tracked on a regular basis by at least one of the many systems around the world,
though single a high-granularity shared SSA picture for international use is still lacking.
2.7.1.2 U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network and Space Catalogue
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has maintained a database of satellite states since the
launch of Sputnik in 1957. As part of their space surveillance mission for the U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), the U.S. Air Force Space Command, located at the Space Control
Centre inside Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station in Colorado Springs, is responsible for
tracking all objects orbiting the Earth that are larger than 10 centimeters in any dimension.
Currently, the Air Force employs Very High Frequency (VHF) radar tracking systems in what is
known as the “Air Force Space Fence.” Higher resolution tracking is planned with Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) and other, shorter wavelength radar systems in the future. The Space Control
Center then monitors and updates the a space catalogue. A backup system, provided by the US
Naval Space Command, is called the Alternate Space Control Center, and is designed to continue
space surveillance if the Space Control Center were unable to function. The resulting catalogue
is still often referred to as the USSPACECOM Catalogue, or just the Space Catalogue. Data for
these objects is collected and updated continuously by the aforementioned Space Surveillance
Network (SSN). Two separate catalog databases are maintained under the U.S. Strategic
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Command (USSTRATCOM): a primary catalog created and maintained by the Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC), and an alternate catalog by the Naval Space Command (NSC). The number
of cataloged objects is over 20,000. Different astrodynamic theories are used by AFSPC to
maintain these catalogs in order to achieve a time-averaged optimal synthesis of the different
results.
The SSN is also known as the “SPACETRACK” Program. It consists of an integrated set of
dedicated, collateral, and contributing electro-optical, and passive and active radio frequency
(RF) sensors that are distributed worldwide. The SSN is dedicated to detecting, tracking,
cataloging and identifying artificial objects orbiting Earth. These include active and
inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and fragmentation debris. Space surveillance
accomplishes the following: 1) predict when and where a decaying space object will re-
enter the Earth's atmosphere; 2) prevent a returning space object, which to radar looks like a
missile, from triggering a false alarm in missile-attack warning sensors of the U.S. and other
countries; 3) chart the present position of space objects and plot their anticipated orbital paths; 4)
detect new man-made objects in space; 5) produce a running catalog of man-made space
objects; 6) determine which country owns a re-entering space object; and 7)
inform NASA whether or not objects may interfere with satellites and ISS orbits.
In developing, improving, and updating the Space Catalogue AFSPC employs the so-called
General Perturbations (GP) theory for analytical solutions of the satellite equations of motion.
The orbital elements and their associated partial derivatives are expressed as series expansions in
terms of the initial conditions of these differential equations. Today, assumptions must be made
to simplify these analytical theories. These include truncation of the Earth’s gravitational
potential to a few zonal harmonic terms. Also, the atmosphere is usually modeled as a static,
spherical density field that exponentially decays, not a faithful reflection of non-periodic
anomalies such as those caused by extreme solar activity. Third body influences and resonance
effects are partially modeled. Increased accuracy of GP theory will require significant
development efforts. NASA maintains civilian databases of GP orbital elements, also known as
NASA or North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) two-line elements (TLE).
The GP element sets are "mean" element sets that have specific periodic features removed to
enhance long-term prediction performance, and require special software to reconstruct the
compressed trajectory.
The current U.S. SSN has difficulty in cataloging some space objects in highly elliptical orbits
(HEO) and low-inclination orbits. Objects in HEO are difficult to detect because they spend a
large fraction of their time at very high altitudes, while objects in low-inclination orbits are more
difficult to detect because of the relative lack of U.S. ground-based sensors at or dedicated to low
latitudes. Also, while there are an estimated 600,000 objects larger than 1 cm (0.4 in) in orbit,
the SSN only actively tracks space objects which are 10 centimeters in diameter (softball size) or
larger. The SSN does not monitor every object continually, but does spot checks to ensure that
the objects are where they are expected to be. This is due to the limitations of the network in
terms of geographic distribution, capability and availability. Nevertheless, well over 100,000
observations are made each day. It should be emphasized that these limitations and peculiarities
do not represent deficiencies in the way the SSN performs its mission of maintaining an object
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catalog of relevance to U.S. national security. It does however highlight the fact that the U.S.
SSN, as the global state of the art in such networks, is not optimized to characterize the entire
global space debris population in support of an international environmental threat. What follows
are short descriptions of the various sensors and sensor sets that make up the U.S. SSN:
Figure 26. The SSN includes passive and active radar and optical sources distributed worldwide.
2.7.1.3 Optical Tracking of Satellites and Debris
Optical tracking is currently used by the SSN for tracking both space debris and satellites. It is
also used during the launch of space vehicles. In the U.S. optical tracking systems were first
developed in 1956 and fielded in 1958. This constituted a worldwide network of stations, whose
aim was to obtain enough accurate photographs of satellites to be able to determine highly
precise orbits. Special cameras, designed by James G. Baker and Joseph Nunn provided the
tracking information. The Baker Nunn system imaged satellites at an altitude ranging from
about 4,800 kilometers to 35,800 kilometers. The Baker Nunn system suffered from two major
drawbacks. First, as film was used as the detector, it had to be developed. This limited how
quickly the results were available. Second, in order to detect satellites personnel had to look for
streaks across the photograph as the film had to be scanned manually. This was time-consuming
and open to human error. As technology advanced, the Baker Nunn cameras have been replaced
by a new system known as the Ground based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance.
2.7.1.3.1 Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS)
GEODSS tracks objects in deep space, or from about 3,000 mi (4,800 km) out to beyond
GEO altitudes. Each GEODSS site has three telescopes each facing a different section of the
sky. Each telescope has a 40-inch (1.02 m) aperture and two special mirrors that form focused
30
images over a 2° field of view. In comparison, the full Moon is only about half a degree wide.
The visible wavelength telescope detectors are able to detect objects 10,000 times dimmer than
the human eye is capable of, down to a magnitude of about 16. GEODSS sensors can image
objects as small as a basketball located in a GEO. GEODSS is a vital part of the SSN, as it can
even detect Molniya satellites in HEO at apogee distances that even surpass the Moon (245,000
miles). Each GEODSS site tracks approximately 3,000 objects per night out of 9,900 object that
are regularly tracked and accounted for by the SSN.
There are three fixed-permanent GEODSS sites controlled from the U.S. Edwards Air Force
Base, California. They are located in Socorro, NM; Maui, HI; and Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean. A mobile telescope that contributes to the GEODSS system is located at Morón Air
Base, Spain. The GEODSS telescopes electro-optical sensors in that they employ low light level
TV digital cameras and a computer instead of film for digital, transferable images. Optics
sensitivity and sky background during daytime that masks satellites reflected light, dictate that
GEODSS sites operate at night. As with any ground-based optical system, full moons, cloud
cover, and local weather conditions directly influence its effectiveness. The telescopes scan the
sky at the same rate as the stars appear to move, thus keeping the stars in a fixed position in the
field of view. As the telescope is scanning, cameras take rapid snapshots. Computers then
overlay these images onto each other. As the stars have remained in the same position, they are
easily electronically erased, leaving only items moving with respect to the star background. This
includes man-made space objects, asteroids and comets, all of which appear as streaks across the
image. From measurements of the streaks, the orbits of the objects in space can be calculated.
The type of telescope is called a Ritchey–Chretien design and is also used for the Hubble Space
Telescope’s optical system.
Figures 27-29. GEODSS sites at Diego Garcia (L), Maui, HI (C), and Socorro, NM (R).
2.7.1.3.2 Space Based Surveillance System
The Space-Based Visible (SBV) sensor, an electro-optical camera that works in the visible light
band of the spectrum, provides useful data to the SSN. The SBV sensor can detect faint objects
near the sunlit limb of the Earth and also has the ability to scan large areas of the sky. Onboard
signal processing reduces the amount of data produced to a manageable size. SBV operates for
eight hours per day and gathers as many observations as the GEODSS ground based sites, and is
considerably more accurate than the GEODSS sensors. To replace the SBV sensor, the first of a
constellation of five satellites forming a Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) is currently
being built. SBSS will also be an integral component of the SSN. The constellation will operate
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in LEO but will look at objects up to a GEO using a visible-spectrum telescope. The SBSS aims
to survey an area of interest a few times a day as opposed to every few days with the current
SBV. Another program that was intended to compliment the SBSS was the Orbital Deep Space
Imager. It was to be a space telescope that would have produced high-resolution images of
objects in GEO; however, due to budget restraints an operational system is not currently being
developed.
Figures 30-32. SBSS artist rendition (L), in production (C), and notional operational system.
2.7.1.3.3 Air Force Maui Space Surveillance System
The Maui Space Surveillance System (MSSS) provides a satellite tracking capability using a
3.67-meter telescope known as the Advanced Electro-Optical System (AEOS). The MSSS is
also commonly referred to as the Air Force Maui Optical and Supercomputing (AMOS)
observatory. It is owned by the DoD, and is the U.S.’s largest optical telescope designed for
tracking space objects, . The MSSS is routinely involved in numerous observation programs in
support of the SSN. The MSSS also has the capability to project lasers into the atmosphere for
the purpose of characterizing a specific path in real time in order to adjust the adaptive optics of
the mirror aperture for optimization of imagery resolution. The MSSS is situated at the crest of
the dormant Haleakala volcano at an altitude of 3,058 meters. It is noteworthy that in the process
of accomplishing its primary mission to track and characterize man-made objects, the MSSS has
discovered a number of asteroids. Accordingly, through its primary mission for Air Force Space
Command, the MSSS has combined large-aperture tracking optics with visible and infrared
sensors to collect data on near Earth and deep-space objects.
The 75-ton AEOS telescope points and tracks accurately, yet is fast enough to track LEO
satellites, ballistic missiles, and selected debris. As noted, AEOS is equipped with an adaptive
optics system (AO), the heart of which is a 941-actuator deformable mirror that can change its
shape to remove the atmosphere's distorting effects. This permits scientists to get near
diffraction-limited images of space objects, including debris, by removing the effects of
scintillation from atmospheric turbulence. Other equipment at the MSSS site includes a 1.6-
meter telescope, two 1.2-meter telescopes on a common mount, a 0.8-meter beam
director/tracker, and a 0.6-meter laser beam director.
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Figures 33-34. Maui Space Surveillance System (MSSS) seen from above and from the side.
2.7.1.3.4 Starfire Optical Range
The Starfire Optical Range (SOR) is located at the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
on Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM. The primary mission of SOR is to research,
develop, and demonstrate optical wavefront control (i.e. AO) technologies that cancel the
distortions from atmospheric turbulence that interferes with laser beam integrity over long
distances. The range is a secure lab facility, and is a division of the Directed Energy
Directorate of AFRL. According to the Air Force, SOR's optical equipment includes a 3.5
meter telescope which along with MSSS is one of the U.S.’s largest telescopes. Like the Maui
MSSS, the SOR is equipped with adaptive optics designed for both its research mission and
satellite tracking, in fact SOR research improves MSSS’ performance. SOR also conducts
research into the use of lasers as a means for long-distance, high-bandwidth, free space
communications. Fidelity of the optical carrier in air-to-air laser connectivity is important for
data integrity. SOR also studies the effects of scintillation as it pertains to the development high
energy laser (HEL) weapons. The SOR is also an integral component of the SSN.
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Figures 35-36. Starfire Optical Range (SOR) seen from above (L) and from below (R).
2.7.1.3.5 Space Surveillance Telescope
The Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) program began as a Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) initiative to develop a ground based optical system for detection and
tracking of faint objects in space such as asteroids and orbital debris. It is also to be employed in
support of space defense missions. The program is designed to advance, or expand, space
situational awareness, and in this be able to quickly provide wide area search capability. The
large, curved focal surface array sensors of the SST are innovative designs that encompass
improvements in detection sensitivity, allow for a shorter focal length, a wider field of view, and
provide improvements in step-and-settle abilities. SST detects, tracks, and can discern small,
obscure objects, in deep space with a "wide field of view system." It is a single telescope with
dual abilities. First the telescope is sensitive enough to allow for detection, of small, dimly lit,
low reflectivity objects. Second it is capable of quickly searching the visible sky. This
combination is a difficult achievement in a single telescope design.
The SST is an F/1.0 aperture telescope with a 3.5 meter primary mirror like SOR’s that can
capture more light in a day than a conventional telescope can capture in a week. It is capable of
delivering wide-angle views of the Earth's firmament thanks to a curved, focal plane array/CCD.
Multiple searches can be conducted from the ground several times throughout the night. As a
telescope system, it can give precise locations of discovered objects, extrapolate the course of the
object, and indicate the objects stability, all crucial for SSN awareness. The telescope's primary
task will be to look for man-made space debris, microsatellites, meteors or other objects moving
at the same speed at which the Earth rotates, namely at GEO. The US Air Force has been
transitioning the capability and integrated the SST as a sensor set within the SSN. The system
developed its first images in early 2011, and the Air Force may place SSTs all over the world,
creating 360-degree surveillance coverage of GEO in order to keep U.S. spacecraft aware of
avoidable environmental hazards.
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Figures 37-38. DARPA Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) as rendition and operational.
2.7.1.4 Space Fence or US Air Force Fence
The Air Force Space Surveillance System (AFSSS) is an array of multistatic radar antennas
spread across the southern USA that is used as an interferometer to make precise measurements
of the path of satellites and other objects as they pass over the USA. It is the detection and
tracking foundation of the NSS. It is a VHF (30 - 300 MHz) Band capability to detect objects
down to 10 cm in LEO. An upgrade to the system is planned to replace the VHF transmitters
with S-Band (2 - 4 GHz) radar systems capable of detecting 5 cm to a range of 160–1,000 in
LEO. The S-band system will also allow faster revisit times and, as the radars themselves will
be distributed over a wider geographical area, it will also give a wider view of the sky, and
capable of detecting objects as small as 10 cm at altitudes up to 30,000 km. Today, the AFSSS
detects space objects originating from new launches, maneuvers of existing objects, breakups of
existing objects, natural objects such as meteorites and asteroids, and provides data to users from
its catalog of space objects. Orbital parameters of nearly 20,000 objects are currently maintained
in the catalog developed by the AFSSS, a critical resource which now has gained usage by
NASA, weather agencies, and even friendly foreign agencies.
The current VHF-based AFSSS includes 3 known transmitter sites. The master station is located
at at Lake Kickapoo, Texas, and two other transmitters are located at Gila River, Arizona and
Jordan Lake, Alabama. There are 6 known receiving stations, namely: San Diego, CA, Elephant
Butte, NM, Red River, AR, Silver Lake, MS, Hawkinsville, GA, and Tattnall, GA. The
receiving stations at Elephant Butte and Hawkinsville are considered to be "High Altitude"
stations with longer and more complex antenna systems that are designed to see targets at higher
altitudes than the other four receiving stations.
The future upgraded AFSSS will have S-Band radar stations spread out across the continental
U.S. at roughly the level of the 33rd parallel north, running from California to Georgia. As an S-
Band capability with ground-based transmitters and multiple receivers it is designed to perform
uncued detection, tracking and accurate measurement of smaller orbiting space objects.
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Figures 39-40. Legacy VHF fence transmitter (L), and future S-Band transmitter (R).
2.7.1.4.1 Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System PAVE PAWS
The United States Air Force Space Command Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array
Warning System (PAVE PAWS) is a system of ground-based ultra high frequency (UHF) phased
array radars that are located around the world. PAVE PAWS constitutes the heart of the U.S.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). The UHF band of PAVE-PAWs covers the
UHF radio frequency band from 300 megahertz to 3 gigahertz. Published site locations include
but are not necessarily limited to: Flyingdales, England; Beale AFB, CA, Cape Cod, MA,
Shemya Island, AK; Clear AFS, AK; Thule, Greenland; Cavalier AFB, ND; Eglin AFB, FL;
Robins AFB, GA; and perhaps other sites.
Traditionally, the primary mission of PAVE PAWS has been to detect and track sea-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) entering North
American air space, with a secondary mission to track satellites. Information received from the
PAVE PAWS radar systems pertaining to SLBM, ICBM, and satellite detection is forwarded to
the USSTRATCOM facilities at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Colorado. Beyond its early
warning mission and satellite tracking missions, PAVE PAWS now also serves as valuable
collection sources for the real-time refinement of the growing catalogue of detectable debris.
36
Figures 41-42. A PAVE PAWS site (L), and phased planer array beam steering principles (R).
2.7.1.4.2 Haystack Radar
The Millstone/Haystack complex is owned and operated by Lincoln Laboratories of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Millstone/Haystack is part of the Lincoln Space
Surveillance Complex (LSSC), which consists of four large-aperture high-power radars: 1) the
Millstone Hill Radar (MHR) L-Band, 2) the MHR UHF, 3) Haystack Long-Range Imaging
Radar (LRIR), and 4) the Haystack Auxiliary (HAX) Radar. The LSSC sensors are contributing
sensors to the SSN. MHR and Haystack LRIR are both located in Tyngsboro, Massachusetts.
MHR is a deep-space radar that contributes 80 hours of space surveillance per week to the SSN.
Haystack is a deep-space imaging X-Band radar that provides wideband SOI data to the SSN one
week out of every six.
Measurements of near-Earth orbital debris are accomplished by conducting ground-based and
space-based observations of the orbital debris environment. As components of the SSN,
the Haystack X-Band Radar radiates at 22-25 GHz, 35-50 GHz, and 85-115 GHz frequency
bands to capture RF imagery of object details at 1-10 cm resolution. The Haystack Radar
currently operates in the 9.5 GHz to 10.5 GHz frequency band, and is scheduled to be upgraded
to a millimeter-wave (MMW) radar that operates in the 92 GHz to 100 GHz frequency band.
The new radar will use innovative transmitter design and signal processing to achieve image
resolution that is about 10 times better than what is currently available. The existing 37 meter
(120 foot) antenna will be replaced by a new dish, accurate to 0.1 millimeter (0.004 inch) over its
entire surface, which is a factor of 3 better than at present. The new antenna will also permit the
Haystack radio-telescope to operate in the 150 GHz range or higher, making it a premier radio-
astronomy facility.
2.7.1.4.3 Globus II Radar
The Globus II is an AN/FPS-129 radar station located at in Vardø, Norway, near the Russian
border. The site is administrated by the Norwegian Intelligence Service and is used for: 1) to
conduct space surveillance; 2) to conduct surveillance of areas of national interest abroad; and 3)
to gather information of interest to research and development. The radar was made by Raytheon
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to collect intelligence data against ballistic missiles. It was relocated to Norway from
Vandenberg AFB, CA where it had been titled “HAVE STARE.” The radar, which uses a
mechanically steered 27-meter dish antenna, is believed to have similar capabilities to the newer
U.S. X-band radar used in the sea-based anti-ballistic missile system. When the radar was built
the Norwegians stated that it was going to be used to monitor objects in space such as satellites
and space debris. This information was to be added to the Space Catalogue orbital database
provided by the US Space Command.
Today, it is believed that Globus II has important roles in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system
and the maintenance of space situational awareness. Located near the Russian border it is highly
capable of monitoring and building a signature database of Russian missiles. In addition, Vardø
is well placed for the radar to collect precision data on the warheads and decoys carried by
possible Russian, future Iranian missiles fired toward the U.S. While the radar is administered
by the Norwegian Intelligence Service, it is believed to be integrated within the U.S. SSN.
2.7.1.4.4 Kwajalein Island
The Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, previously referred to as the Kwajalein
Missile Range, is a missile test range in the Pacific Ocean. It covers about 750,000 square miles
(1,900,000 km2) and includes rocket launch sites on multiple islands within Kwajalein
Atoll, Wake Island, and Aur Atoll. It primarily functions as a test facility for U.S. missile
defense and space research programs, and is under the command of the US Army Kwajalein
Atoll, or USAKA. The mission control center, along with most of the personnel and
infrastructure, is located at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The test site includes
various tracking radars, stationary and mobile telemetry, optical recording equipment and a
secure fiber optic data network via undersea cable. The Reagan Test Site also serves as a
tracking station for manned space flight and NASA research projects. Launch activities at the
test site include ballistic missile tests, ABM interception tests, meteorological sounding
rockets, and a commercial spaceport for SpaceX at Omelek Island. The data received by the
space capable sensors at Kwajalein Island can be used to augment the space situational
awareness of the SSN.
Figures 43-45. Haystack Radar (L), Globus II Radar (C), and Kwajalein Radar Facility (R).
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2.7.1.4.5 Sea-Based X-Band Radar
The Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) is a floating, self-propelled, mobile radar station designed
to operate in high winds and heavy seas. It is part of the U.S. DoD Ballistic Missile Defense
System. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar is mounted on a fifth generation Norwegian-designed,
Russian-built CS-50 semi-submersible twin-hulled oil-drilling platform. It is nominally based
at Adak Island in Alaska but can roam over the Pacific Ocean to detect incoming ballistic
missiles. The platform is part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system being
deployed by MDA. Being sea-based allows the platform(s) to be moved to areas where they are
needed for enhanced missile defense. The primary task of SBX will be discrimination and
identification of enemy warheads from decoys, followed by precision tracking of the identified
warheads. The platform has a central, large dome that encloses and protects a phased-array,
1,800 ton X-Band radar antenna. Operating in the 7.0 to 11.2 GHz range, X-Band radar is also
capable of contributing to SSA and the SSN mission by detecting, tracking, and cataloguing new
LEO space objects.
Figures 46-47. Sea Based X-Band radar during transport (L), and underway on own power (R).
2.7.1.5 Infrared Tracking
Infrared (IR) sensors can detect objects that emit heat. As space is cold, on average about –200
C, most objects in space are also cold. This limits ground and airborne terrestrial sensors that
look up at ballistic missile payloads, satellites, and space debris from below with cold space as a
background to the cold objects. At best terrestrial IR sensors are limited to applications that
track missile launches and track objects during re-entry. To overcome this limitation of
terrestrial IR sensors the U.S. and other major military powers have constellations of space-based
IR sensors that look down in an effort to contrast the cold space objects against the hot terrestrial
background. These U.S. space based IR sensors are inputs to the integrated space situational
awareness achieved by the SSN.
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The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is a consolidated system intended to meet
the U.S.'s infrared space surveillance needs through the first two to three decades of the 21st
century. The SBIRS program addresses critical national needs in the areas of BMEWS early
warning, missile defense, terrestrial battlespace characterization, and space situational
awareness. SBIRS will include satellites with IR sensors in GEO, IR sensors hosted on satellites
in HEO, and ground-based data processing and control that ties SBIRS into the SSN.
The SBIRS High will consist of four dedicated satellites operating in GEO, and sensors on two
host satellites operating in a HEO. SBIRS High will replace the Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellite constellation and was intended primarily to provide enhanced strategic and theater
ballistic missile warning capabilities. The SBIRS Low program was expected to consist of about
24 satellites in LEO. The primary purpose of SBIRS Low is the tracking of ballistic missiles and
discriminating between the warheads and other objects, such as decoys, that separate from the
missile bodies throughout the middle portion of their flights. Its effectiveness comes again from
the ability of those cold objects to be contrasted from above by SIBRS Low sensors against the
background of a warm earth. Interestingly, SIBRS High and Low are both optimal for detecting
and characterizing cold space debris.
Figures 48-49. Artistic renditions of SBIRS Low (L), and SIBRS High (R).
2.7.2 Russian Space Surveillance
The Russian Federation Space Surveillance System (SSS) is a space situational awareness
acquisition system that includes 10 radars operating in a combination of UHF, VHF, and C-Band
of 4 to 8 GHz. In a similar fashion as the U.S. SSN, the SSS integrates in multiple (12) optical
and electro-optical facilities. The SSS radars are used to track objects in lower orbits, while the
optical and electro-optical facilities are used only for tracking objects in higher orbits.
Additional sensors are occasionally included in the system for important tasks and experiments.
The lack of a worldwide network of sensors results in some major discontinuities in observation
and some regions in Earth orbital space where objects cannot be observed at all. Observations
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are also provided to the SSS by two Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD) radars in the
Moscow region near Sofrino and Chekhov operating at 400 MHz in the UHF Band.
Data from the sensors comes from approximately 50,000 observations daily to maintain a
catalogue of nearly 5,000 objects, most in LEO, that are transmitted to the Russian Space
Surveillance Center. There they are processed, and the Russian Space Catalogue is updated and
refined. This includes updates on object identification, orbital elements, setting plans for future
observations, determination of orbital lifetimes, and distribution of information to interested
space programs. Owing to geographical limitations similar to those in the U.S., Earth satellites
at low inclinations are difficult or impossible to track. As a whole, the SSS radar sensors appear
to be limited to a range of about 4,000 km, not unlike the U.S. VHF Fence.
Today, two sites appear to form the heart of the SSS in Russia, namely the Okno and Krona
complexes. By means of Okno and Krona Russia maintains a significant space surveillance
capability independent of its Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW) assets. These combined
radar and electro-optical (EO) systems facilities have performed various military and civil roles,
including an analysis of the surface impact point of the Mir Space Station and identification of
space debris. The performance of Okno and Krona systems guarantees the Russian space
surveillance network will play a valuable part to in both national defense and international space
exploitation.
2.7.2.1 Okna Facility
The Okno system is a fully automated optical tracking station used for the detection, tracking,
and identification of satellites. Optical telescopes scan the night sky, while computer systems
analyze the results and filter out the stars through analysis and comparison of velocities,
luminosities, and trajectories. Satellites are then tracked with orbital parameters being calculated
and logged. Okno can detect and track satellites orbiting the Earth at altitudes between 2,000
and 40,000 kilometers. This increased altitude capability over earlier space surveillance radar
systems was necessitated due to the U.S. fielding surveillance satellites operating in high GEO.
The Okno system is situated near Nurek, Tajikistan, approximately 50 km southeast of the
capital of Dushanbe. The main facility consists of ten telescopes covered by large clamshell
domes. The telescopes are divided into two stations, with the detection complex containing six
telescopes and the tracking station containing four. Each station features its own control center,
with a central command and control center, likely also housing the detection and tracking
computer systems, located in the center of the facility. Also present is an 11th, smaller dome
mounted atop a much smaller building. It is not known what function this additional facility
performs. It may contain guide-star-like atmospheric measuring equipment used to assess
atmospheric conditions before activation of the system, such as that employed by the U.S. at the
SOR and MSSS facilities.
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Figures 50-51. Satellite image of Okno complex (L), and four tracking telescopes (R)..
2.7.2.2 Krona Facility
Like Okna, the Krona system combines long-range radar and optical tracking system designed to
facilitate radar slew to EO cue. Rather than simply identifying objects as artificial satellites, the
Krona system seeks to categorize satellites by type. The system consists of three main
components: 1) a large S-Band phased-array radar for target identification; 2) a system of five X-
Band parabolic radar antennae for target classification; and 3) an EO system combining a
telescope with a laser system. The Krona system has a range of 3,200 kilometers and can detect
targets orbiting at a height of up to 40,000 kilometers. Development of the Krona system began
in 1974 when it was determined that current space-tracking systems were unable to accurately
identify the type of satellite being tracked. Target discrimination was an important component of
any ASAT program. Preliminary design work for the Krona complex, designated 45J6, was
completed in 1976. Installation of S and X-Band radar systems followed as did the EO/laser
complex (designated as 30J6) with separate housings for the optical telescope and the laser
system.
The X-Band radar system incorporated into the 20J6 system was designed in part to provide
telemetry data to direct the 30J6 optical/laser system. The laser system was designed to provide
target illumination for the optical system, which would capture images of target satellites at night
or in clear weather. Favorable atmospheric qualities were one factor in determining the location
of the Krona systems. Construction of the first Krona facility began in 1979 near Storozhevaya
in southwestern Russia.
It was initially planned to construct three Krona complexes. The second Krona complex would
have been located near the Okno complex in Tajikistan, with the third complex being located
near Nakhodka in the Russian Far East.
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Figures 52-53. Krona tracking station (L), and 30J6 complex at Krona-Storozhevaya (R).
2.7.3 French Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial
The French Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial (GRAVES) is a space situational
awareness radar employed by France for national security purposes. Known in English as the
Wide Network Suitable for Space Surveillance, GRAVES is designed to detect and characterize
satellites operating in LEO. GRAVES development began in early 1990, with its primary
purpose being to provide France an autonomous capacity for the detection and/or identification,
and cataloguing of satellites and objects like the U.S. Air Force SSN and Russian SSS, and to do
so independently of those foreign systems. GRAVES was commissioned in December 2005 and
to date is the only operational satellite monitoring system in Western Europe. Only Russia and
the United States have similarly capable systems.
The French acknowledge the need to maintain space situational awareness continuously and in
real time from a national security perspective. The French recognized the utility of the U.S.
radar space fence composed of widely separated receivers across a distance between them that
spans the length of the U.S., with the result being an electromagnetic curtain. GRAVES serves a
similar purpose, though with a different geometry.
The GRAVES radar can detect satellites passing over France at orbital altitudes below 1000 km.
In a similar concept to the U.S. PAVE PAWS phased array, GRAVES is a bistatic radar with
electronic scanning and continuous emission active interrogation. The receiving system
measures the Doppler shift of the return signals. Like the U.S. Space fence, the GRAVES
transmitter site is located remotely from the receiver site. The transmitter site is located on
the former Broyes les Pesmes Air Base near the village of Broye-Aubigney-Montseugny. The
receiver site is located on the Plateau d'Albion roughly 400 km from the transmitter. According
to the Federation of American Scientists, the transmitting antennas of the GRAVES radar is
VHF, operating at 143 MHz.
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Figures 54-56. GRAVES transmitter site (Top) and GRAVES receiver site (Bottom L and R).
2.7.4 European Space Agency
The European Space Agency (ESA) Space Debris Telescope is located at the Teide Observatory
on the island of Tenerife, Spain. The telescope is ESA's Optical Ground Station forming a part of
the Artemis Experiment. A large fraction of the telescope observation time is dedicated to space
debris surveys, in particular the observation of space debris in GEO and in GEO transfer orbits.
It was due to this dedicated task that the term ESA Space Debris Telescope became used very
frequently. Space debris surveys are carried out every month, centered, around the time of the
New Moon. The telescope is a Ritchey-Chrétien telescope with an aperture of 1 m and field of
view of 0.7 degrees, and equipped with a cryogenically cooled mosaic CCD-Camera of 4k x 4k
pixels. The detection threshold is between 19th and 21st magnitude, which corresponds to a
capability to detect space debris objects as small as 15 cm in GEO.
The partially ESA-funded Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) global network of observation stations
measure the round trip time of flight of ultrashort pulses of coherent light to satellites equipped
with retro-reflectors. This provides instantaneous range measurements of millimeter level
precision which can be accumulated to provide accurate measurement of orbits and a host of
important scientific data. SLR is the most accurate technique currently available to determine
the geocentric position of an Earth satellite. The SLR network is also able to measure variations
in the Earth’s gravity field over time. SLR can also monitor the response of the atmosphere to
seasonal variations in solar heating. Finally, SLR provides a unique capability for verification of
the predictions of the theory of General Relativity, such as the frame-dragging effect. SLR work
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is carried out at several global locations including Herstmonceux in East Sussex, UK, and
Wettzell, Germany. The ESA funds SLR missions and the U.S. DoD has incorporated data
obtained from this laser ranging into the development of their world surveying and measuring
systems.
Figures 57-58. SDT on Tenerife Island, Spain (L), and SLR facility at Wettzell, Bavaria (R).
2.8 Conclusions About Space Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance
In the 2010 report by the RAND report titled Confronting Space Debris - Strategies and
Warnings from Comparable Examples Including Deepwater Horizon quoted earlier in this paper,
RAND also observed:
[Governments] argue that the problem is not severe enough now, though, to move to
remediation, or actively removing debris, given the lack of government and private
interest (particularly funding) for remediation efforts despite their increasing utilization
of space. “If debris were deemed to represent an unacceptable risk to current or future
operations,” they write, “a remedy would already have been developed by the private
sector.”
A few decision makers in government and industry say that there is still no current business case
for cleaning up space debris, and the lack or infrequency of any serious or damaging collisions is
evidence that debris concerns are overblown. The RAND report continues:
The authors [of the RAND report], though, do provide some lessons for any future
remediation efforts, using the saga of the Deepwater Horizon—the oil rig that was
destroyed in the Gulf of Mexico in April, creating the largest oil spill in US history—as a
case study. The biggest lesson, they argue, is that any remediation technologies need to
be tested first in actual operating conditions, as many of the efforts tested on the
Deepwater Horizon spill failed because they had not been previously used in deep ocean
conditions. The event also demonstrated the need to have multiple approaches to solving
the problem, as no single approach can work all the time.
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The RAND report observations encourage an acceleration of debris clearing efforts to avoid the
pitfalls of reacting to a disastrous forcing function. The space domain is increasingly a global
domain, just as international waters permit unrestricted access. The sole early entrants were
Russia and the U.S., and both continue to have the preponderance of operational space systems,
laying claim to and filling up the best orbital altitudes. With a focus on maintaining national
security and commercial advantages in space, the best U.S. space situational awareness picture is
not shared internationally. The Russian SSS and French GRAVES are similarly compartmented
for reasons of security. So long as the global space situational awareness picture remains
disintegrated serious gaps of coverage and object awareness will grow.
As noted earlier, space situational awareness (SSA) is a critical prerequisite to understanding the
advancing maturity of the Kessler Syndrome. Without real time global SSA the risks of
collisions are going to increase exponentially, in correspondence with the exponential rise in
debris. Collisions must be accurately predicted and avoided to preserve current and future
orbital space systems. “Conjunctions” (orbital intersections of space objects) must be calculable
with precision. Some advocates are calling for more accurate data, and suggest that
USTRATCOM should make available the un-degraded SSA data calculated by the U.S. SSN to
the global space community rather than the relatively inaccurate NORAD TLEs of today. They
echo the RAND report that in denying the larger space community more accurate data we risk a
catastrophic event, and point to other parallels in recent history.
One tragedy is noteworthy, as the combination of a threatening increase in object density in
orbital space and inferior SSA data can be compared to the environment that contributed to the
1983 shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. KAL 007 was a civilian airliner that was
destroyed by Soviet interceptors on 1 September 1983, over the Sea of Japan. It was intercepted
after it strayed widely off of its planned New York City to Seoul, South Korea course, and into
the restricted airspace of the Soviet Union near Sakhalin Island around the time of a planned
Soviet missile test. All 269 passengers and crew aboard KAL 007 were killed, leading to one of
the tensest confrontations of the Cold War. The Global Positioning System (GPS) existed at that
time, but its use was restricted to the DoD. As one consequence of the KAL 007 incident, on 16
September 1983 President Ronald Reagan ordered the U.S. military to make the GPS available
free of charge for civilian use so that navigational errors like that of KAL 007 could be averted in
the future. Unfortunately, this came as a result of tragedy and ensuing public outrage, not U.S.
foresight.
National security restrictions are realities we must live with. Space faring nations who are also
military powers will not want to compromise their secret advantages in SSA in spite of the rising
debris threat. In actuality, as little information as the U.S. Air Force shares regarding its SSN
data collection and catalogue, it actually provides more information than other national security
establishments. In contrast, the U.S. provides timely precision warning to the ISS and
commercial satellites that the SSN tracks. Also, the USSTRATCOM provides the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) two line elements (TLE) to the public and
industry for general purposes. If in a coordinated effort the U.S. and perhaps the Russians could
agree, perhaps USSTRATCOM could reduce the error probability in published TLEs by some
percentage the Russians could do similarly with their SSS TLEs as an initial step towards better
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SSA.
Still, such efforts to change national policies require time and do not guarantee useful outcomes.
Since NORAD TLEs contain large probabilities of error that prevent potential U.S. adversaries
from knowing the true precision of the SSN SSA capabilities strong resistance to change is
assured, in spite of the change in context. This decision to provide the public erred TLEs was
considered a risk worth taking when the Earth orbital space regime was less populated and less
polluted with debris. Collisions were highly improbable so decision makers were satisfied that
the public was not placed at risk. Unfortunately, today orbital space is a much more crowded
and hazardous environment, and all users of space are badly in need of higher precision data to
avoid collisions. Therefore, two efforts must proceed concurrently. First, the value of better
SSA must be articulated. Second, space users must independently develop a work-around to get
more accurate data now as the increasing risk of collisions represents a clear and present danger.
As for value, insurers are currently mixed in their evaluation of debris as a threat that requires
higher operator premiums. Some insurers tend to charge more for that threat than other.
However, it is generally accepted that the threat is increasing. In the future insurers of spacecraft
might welcome reduced risk to the space asset they underwrite. Even more so, space systems
operators might welcome a reduction in the insurance premiums that they are charged. As
evidence, on 18 March 2011 at the Congressional Aerospace Policy Retreat a presentation titled
“Space Debris and Insurance” was briefed by Chris Kunstadter, the Senior Vice President of XL
Insurance. On a slide titled "Basic Space Insurance Market Metrics" he stated:
[There are] 30-40 insured launches per year (~50% of total) carrying 20-25 GEO
satellites and 15-30 LEO satellites. Insured values range up to $400 million (up to $700
million for Ariane dual launches), typically $100 million to $250 million. Annual
premium ranges from $750 to $950 million. Annual claims range from $100 million to
$1.8 billion. Currently 193 insured satellites [are] in orbit [for a] Total insured value of
$19.8 billion. GEO: 175 satellites = $18.5 billion (~50% of total). LEO: 18 satellites =
$1.3 billion (~5% of total). Hundreds more insured for third-party liability.
At the same time, the space team has determined that there may be a monetary cost that can be
assigned to degraded data, specifically the cost that operators incur from debris-related damage
and destruction over the course of the lifetime of representative space system constellations.
Again, as evidenced at the aforementioned Congressional Aerospace Policy Retreat, in another
presentation titled “Orbital Debris: Human Created Barriers to Space,” Aerospace Corp.
analyzed projections of the cost of debris on representative satellite constellations for a 30
timeframe. The analysis found:
[1] A small constellation (5 satellites) of government weather satellites with a lifetime of
about 6 years. [2] A medium-sized (20 satellites) constellation of commercial Earth
imaging satellites with a lifetime of about 9 years. [3] A large constellation (70 satellites)
of commercial communications satellites with a lifetime of about 12 years. Increase of
between $700M and $1.2B in constellation replenishment costs for these hypothetical
constellations.
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Another cost would seem to be incurred from operators responding conservatively to error-filled
data, and consequently making unnecessary spacecraft maneuvers in a dense object environment.
Each maneuver expends fuel and shortens the operational lifetime of the satellite. When
calculated over the lifetime of the satellite individual maneuvers can cost millions of dollars per
event, particularly for massive satellites that need to maneuver in GEO.
Conversely, more accurate data has an inversely proportional value. More accurate data leads to
lower probabilities of error in predicted missed distances and fuel and system lifetime are
conserved.
In addition to the monetary value of better data the space team has identified a normative, better
said altruistic value. There should be a shared incentive to avoid a catastrophic tragedy,
especially when it can be predicted in advance, and is not acted on. The BP oil spill and KAL
007 flight path deviation are examples that led to public forcing functions that forced changes
based on public outrage rather than foresight. As for space, the collision between Iridium and
Cosmos satellites was a taste of the expensive possibilities. Loss of GPS and certain GEO
systems would be even more costly, perhaps seriously upsetting terrestrial civil capabilities in the
process. Blackouts and transportation interruptions cannot be ruled out, much less loss of
internet, navigation and other communications capabilities. At the extreme end of the spectrum
is the possibility for loss of life in orbit or on Earth.
As for an independent work-around, a catastrophe of the sort described above has not yet
happened, and it would appear that the space community still has a chance to get in front of the
issue in a preventative fashion. The story of Differential GPS is instructive as it has similarities
with the TLE accuracy dilemma.
Differential GPS (DGPS) is an enhancement to GPS that provides improved location accuracy,
from the 15-meter nominal GPS accuracy up to about 10 cm. When GPS was first being put into
service, the U.S. military was concerned about the possibility of enemy forces using the globally
available GPS signals to guide their own weapon systems. To avoid this, the precision signal was
encrypted. The publicly available signal was deliberately degraded, just as the NORAD space
TLEs are degraded today. The degraded GPS public signal was known as "Selective Availability
(SA)," and was useless for any serious navigation purposes. It even proved dangerous when
during the Gulf War widespread use of civilian receivers by U.S. forces causing position errors
of up to 100 meters. SA threatened to bring greater harm to U.S. forces than if it were turned off.
Government enforcement of SA persisted into the 1990s, so users in need of high position
location data turned to the independently available DGPS work-around to great satisfaction, as it
had evolved into a more accurate capability than the encrypted military signal. DGPS was a
positive forcing function that helped lead to President Bill Clinton’s decision to turn the military
encryption and SA signal off permanently in 2000.
Independently, experts at the NASA Ames Research Center have studied the deficiencies of
publicly available TLE data and asked the following questions: 1) Can we calculate more
accurate a more accurate real time SSA using the degraded public data, and 2) Can we predict
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conjunctions using only public TLEs well enough to make practical collision avoidance / space
traffic management decisions? On 11 February 2010 Creon Levit and Will Marshall of the
NASA Ames Research Center coauthored a paper titled Improved Orbit Predictions Using Two-
Line Elements. In the paper Abstract the authors stated in part:
This paper addresses collision avoidance, by describing a method that contributes to
achieving a requisite increase in orbit prediction accuracy. Batch least-squares
differential correction is applied to the publicly available two-line element (TLE) catalog
of space objects. Using a high-precision numerical propagator, we t an orbit to state
vectors derived from successive TLEs. We then propagate the fitted orbit further forward
in time. These predictions are compared to precision ephemeris data derived from the
International Laser Ranging Service (ILRS) for several satellites, including objects in the
congested sun-synchronous orbital region. The method leads to a predicted range error
that increases at a typical rate of 100 meters per day, approximately a 10-fold
improvement over TLE's propagated with their associated analytic propagator (SGP4).
Corresponding improvements for debris trajectories could potentially provide initial
conjunction analysis sufficiently accurate for an operationally viable collision avoidance
system.
The authors go on to discuss additional optimization and the computational requirements for
applying all-on-all conjunction analysis to the entire current TLE catalog, and to future catalogue
entrants. The authors conclude by outlining a scheme for debris-debris collision avoidance that
may become practicable given these developments.
The scientists at NASA Ames have also conceived of complementary efforts that can assist in
refining the SSA common operating picture with existing sensor technologies. Creon Levit has
suggested that amateur space enthusiasts and research institutions can be incentivized to
purchase small VHF receivers that capture the Air Force fence radar returns continuously and
directly. The fence transmission frequencies are known, and in a form of crowd-sourcing those
distributed inputs can be synthesized in real time for increased accuracy. Just as millions of
personal computers have participated as netted, parallel contributors to massive research
problems by conducting calculations invisibly in the background, the same can be done for SSA.
These 24/7 received VHF returns can, via internet contribute to an ever-more refined space
object data base that is not under the control of USSTRATCOM. Space systems operators and
insurers might subsidize or provide small receivers for free due to the commercial value of
superior SSA. The space team predicts that space enthusiasts can be predicted to benefit from
the great normative satisfaction of contributing to the future of space. A company such as Radio
Shack might be willing to assist with distribution as provision of the cheap or no-cost receivers
would draw many customers to their stores. NASA Ames noted that the much touted but long
delayed S-Band upgrade to the Air Force Fence may be unnecessary as the products of the batch
least-squares differential corrections may be superior to the higher resolution promised by S-
Band. Here again is a one-for-one analogous repetition of the DGPS example described above.
Finally, Creon Levit has noted there should be a concurrent software development effort to keep
pace with the improvements via TLE differential corrections. The corrections are admittedly
computationally intensive, although the NASA Ames super-computing capacity to do such
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processing is more than able to handle the increased load. Nevertheless, improved software
would permit even more efficient use of the computational resources.
Other groups outside of the national security space communities have also taken the initiative to
provide better data for collision avoidance. For example, “What’s Up” is the title of a useful
website at http://www.satellitedebris.net/whatsup/. What’s Up is a visual data base for satellites
and debris that combines database information from the U.S. SPACETRACK catalog and the
UCS Satellite Database, and presents it visually in Google Earth. It allows the user to display the
location of individual objects or sets of objects (both active satellites and debris) around the
Earth, as well as showing the orbit and technical information about each object. The user can
also change the color of sets of objects to distinguish them in the display. The location and orbits
of each object are updated every morning from the SPACETRACK catalog and are downloaded
to the user’s computer. Another example is the Space Data Association (SDA), which has a
website at http://www.space-data.org/sda/. The SDA is a non-profit association that brings
together satellite operators who value controlled, reliable and efficient data-sharing critical to the
safety and integrity of the space environment and the RF spectrum. The SDA was founded by
Inmarsat, Intelsat and SES, three of the leading global satellite communications companies.
2.9 Gaps in Space Situational Awareness and Debris Removal Efforts
Estimates on the number of human-made and potentially damaging space debris and objects
currently in orbit range from 500,000 1 cm or greater in size to tens of millions of objects less
than 1 cm. All are potentially damaging to satellites, many with predictably catastrophic results.
In spite of the SSA systems such as SSN, SSS, and GRAVES the objects between 1 mm and 10
cm escape detection. Increased resolution over time will improve certainty, but for the time
being exact locations cannot be determined. Scientists are in agreement that the debris field
continues to be populated faster than the rate of debris reentry.
Resolution and SSA issues aside, the growing danger of collisions between massive detectable
objects is a call to action for orbital debris removal (ODR) of those objects. There is also a
consensus that a single collision between two satellites or large pieces of “space junk” will send
(and have recently sent) thousands of new pieces of debris spinning into orbit, each capable of
destroying further satellites. Some scientists have speculated that the threshold of a runaway
Kessler Syndrome has already been crossed in polar orbits where satellites converge, and that
exponential debris self-proliferation / growth is underway.
A further aggravation of the problem is lacking international accountability. The dominance of
“clean orbits” in LEO and MEO, especially by legacy space powers, suggests responsibility be
assigned to them for the ODR from polluted orbits, orbits that they were solely responsible for
polluting in the past. Today many of those LEO orbits between 800 km and 1,000 km and
between 1,400 km and 1,600 km are nearly unusable due to the higher risk of collisions.
Clearing and opening up the polluted orbits would permit current and pending new entrants to
space to plan and execute missions of interest to their nations. In addition to existing space
faring nations who would appreciate new clean orbits, cash rich new entrants could include, but
are certainly not limited to the United Arab Emirates, and Brazil and Saudi Arabia in the future.
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In the U.S. NASA already has a program dedicated to understanding and mitigating space debris.
However NASA cannot do it alone. At a minimum the U.S. (Air Force) Executive Agent for
Space in DoD should demonstrate accountability, and fund technologies and systems to
eliminate debris in unusable orbits, the pollution of which the U.S. is partially or fully
responsible. This DoD initiative should be taken in the spirit of the U.S. demonstrating
international responsibility and cooperation in space matters. On the other hand if the U.S. DoD
does not take the initiative, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China, and other cash rich nations might
unilaterally fund efforts to clean up those orbits on their own, and for their own benefit and use.
The Japanese have already begun such work with a “fishing net” based concept, to be discussed
later. There are other several viable commercial technologies for debris collection and removal
that only lack funding for full realization.
In 1976, when NASA scientists first identified the debris risk, they predicted that space collisions
would happen once a century. Four occurred over the next four decades. Today the agency
predicts four collisions every 20 years. Former NASA scientist Don Kessler, who discovered the
debris amplification process with former NORAD senior analyst John Gabbard, foresees a
catastrophic collision once every 20 years. Even NASA recognizes that its existing rule, namely
that objects must have the capability to push themselves (or be pushed) out of orbit within 30
years of launch, isn’t enough anymore. Earlier this year, it published a paper showing that it
could make low-Earth orbit safe by removing five objects per year.
To collect ideas on how to achieve this, last year NASA and DARPA, the DoD’s research arm,
gathered hundreds of engineers and scientists for the first-ever International Conference on
ODR. Nearly all the solutions discussed there rely on finding some way to de-orbit the debris so
it burns up in the atmosphere. The conference also revealed that international cooperation is the
greatest hurdle. There is, for example, no official consensus on what constitutes space debris.
One country’s seemingly dead satellite might just be hibernating for future use. Governments
were also concerned that debris-removal systems could have military uses, and not every country
provides details about what they have in orbit.
Concurrently, NASA stood up an Orbital Debris Program Office. The office located at
the Johnson Space Center which has been assigned as the lead NASA center for orbital
debris research. Since its formation the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has taken the
international lead in conducting measurements of the environment and in developing the
technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment.
Work at the center continues with developing an improved understanding of the orbital debris
environment and measures that can be taken to control its growth. As noted earlier NASA Ames
Research Center has also begun to make significant contributions to NASA’s efforts. Orbital
debris research at NASA is divided into several broad research efforts, involving modeling,
measurements, protection, mitigation, and reentry of orbital debris. Protection and reentry were
discussed earlier in this paper. What follows is a discussion of the various kinetic and
electromagnetic avoidance and removal concepts that have been developed by NASA or
presented to NASA to-date.
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2.9.1 Orbital Debris Removal Concepts
Amateur astronomers and space enthusiasts worldwide can also contribute to collision avoidance
efforts. Specifically, amateurs can contribute by filling gaps and independently making and
reporting objects and phenomena of potential interest. Amateur discoveries of comets and
asteroids are reported in the media fairly routinely. As for space debris there is a significant
opportunity for amateurs globally to contribute to the shared picture of orbital Earth. Space
enthusiasts worldwide can potentially be incentivized to search NASA space imagery archives or
the night sky in real time in order to make new discoveries, and/or confirm previous
observations. Naming debris and asteroid objects after the discoverers, paying discoverers for
new object discoveries, and even X-Prizes for technological designs that lead to the actual
mitigation of debris to clean up the most polluted orbits are all worthy of consideration.
2.9.1.1 Electrodynamic Tethers
Electrodynamic tethers (EDTs) are long conducting wires which can operate on electromagnetic
principles as generators by converting their kinetic energy to electrical energy, or alternatively
converting electrical energy to the kinetic energy in the form of a motor. Electric potential is
generated across a conductive tether by its motion through the Earth's magnetic field. As part of
a tether propulsion system, crafts can use long, strong conductors to change the orbits of
spacecraft. It is a simplified, very low-budget magnetic sail. It can be used either to accelerate or
brake an orbiting spacecraft. When direct current is pumped through the tether, it exerts
a Lorentz force against the magnetic field, and the tether accelerates the spacecraft.
A motional Electromotive Force (EMF) is generated across a tether element as it moves relative
to a magnetic field. It is assumed the tether system moves relative to Earth’s magnetic field.
Similarly, if current flows in the tether element, a force can be generated that is orthogonal to the
path of both the direct current path through the conductor and the lines of magnetic force that the
tether crosses. In self-powered mode, this EMF can be used by the tether system to drive the
current through the tether and other electrical loads, to emit electrons at the emitting end, or
collect electrons at the opposite. The self-powered mode will cause the perigee of the spacecraft
to be lowered in altitude as the velocity slows. There atmospheric drag will take over and
rapidly de-orbit the spacecraft. Conversely, if the system is in boost mode, on-board power
supplies must overcome this motional EMF to drive current in the opposite direction, thus
creating a force in the opposite direction. This will increase the velocity of the spacecraft and
over time drive the system to a higher orbital altitude.
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Figures 59-60. Electrodynamic tether boost and de-boost forces (L), and deorbiting tether (R).
There are several tether developers who have made proposals and even conducted successful
experiments in support of NASA. One commercial proposal is employed here as a
representative concept. It has been selected for its public domain availability, and its inclusion is
not intended to indicate a preference for one concept over another. On 10 February 2010,
Jerome Pearson, Eugene Levin, John Oldson, and Joseph Carroll of Star Technology and
Research, Inc. and Tether Applications made a presentation titled “ElectroDynamic Debris
Eliminator (EDDE) for Safe Space Operations” before the 13th Annual FAA/AIAA Commercial
Space Transportation Conference. The presentation focused on the EDT product. For the
purpose of discussion below, “EDDE” has been replaced with “EDT” for neutrality, yet to
demonstrate the general maturity of existing EDT concepts by showing what one proposer has
presented.
The presentation began with the illustration of all the man made debris mass orbiting earth, 99%
of the mass and 98% of the surface area of all those debris is still concentrated in a mere 2,465
objects, each having a mass of 2 kg or greater. This concentration represents the possibility to
clean up LEO in the near term, given effective technologies. If the removal of all 2,465 objects
over 2 kg from LEO, future collision-generated LEO debris can be accomplished, it would be
reduced by 99%, effectively preventing the Kessler Syndrome debris runaway / proliferation
from occurring. The ideal technology must focus on capturing the 2,465 objects of >2 kg mass
and cause each to be de-orbited in a controlled de-boost. EDT generally, and EDT specifically
were introduced as hopeful technologies.
In the process of orbital cleanup operations, the EDT must actively avoid all tracked satellites
and debris. The EDT vehicle must also enable targeted precision re-entry if that is required.
EDT vehicles could eliminate the threat of future collision-generated debris in LEO over a period
of 7 years. This could also include the start of a regular service that removes all newly launched
upper stages and failed satellites.
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The electromotive force (EMF) that is imposed on the tether that can drive the EDT to higher
and lower orbital altitudes, and amounts to “Propellantless Propulsion.” The principle has been
demonstrated in practice in orbit by NASA-JSC on JSC’s Plasma Motor Generator (PMG) flight.
Each EDT is only 100 kg, and stows into 24” by 24” by 12” volume. In fact two EDTs fit into
one ESPA secondary payload slot. Each net manager holds 100 50 gram mesh nets. When the
EDT passes the target at 2-3 meters per second it can capture the object in the net, while
damping out capture dynamics.
Figure 61. EDT boost and/or de-boost vehicle (courtesy: Star Inc.).
EDT can perform 100’s of kilometers per day in altitude changes, and over one degree per day in
orbital plane changes. As an incremental approach, a “Mini-EDT” demonstration could be
performed first as a proof of concept. This demo system could be launched as a piggy back
payload on any flight with 100-kg margin. Once in space it could capture and drag down an
inactive U.S. object. For example, a Pegasus Upper Stage could serve as the captured object. A
scaled-down mission-capable EDT could also be employed to demonstrate orbit transfer and
rendezvous capabilities, again using a Pegasus Upper Stage as the sample object in place of an
operational satellite.
EDT is also capable of removing debris to higher, non-interfering graveyard orbits for storage in
anticipation of future recycling in salvage operations. Alternatively, EDT can lower debris to a
330 km altitude orbit for rapid natural decay, and with a “smart drag” device a controlled reentry
could better guarantee a precision and safe impact on land or at sea. Release to targeted reentry
point could use the momentum exchange between the EDT and the debris object. This principle
was demonstrated by SEDS-1 by the U.S. and by YES-2 during a joint ESA and Russian
mission.
The EDT capability fits well with emerging concepts and plans for international space traffic
control EDT is the first of a new class of space vehicles that is designed to roam over and
throughout LEO like a Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) in controlled air space. It is designed to
cross satellite orbits while avoiding collision, based on real time space situational awareness and
coordinated flight plans for safe navigation. During typical debris removal operations EDT
would drag each captured object below the 330 km altitude of the ISS, thereby reducing its orbit
life to a few months. In fact each EDT vehicle could remove 40 tons per year from LEO, or 400
times its own mass per year. In the end all of the 2,465 objects over 2 kg (2166 metric tons total)
currently in LEO could be removed by 12 EDTs over a period of just 7 years.
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Figures 62. Errand satellite with de-boost / de-orbiting electrodynamic tether attached.
2.9.1.2 Combining Kinetic and Electromagnetic ODR
EDTs from Star Inc. and other manufacturers appear to be sufficiently mature to be integrated in
all new space vehicles or components that find themselves in orbital space. As for existing
debris, it is critical to note that the economical role of tethers is primarily in de-orbiting larger
pieces of space debris, including non-operational satellites. These objects currently number in
the low thousands and can be located and characterized with great precision so that robotic
systems could approach them and attach de-orbiting tethers. As for smaller, less massive objects
such as those in the size range of 1 – 10 cm, those objects are better suited for other ODR
techniques, most notably high energy lasers (HEL). Tethers and lasers are therefore completely
complementary technologies with respect to addressing the orbital debris challenges. Directed
energy (DE)-enabled ODR is discussed in the next section.
2.9.1.3 High Energy Lasers
DE engagement of debris provides an instantaneous capability to protect spacecraft and satellites
55
from destructive hypervelocity collisions with debris. In LEO debris is closing with spacecraft at
up to 10 km per second and poses the greatest threat to spacecraft today according to NASA.
There are several advantages to high energy laser (HEL = / > 1 kW average power) ODR and
collision avoidance techniques: 1) the momentum of laser beam photons imparted to the object at
the speed of light can be used to produce thrust on the debris directly. While this photon
pressure would be miniscule, it may be enough to nudge small debris into new orbits that do not
intersect those of working satellites, achieving collision avoidance. 2) another laser induced
cause of thrust can come from debris out-gassing when that object is thermally loaded during
prolonged exposure to a high average power laser; 3) finally, high energy pulse lasers are
capable of ablating the surface of the engaged debris causing momentary acceleration from high
velocity plasma jet forces.
One proposed concept that NASA has considered is the “Laser Broom.” The laser broom
concept is based on a powerful multi-megawatt ground-based HEL designed to ablate the front
surface off of debris and thereby produce a rocket-like thrust that slows the object. With a
frequently repeated application the debris will eventually decrease in altitude enough to become
subject to atmospheric drag. In the late 1990s, US Air Force worked on a ground-based laser
broom design under the name "Project Orion” as a means to remove fragments from 1 - 10 cm in
size is the laser broom, a proposed multi-megawatt land-based laser that could be used to target
fragments. When the laser light hits a fragment, one side of the fragment would ablate, creating a
thrust that would change the eccentricity of the remains of the fragment until it would re-enter
harmlessly. A laser broom is a proposed ground-based laser beam-powered propulsion system
whose purpose is to sweep space debris out of the path of other artificial satellites such as the
International Space Station. Lasers are designed to target debris between one and ten
centimeters in diameter. Even small-sized debris can cause considerable damage in extremely
high-speed collisions. The laser broom is intended to be used at high enough power to punch
through the atmosphere with enough remaining power to ablate material from the debris for
several minutes. Intensive laser energy would also would impart a small thrust to alter
the orbit of orbital debris, ostensibly dropping the perigee into the upper atmosphere, thereby
increasing drag so that the debris would eventually burn up on entry into the Earth atmosphere.
Recent NASA research (2011) indicates that firing a lower power HEL beam at a piece of space
junk could alter velocity by 1.0 mm per second. Keeping it up for a few hours per day could
alter its course by 200 m per day.
In 2011 scientists at NASA Ames Research Center proposed that lower power ground-based or
space-based HELs could also perturb orbits and nudge small debris to higher or lower altitudes
so they would de-orbit quicker, or avoid a predicted collision. Again, the NASA Ames concept
targets smaller space debris that are not suited physically or economically for removal by kinetic
means. The advantages of the lower power HEL its immunity from being classified as an anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapon and a lower likelihood of unintended damage to functional space
systems. The most promising laser concepts for ODR are discussed below:
2.9.1.3.1 Laser Orbital Debris Removal
In a 2 February 2002 presentation titled “Laser Orbital Debris Removal (LODR),” the President
of Photonic Associates discussed the Photonics LODR concept. The presentation noted that a
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LODR concept engineering validation study was funded by NASA in 1996. Based on that study
NASA concluded that: “The capability to remove essentially all dangerous orbital debris in the
targeted size range is not only feasible in the near term, but its costs are modest relative to the
likely costs to shield, repair or replace high-value spacecraft that could otherwise be lost due to
debris impacts for debris particles greater than about 1cm in size.” The study concluded that in
1996 dollars less than $200M was required to field a LODR system capable of clearing 80% of
LEO debris over a period of two years.
By employing LODR, target access is speed-of-light, multi-tasked, redundant and agile. Unlike
kinetic ODR concepts, new debris created by LODR are microscopic. The ablation depth per
pulse is a few monolayers, so the total mass removed is small, however with a jet velocity of
10.7 km/s. LODR also exhibits system multi-applicability, as it can address challenges in LEO,
MEO and GEO in the form of divert-to-protect applications. By causing the ablation jet to push
“back” or “up” on the object will cause the object to enter a lower perigee by slowing or
distorting the eccentricity of the orbit. The objective is to cause the object to be forced into a
lower perigee of 200km or less. For LEO objects this is typically achieved by adding a ∆V of -
150 m/s. By employing LODR many small objects in LEO can be forced to re-enter in one
pass. The ablation plume is normal to the heated surface of the debris, independent of laser
beam incidence angle. Also, targets at altitude are tumbling, and stationary objects will be
caused to spin by laser strike. However, the time-average plume thrust vector of a rotating target
over many shots of a 100 Hz pulse train favors the direction from which the laser beam arrived
over time.
LODR engagement is a three step process. In Step 1 SSN data provides sufficient cuing
information so that wide field-of-view (FOV), solar-illuminated survey instruments can optically
capture the object and establish ephemerii. In step 2 a precision, active day or night optical
tracker having a narrow FOV system takes over to allow range-gating & parallel processing.
The MSSS and SOR LIDAR capabilities are good representatives of this capability. In Step 3
the target debris is handed off to the LODR short pulse “pusher laser” for engagement multiple
close succession engagements (100 Hz typical). Post engagement measurements are then taken
using SLR and engagements are repeated on subsequent orbital passes as required until the
object has been satisfactorily “nudged” in such a way as to avoid an otherwise predicted
collision.
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Figure 63-64. Large beam director (L) projecting short pulse laser for surface ablation (R).
2.9.1.3.2 Free Electron Laser
In December 2009, R. Whitney & G. Neil of Thomas Jefferson Lab, S. Biedron and J. Noonan
Aargon National Lab, and J. Lewellen of the Naval Postgraduate School presented a concept for
orbital debris removal at the International Orbital Debris Removal Conference titled Directed
Energy –Orbital Debris Removal. The purpose of the presentation was to introduce the 100 kW
– MW class average power Free Electron Laser (FEL) as a candidate capability to rapidly clean
all LEO altitudes of orbital debris. Much of the following discussion is derived directly from the
referenced presentation. The use of a 100 kW – MW-class Free-Electron Laser (FEL) based
Directed Energy (DE) source for high energy laser Orbital Debris Removal (ODR) has many
general advantages which make it conducive to integration with short pulse LODR:
Figure 65. Free Electron Laser generates coherent light from undulating electron beam.
The most important FEL advantage is the tunability of a single FEL DE source in real time and
across an operationally significant band of the mid IR, near IR, visible light, and near ultraviolet
(UV) spectrums. Due to FEL tunability a single FEL source can be optimized in real-time for
maximum atmospheric transmissibility during debris engagements, based on local ground-to-
space propagation windows at the time of engagement. When combined with adaptive optics
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that compensate for atmospheric turbulence the high average power FEL provides the most
efficient means of transmitting laser energy to space in support of ODR. The FEL can also serve
to act as a guide star laser in support of a coaxial high energy short pulse laser, such as the
LODR in the previous discussion.
The FEL micro pulse train couples with debris more effectively. Another benefit of the FEL
over other laser sources is the unique optical beam structure. The FEL beam, as a function of the
unique manner in which the optical beam is generated, is composed of a long, yet variable train
of micro pulses having a pulse duration of approximately 500 to 1,000 femtoseconds at the
aperture at a rate of up to 75 MHz. During transmission to space those pulses will elongate to a
pulse duration of approximately one nanosecond each and upon arriving at the debris object will
be quasi-CW. In addition to exerting photon pressure, the FEL can thermally load the target,
cause propulsive out-gassing, and potentially vaporize the material. Together these FEL counter-
thrust generating effects will slow the velocity of debris.
The FEL design is free of these lasing medium thermal management issues, and the FEL can
therefore lase continuously, as necessary. The FEL optical resonator is a vacuum and has
significant advantages when compared to other all-electric alternatives. Solid State lasers must
dissipate accumulated heat efficiently if they are to achieve sustained short pulse operation
without suffering damage due to an unsuitable duty cycle. A cryoplant is required to cool
Helium for the operation of the linear accelerator (LINAC) that is integral to the FEL, however
this too is electricity powered. During operation the only cooling that is required is for the
resonator mirrors, to prevent their distortion. One can turn the FEL on and leave it lasing
indefinitely as long as the precision and endurance of the cooled resonator mirrors hold out - this
is why high average power FELs are suited to power beaming.
For these reasons the FEL and solid state LODR systems are ideally suited for integration into a
single, combined effects LODR that exhibits the best qualities of both. Two variations of high
average power FEL generation are pictured below, namely the recirculating oscillator and
amplifier designs.
Figure 66-67. FEL light generation using oscillator design (L), and amplifier design (R).
59
FEL technology today is mature, and now scalable from 10kW to 100kW for early
demonstrations and iterations of LODR. If power beaming is desired as a future additional
capability of a FEL-LODR site, FELs will have MW-class capabilities within a decade.
2.9.1.3.3 Combining LODR Short Pulse and High Average Power FEL in Single System
The proposed LODR short pulse ODR laser and the FEL high average power ODR laser are well
suited to complimentary integration within a single ground-based LODR system. The high peak
power short pulse system is better suited to the debris surface ablation/counter thrust capability
that has always been the touchstone of LODR. Likewise the FEL is perhaps better suited to
LIDAR imaging, longer dwell time for thermal loading and vaporization, guide-star operation,
ranging, and dual functionality for power beaming, perhaps for relay mirror-equipped high
altitude airships or for powering orbital robotic tugs during periods of darkness. Systems
integration would permit them both to be projected through the same large beam director
aperture. Both lasers and the selected optics can be optimized for the best ground to space
wavelength in the range of 265-nm to 4 μm. Together the two distinctive lasers could combine
their advantages cover the spectrum of ground to space applications is support of ODR.
Combined LODR systems could be located at relatively high elevations in Arizona, Hawaii,
Atacama Chile, Australia, the Mideast, and / or other suitable sites near the South and North
Poles to minimize atmospheric disturbances for the light. All LODR sites would be
internationally manned, and each engagement of sequence of engagements would be coordinated
through relevant national Laser Clearinghouses, most importantly those of Russia, China, and the
U.S. With respect to research and development, high average power FEL can leverage the U.S.
Navy investment in scaling up the average power capability of FEL. Likewise, short pulse
LODR can leverage the extensive funded short pulse R&D being conducted at the U.S.
Departments of Energy and Defense (DoE and DoD).
In support of LODR, another critical R&D effort that can be conducted concurrently is laser
effects experimentation. The DoE has exceptional user FEL user facilities at which FELs and
short pulse lasers could be experimented with side-by-side. Measurements related to LIDAR
performance, vapor thrust from out-gassing, jet thrust from surface ablation, glint,
melt/vaporization rates and other factors could be taken. Both laser types could engage
magnetically or electrostatically floating coupons that are representative of real debris floating in
vacuum.
60
Figure 68. Combining high average power FEL and high energy short pulse lasers in LODR.
2.9.1.3.4 NASA 10 kW Average Power Solid State Laser
On 10 August 2011 the GSP-11 Space Team received a presentation coauthored by NASA
employees Chris Henze, Will Marshall, James Mason, Jan Stupl, and Creon Levit of the Ames
Research Center. The title of the brief was “Space Debris Research Activities at NASA Ames
Research Center.” The brief began by asking what technique is most hopeful for slowing or
stopping the runaway Kessler phenomenon that may have already begun in polar orbits. The
brief questioned whether the publicly available Two Line Element (TLE) data is sufficient for
calculating the risk of collisions for practical global collision avoidance / space traffic
management. The brief concludes that kinetic mitigation means such as timely reentry and
removal of non-functional satellites to graveyard orbits is not enough in the near term. The
number of actual major collisions in 2011 follows an even more severe curve than the average
predicted by Kessler in 1978. Also, Active Debris Removal (ADR) by kinetic means such as
tethers, tugs, etc. did not appear to be economical, and conceptually failed to keep pace with the
rate of debris proliferation. The brief went on to look at remaining options to prevent a runaway
reaction that would make LEO unusable over time, and lasers were identified as a hopeful
solution.
61
The presenters looked at various ground, space, and airborne laser concepts that have been
proposed over the years. These included a ground-based high peak power LODR concept
discussed earlier, as well as a dual use function / mission for the Air Force’s Airborne Laser
(ABL). Both ABL and LODR systems were multi-megawatt continuous wave and pulse laser
designs. The objective of LODR is to achieve surface ablation and jetting, -∆V, and early
deorbiting. ABL sought target destruction through thermal loading and vaporization. Both were
found to be suboptimal when compared to an economical 10 kW industrial solid state laser (SSL)
combined with a modest 1 meter diameter beam director.
Figure 69-70. 10 kW SSL from IPG Photonics (L), & 1.5 meter beam director from L3 (R).
The presentation further observes: “Given high accuracy predictions, we may be able to use
medium power lasers to prevent the Kessler Syndrome by nudging objects to avoid collisions –
at much lower cost than ADR.” The success of the lower power alternative is dependent on
higher accuracy data. Better data on par with the accuracy currently only available to national
security space operators will permit future collisions to be predicted with greater accuracy.
Longer lead times that allow repeated engagements to nudge objects out of the path of other
objects to avoid potential collisions without the need for ADR.
NASA has concluded that given lower probability of error and longer lead times, modest
photonic pressure during engagements that apply approximately10 x solar constant for 20
minutes will be sufficient. There is no threshold intensity necessary for photonic pressure to
work, however a favorable area-to-mass ratio is crucial to practicality. In the end the NASA
Ames team recommended a 10 kW laser combined with a 1.5 meter beam director, one that
benefited from guide star corrected adaptive optics (AO). The ideal location for such a system
was determined to be Antarctica.
62
Figure 71. Architecture of an AO-aided, 10kW industrial SSL.
The space team concludes that the NASA Ames Research Center proposed laser debris nudging
capability is the best first step in demonstrating the operational utility of SSL LODR, and FEL
LODR, and combined LODR systems. Modest funding would enable the integration of a 10kW
industrial SSL with a small diameter director to study basic phenomenology of LODR. In
coordination with a major tracking site capable of LADAR can assist the small NASA prototype
in acquiring and engaging a representative piece of orbital debris. Subsequent orbital
measurements can determine the extent to which photonic pressure influenced the debris position
and behavior. Concurrently, one or a few inexpensive “cubesats” equipped with SLR retro-
reflectors and limited active telemetry can be developed and launched as piggy back payloads of
one or more scheduled LEO missions. This would permit a precise quantification of the effects
of photonic pressure, in an effort to demonstrate value for collision avoidance.
2.9.1.3.5 Proof of Effects Experimentation
Experimentation that involves the engagement of representative debris in a vacuum chamber
could be the first step in such an initial program. The Thomas Jefferson Lab FEL user facility in
Newport News, VA is ideally suited to conducting not only experiments related to the 10kW
NASA proposal, but also the SSL LODR and FEL testing, with the FEL serving as a surrogate
for all. In the lab, FEL sub-picosecond duration pulses can simulate the plasma jetting effects of
the high power LODR SSL. At the same time the FEL can with longer macro pulse
engagements represent itself with respect to thermal loading, out-gassing, and possible
vaporization of targeted debris. At lower power levels and the precise desired wavelength, the
FEL can simulate the quasi-CW power densities on target that NASA predicts with their
industrial SSL and small beam director. In order to achieve a representative target environment,
a small vacuum chamber can be tailored to include a capacity to suspend the “debris coupon”
magnetically or electrostatically to detect even miniscule accelerations one might anticipate in
LEO.
63
This experimentation could be done particularly cost-effectively if included in a single
comprehensive experimentation plan. Our organization could plan, coordinate, execute /
supervise, and analyze such experimentation given seed funding for that purpose.
2.9.1.4 Space Mist
Another promising idea that has been proposed is titled “Space Mist.” First proposed by
researchers at NASA’s Ames Research Center in 1990 and recently resurrected, the concept
proposes to use frozen mist to drag an object out of orbit. In practice, a rocket would launch a
tank filled with liquid gas, such as carbon dioxide. Thrusters would position the tank far ahead
of the targeted object though directly along the calculated path that object. Thousands of miles
forward of the debris, the tank would spray a cloud of frozen mist. The droplets would then slow
down and de-orbit anything they encounter such as the fast-approaching targeted object.
According to George Sarver, the idea’s originator at Ames, a spaceship emitting a 220-pound,
62-foot-diameter cloud of frozen mist could de-orbit dense objects such as steel nuts. Larger
clouds could stop less-dense items like insulation. Once the mist dissipates, nothing remains in
orbit along that orbital path. The tank would then fall back into the atmosphere and avoid
becoming or causing more debris by its very presence. , which means less clutter that could
otherwise create more debris. Creon Levit, the chief scientist for debris programs at Ames has
stated that NASA could test the concept within 18 months if it were funded.
64
Figure 72. NASA Ames Space Mist ODR concept proposal.
2.9.1.5 Robots
One type of robotic spacecraft that has been proposed is designed specifically to deorbit space
debris with lasers. These advanced systems could seek out debris that becomes evident when
sunlight reflect off of it. Alerted to the presence of the object, the “debris deorbiting” robotic
satellite would track the debris a low power laser. Once the debris comes within range, it would
be engaged by a second and more powerful laser that nudges the debris out of orbit so that it
burns up in the atmosphere.
Another robotic concept proposes a satellite fitted with robotic arms that can grab and release
debris, essentially tossing them earthwards, again in order to burn up in the atmosphere. Such
spacecraft would have the capability to remove multiple pieces of debris, and advocates say that
such a system could be tested in space within five years of receiving developmental funding.
65
2.9.1.6 Tether-Secured Nets
Space tugs could have an additional function of policing up debris in their space vicinity. These
tugs could be equipped with conventional chemical propulsion or all electric ion engines and
have remotely operated or fully autonomous arms equipped to grab, manipulate, and or propel
larger pieces of space debris. Specially-designed vehicles could intercept old rocket bodies, for
instance, and attach a propulsion system or so-called drag augmentation device onto the object.
The result would quicken the debris' descent to Earth. Alternatively, the tug vehicle could attach
a drag augmentation device to several objects moving at identical velocity in close proximity,
and perhaps a third. Once a reasonably sized set of objects have been lassoed together the tug
could drag them to a preferred orbit.
As an example, the aerospace company Tethers Unlimited proposes a system called Rustler (for
Round Up Space Trash Low Earth-orbit Remediation). Once launched into low-Earth orbit, the
satellite releases an EDT, a 1.5-mile-long cable that conducts electricity as discussed earlier. The
conductivity allows the tether to wrap a net around any piece of debris that it encounters, which
it then drags into the atmosphere where the object either falls into the ocean or burns up on
reentry. The net secures even small objects tumbling in space, a challenge for other systems.
Tether-based solutions have been tested by NASA, including a 1996 experiment with a 12.5-mile
cable in space. The Rustler system has been tested on a zero-G flight and could launch on a real
mission within five years of receiving funding.
In the plan, two teams plan to launch a satellite carrying a long, thin metal net known as an EDT
and attach the tether to a dead satellite (or other large space debris) using a robotic arm. Once the
EDT becomes charged with electricity while it orbits the Earth, it will create drag that pulls the
dead satellite down to the atmosphere where it will burn up on re-entry.
Figure 73-74. Laser (L) and EDT (R) equipped satellites dedicated to ODR.
66
A giant space debris net several kilometers in size has been proposed as a collaboration between
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and Nitto Seimo Co, a 100-year-old Japanese
maker of fishing nets in an effort to collect debris from orbital space. Nitto Seimo is a 100-year
old fishing net maker notable for inventing the world's first machine to make durable knotless
fishing nets in 1925 and capturing half of the fishing net market in Japan. It hopes its expertise in
catching fish will translate to catching space debris.
The Japanese plan will see a satellite attached to a thin metal net spanning several kilometers
launched into space. The net is then detached, and begins to orbit earth, sweeping up space waste
in its path and then pulling them down to Earth. After catching the debris for several weeks, the
scientists back down on Earth will activate the electrical charge of the net which will have the
net move towards Earth due to the planet’s magnetic fields attraction of the electrified net.
Both the net and its catch will then burn up in the atmosphere. It is likely the nets will target the
orbital paths of space shuttles which are constantly monitored for debris. By remaining in orbit
collecting rubbish for several weeks the trip will become financially worthwhile, before sending
another net into space.
Inspired by a basic fishing net concept, the super-strong space nets have been the subject of
extensive research by Nitto Seimo for the past six years and consist of three layered metal
threads, each measuring 1mm diameter and intertwined with fibres as thin as human hair. Nitto
Seimo started development of the net in 2005 and has created a usable tether material composed
of three layers of metal threads, each layer measuring 1 millimeter in diameter, combined with
very thin fibers.
Figures 75-76. JAXA (L), teamrd with Nitto Seimo Co. co-developed debris capturing net (R).
2.9.1.7 Solar Sails
The sun’s radiation can be harnessed to exert photon-induced force on solar sails composed of
ultra-thin fabric material that is cheap and portable. The photonic pressure of solar light acts on
the solar sail much like wind propels a sailboat. These sails can clean up orbit by slowing debris
enough that it de-orbits. For example, an expandable 97-square-foot sail can be launched as a
secondary payload on even a small 110-pound satellite, and an onboard system or ground control
triggers its deployment. Conductive coils embbeded in the sail control its angle of incidence to
67
the sun so that it can maneuver a satellite so as to force it to deorbit. The sail and the satellite
would disintegrate together in the atmosphere. Solar sail technology is mature and has existed
for decades. This includes sail-equipped spacecraft in the mid-1970s that was intended to ride
along with Halley’s Comet; however the spacecraft was never launched. Another example
involves the large solar arrays that are currently affixed to the Messenger spacecraft, which are
helping steer the spacecraft to the planet Mercury. Most recently, JAXA launched a solar-sail-
propelled “space yacht” called Ikaros. But the solar sails precisely controllable enough to remove
debris are still years away.
2.9.1.8 Orbital Spheres
Adhesive Synthetic Trash Recovery Orbital Spheres, or “ASTROS” are essentially large sticky
balls/shells or “space flypaper.” The balls consist of a layer of metallic foam (such as silicon
carbide) and an outer shell of adhesive (such as aerogels or resins). They attach themselves to
debris and once a mass of debris has been collected, then deorbit into the atmosphere where both
are incinerated. The large shells would spanning a mile (1.6 km) in diameter. As small particles
pass through the foam-like contents of the internal volume of the ball they would lose energy.
Those that pass through would lose velocity and reenter the Earth’s atmosphere more rapidly.
The debris that does not pass through the ball completely would likely adhere to it internally or
externally. Since the ball itself would lose velocity over time due to its lightweight relative to its
large LEO cross-section, and the countless energy-depleting impacts with counter-orbiting
debris, it too would reenter the atmosphere fairly quickly, dragging with it captured debris that it
had not already deorbited. Another version of this is a similarly sized “NERF Ball” that would
deflect debris entirely thereby absorbing their energy, slow their velocities, thereby lowering
their perigees to increase atmospheric drag for quick reentry.
Figures 77-78. Solar sail propulsion for ODR (L), and adhesive shells dragging debris (R).
68
2.10 Potential Orbital Debris Removal X-Prize
The X Prize Foundation addresses the world’s Grand Challenges by creating and managing
large-scale, high-profile, incentivized prize competitions that stimulate investment in research
and development worth far more than the prize itself. It motivates and inspires brilliant
innovators from all disciplines to leverage their intellectual and financial capital. On the X Prize
Foundation website at http://xprize.org/about/who-we-are under “concepts under consideration,”
“Orbital Debris Removal” is discussed as a potential candidate prize:
Millions of pieces of debris are currently orbiting Earth at altitudes that pose a danger to
satellites and human spacecraft. The threat from such debris is predicted to rise 50% in
the coming decade and quadruple in the next 50 years. Large object collisions are
particularly dangerous, due to the ensuing creation of additional debris. Teams competing
in the Orbital Debris competition must select a target piece of orbital debris and either de-
orbit the debris or move the debris in a predicted and accurate fashion to a new orbit
deemed non-threatening by a panel of expert judges. The first team to complete this task
will be determined the winner.
The Space Team believes that if the urgency of the space debris can be communicated to a large
public and private audience in the near term, that the X Prize Foundation will make a decision to
activate the Orbital Space Debris prize by announcing and funding it.
69
Chapter 3:
The Proposed Sustainable Organization
3.1 The Space Team concludes that in the near term organization dedicated to removing debris
from Earth orbit in order to preserve the viability of orbital space is sustainable. Our
organization’s expertise centers on research, technology analysis, project management, and
government-industry coordination. The team constitutes a first iteration with the potential to
evolve later.
3.2 The team believes that space systems insurers and operators will identify a value in lowering
the risks of debris collisions with the systems they operate and insure and pay for our services in
helping to get it done. Insurers and operators will pay for our research, down-selection analysis,
project management, and coordination services in support of ODR technology development and
demonstration.
3.3 The team also believes that cash rich non-space faring nations will identify a value in
increased influence over space related high technology development and playing a larger role in
the future of space. Nations such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil might therefore pay for
our organization’s services in facilitating their full inclusion in United Nations space bodies such
as the IADC. The team likewise believes those same wealthy nations will fund industry to
support the development and demonstration of ODR capabilities, as a global contribution that
garners high technology access and national prestige.
3.4 The space team concludes that the NASA Ames Research Center proposed laser debris
nudging capability is the best first step in demonstrating the operational utility of SSL LODR,
and FEL LODR, and combined LODR systems. Modest funding would enable the integration of
a 10kW industrial SSL with a small diameter director to study basic phenomenology of LODR.
In coordination with a major tracking site capable of LIDAR and SLR, such as MSSS (AMOS)
or ESA SLR, NASA Ames can prototype acquisition and engagement of orbital debris.
Concurrently, one or a few inexpensive “cubesats” equipped with SLR retro-reflectors and
specialized active telemetry developed at Ames can be launched as piggy back payloads on one
or more scheduled LEO missions so that the precise quantification of the effects of photonic
pressure and be observed in an effort to demonstrate value for collision avoidance.
3.5 Experimentation that involves the engagement of representative debris in a vacuum chamber
could be the first step in such an initial program. The Thomas Jefferson Lab FEL user facility in
Newport News, VA is ideally suited to conducting not only experiments related to the 10kW
NASA proposal, but also the higher power SSL LODR and FEL testing, with the FEL serving as
a surrogate for all. In order to achieve a representative target environment, a small vacuum
chamber can be tailored to include a capacity to suspend the “debris coupon” magnetically or
electrostatically to detect even miniscule accelerations one might anticipate in LEO. This
experimentation could be done particularly cost-effectively if included in a single comprehensive
experimentation plan. Our organization could plan, coordinate, execute / supervise, and analyze
experimentation given seed funding as a first funded task.
70
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Figure 55. http://www.thelivingmoon.com/45jack_files/03files/GRAVES.html
Figure 56. http://www.thelivingmoon.com/45jack_files/03files/GRAVES.html
Figure 57. http://lfvn.astronomer.ru/report/0000048/004/index.htm
Figure 58. http://www.qwiki.com/q/?_escaped_fragment_=/Satellite_laser_ranging
Figure 59. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Fig12_Tether_System.PNG
Figure 60. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_tether
Figure 61. Star Inc. presentation
Figure 62. http://www.popsci.com/node/22487
Figure 63. Claude Phipps - Laser Role in Planetary Defense
Figure 64. Space Team Short Pulse (internet image background no reference available)
Figure 65. http://www.ar15.com/forums/t_1_5/1152415_.html
Figure 66. http://www.4gls.ac.uk/ERLP.htm
Figure 67. http://www.lanl.gov/science/1663/june2010/story4b.shtml
Figure 68. http://www.geekwithlaptop.com/tag/nasa-laser-debris
Figure 69. Henze, Marshall, Mason, Stupl, Levit - Ames Space Debris Research
Figure 70. Henze, Marshall, Mason, Stupl, Levit - Ames Space Debris Research
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Figure 71. Henze, Marshall, Mason, Stupl, Levit - Ames Space Debris Research
Figure 72. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 73. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 74. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 75. http://space.azzopardi.info/
Figure 76. http://www.yahind.com/fishing-net-to-collect-debris-from-space_18104.html
Figure 77. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 78. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Space Team Project Final Technical Report
Removing Orbital Debris:
A Global Space Challenge
Technical Report Authored By:
Lucy Rogers and Franz Gayl
Space Team Member Roster:
Lucy Rogers, Eric Chiang, Yasemin Baydaroglu, and Franz Gayl
Team Project Advisors:
Yvonne Cagle, Marco Chacin, and Mona Hammoudeh
Singularity University
Graduate Studies Program 2011
2
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Chapter 1: Introduction, Purpose, and Background
Chapter 2: Space Debris: An Exponentially Growing Threat
Chapter 3: The Proposed Sustainable Organization
Bibliography
3
Executive Summary
Satellites are in danger from catastrophic impact by space debris. This means that
infrastructure critical to modern society is under threat – from power and water supplies, to
military security and global navigation, from the conduct of global communications to
commerce. This could affect billions of people.
The rate of increase in debris is exponential, and left unaddressed, will lead to a runaway
debris proliferation phenomena known as the “Kessler Syndrome.” The resulting density of
debris will threaten all space activities.
Improved tracking and prediction of the path of debris can be enhanced through shared,
accurate, and real time global space situational awareness. However, national security and
military concerns of major space faring powers currently limits this ability.
Mature NASA and industry orbital debris removal concepts, such as tethers and lasers
remain underfunded and mainly untested.
The aim of the Project is to develop a sustainable capability to develop and test
technology, and to ultimately remove all dangerous debris from Earth orbital space by using
mitigation, collision avoidance and debris removal techniques.
We are looking to found an international organization dedicated to addressing threats to
spacecraft, satellites and to the Earth, such as from space debris and asteroids. We will do this by
influencing governments, businesses, and the public to seek and achieve better space situational
awareness. We will also work with those space stakeholders to improve mitigation and removal
capabilities to improve the space environment upon which we have all come to depend. We will
use practical experience, new technologies, knowledge and credibility to create long-term
solutions for the Earth’s space environment and keeping corridors to Earth orbital space open.
The potential stakeholders include space systems insurers and operators, but may also
include cash rich countries that value involvement with cutting edge technologies and have the
desire to help solve environmental issues, and also other countries who may wish to become
space farers.
We are uniquely placed to form this organization, as we are completely objective, with no
national or industrial agenda. We are an international team, with experience in the private and
public space industries, the military, and larger research communities.
4
Chapter 1:
Introduction, Purpose, and Background
1. Introduction
The Singularity University Graduate Studies Program of 2011 (SU GSP-11) Space Team
selected a topic that met the following SU criteria: 1) the team project must employ exponential
technologies and be dependent on them for success; 2) the product resulting from the team effort
must benefit a billion people over a time span of ten years; 3) the selected topic must fit within
the category of one of the SU’s six Grand Challenge problem areas, namely space, poverty,
energy, global health, security or energy; 4) the team product must exhibit scalable and
sustainable economics commensurate with the exponentially growing challenge it addresses; and
5) the topic must present a compelling business case founded on a competitive concept of
operations. Following discussion the Space Team proposed a research-founded product focused
on solving the dilemma of Earth orbital space debris. The project was found to meet the
requisite criteria and approved by the SU faculty and staff.
The team evolved into two subsections. One section was focused on the physical quantification
of, and technological solutions to the growing problem of orbital space debris. The other section
was focused on policy-related issues that impact space generally, and space debris specifically.
The findings of the non-technical and policy-related Space Team section composed of Eric
Chiang and Yasemin Baydaroglu was published in a separate document. What follows in this
document is a report of the technical research findings and conclusions of Lucy Rogers and
Franz Gayl who formed the technical section of the Space Team.
2. Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to define the specific ideas that the GSP-11 Space Team has
developed in support of the debris related Space Team Project (TP). The title of the GSP-11 TP
research proposal is “Orbital Debris: A Global Space Challenge.” The objective of the Space
Team coming out of GSP-11 is to launch a sustainable organization dedicated to making orbital
space safe for all of humankind. This technology-intensive effort begins with a specific focus on
mitigating and solving the growing threat from orbital debris.
3. Background
In his article titled Overview of the legal and policy challenges of orbital debris removal [tt]
published in the February 2011 edition of Space Policy, author Brian Weeden states:
Since the launch of the first satellite in 1957 humans have been placing an increasing
number of objects in orbit around the Earth. This trend has accelerated in recent years
thanks to the increase in number of states which have the capability to launch satellites
and the recognition of the many socioeconomic and national security benefits that can be
derived from space. There are currently close to 1000 active satellites on orbit, operated
by dozens of state and international organizations. More importantly, each satellite that is
placed into orbit is accompanied by one or more pieces of non-functional objects, known
5
as space debris. More than 20,000 pieces of space debris larger than 10 cm are regularly
tracked in Earth orbit, and scientific research shows that there are roughly 500,000
additional pieces between 1 and 10 cm in size that are not regularly tracked. Although
the average amount of space debris per cubic kilometer is small, it is concentrated in the
regions of Earth orbit that are most heavily utilized...and thus poses a significant hazard
to operational spacecraft.
The sobering statistics documented by Weeden and many others prompted the GSP-11 Space
Team to take a closer look at the orbital space debris threat. Sharing an enthusiasm and
professional backgrounds related to space, the team members united around a sense of mission to
solve the problem rather than a business case. The urgency of taking action to preserve the
freedom to operate in and transport through Earth orbital space was clear to all members.
Even in the absence of debris, humankind’s dependence on the Earth orbital space extends to
military security of nations, position, navigation, and timing (PNT), and the conduct of global
communications and commerce. Satellite-enabled capabilities expose their vulnerability, as they
constitute critical infrastructure for modern societies. Humankind’s dependency leads to a
bottleneck as nations compete for limited orbital real estate. If unanticipated problems, man-
made or natural, threaten key satellite constellation enabled capabilities such as PNT, serious
civil and social disruptions can be predicted. Preserving the conditions that permit space
dependency represents a benefit that extends to all humankind. Unfortunately, we continue to
pollute the orbital space environment and threaten to initiate a devastating uncontrolled runaway
proliferation of debris creation. Author Brian Weeden continues [tt]:
In the late 1970s, two influential NASA scientists, Burt Cour-Palais and Donald Kessler,
laid the scientific groundwork for what became to be known as the “Kessler Syndrome.”
They predicted that at some point in the future the population of artificial space debris
would hit a critical point where it grew at a rate faster than the rate at which debris is
removed from orbit through natural decay into the Earth’s atmosphere. According to their
models, large pieces of space debris would get hit by smaller pieces of debris, creating
hundreds or thousands of new pieces of small debris which could then collide with other
large pieces. This “collisional cascading” process would increase the population of space
debris at an exponential rate and significantly increase the risks and costs of operating in
space.
Efforts at mitigation through better launch vehicle and satellite design and operations have
proven successful. But accidents still happen and debris growth outpaces natural reentry. Also,
efforts at better characterizing the environment through shared, accurate, and real time global
space situational awareness (SSA) are stymied by national security concerns of major military
powers. Finally, mature orbital debris removal (ODR) concepts remain dormant. Security
parochialism and resource scarcity invite a catastrophe that will force the world into action.
With this confirmation of Space Team concern in the background the GSP-11 Space Team
researched: 1) if nations aspiring to go to space in the future should be invited to join space
faring nations earlier in resolving orbital debris; 2) can more accurate SSA data be obtained from
the U.S., Russia, and France for better global collision avoidance; and 3) what ODR technologies
6
are most hopeful in the near term to prevent the Kessler Syndrome. The best vehicle for sharing
team conclusions and recommendations was determined to be the inclusion of this report as an
additional chapter in the Space Transportation Technology Roadmap, since New Space and
space tourism would greatly benefit from orbital debris reduction and elimination.
7
Chapter 2:
Space Debris: An Exponentially Growing Threat
Chapter 3 is organized into three sections. In the first the Space Team defines the problem of the
exponential growth in space debris, to portray it as an urgent global need that calls for immediate
solution. The second section presents the state of the art in orbital debris mitigation, space
situational awareness / collision avoidance, and debris removal concepts, followed by
discussions of the gaps that remain as conclusions. The third section restates the Space Team
conclusions concisely in preparation for the final report chapter titled “Recommendations.”
2.1 Defining the Problem: Space Debris is an Exponentially Growing Threat
Orbital space debris is any man-made object in Earth orbit which no longer serves a useful
purpose. Examples are derelict spacecraft, launch vehicle upper stages, payload fairings, debris
from launch vehicle separation, debris from explosions or collisions, solid rocket motor
effluents, paint flecks from thermal stress or particle impacts, and coolant droplets.
Figure 1. Popular Science infographic depiction of satellite and debris populations.
8
In a 2010 report by the RAND National Defense Research Institute titled Confronting Space
Debris - Strategies and Warnings from Comparable Examples Including Deepwater Horizon
RAND observed [hh]:
Moving to remediation...may require a “catastrophic” event that lowers the community’s
risk tolerance, as has happened in other fields—which suggests the problem of orbital
space debris may get worse before it gets better.
The damage caused by debris to operational space systems can be catastrophic. The impacts of
small particles cause erosive damage to operational satellites, similar to sandblasting. This
damage can be partly mitigated through the use of a protective "meteor bumper" which is widely
used on spacecraft such as the International Space Station (ISS). However, not all parts of a
spacecraft may be protected in this manner. Solar panels and the optical components of
telescopes, star trackers, and even portals and windshields are subject to constant wear by debris,
and to a lesser extent, micrometeorites. However, even a 1 cm object can prove catastrophic for
a satellite:
Figures 2-3. NASA test target (L), and debris after 7 km/sec impact with 1 cm Al object (R).
A smaller number of the debris objects are larger, measuring over ten centimeters (3.9 in), and
are far deadlier. Against larger debris, the only protection is provided by maneuvering the
spacecraft out of the way in order to avoid a collision. Shielding against such hypervelocity
debris is ineffective. For example, a one kilogram object impacting at 10 kilometers per second,
for example, is probably capable of catastrophically breaking up a 1,000-kg spacecraft if it
strikes a high-density element in the spacecraft. In such a breakup, numerous fragments larger
than 1 kg would be created.
If such a collision with larger debris occurs, many of the resulting fragments from the damaged
spacecraft will themselves be in the one kilogram (2.2 lb) mass range or larger. These then
become an additional source of additional collision risk. As the chance of collision is a function
of the number of objects in space, proliferation leads to a critical density where the creation of
new debris occurs faster than the various natural forces that remove these objects from orbit.
9
Beyond this threshold a runaway chain reaction can occur that reduces all objects in orbit to
debris in a period of years or months.
Currently, over 18,000 objects larger than 10 cm are known to exist. The estimated population of
particles between 1 and 10 cm in diameter is approximately 500,000 [tt]. The number of
particles smaller than 1 cm probably exceeds tens of millions. In order to determine the number
of orbital debris, large orbital debris (>10 cm) are tracked routinely by the U.S. Air Force Space
Surveillance Network (SSN), the Russian Space Surveillance System (SSS), and the French
Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial (GRAVES). In fact, objects as small as 3 mm can be
detected by ground-based radars today, providing a basis for a statistical estimate of their
numbers. Assessments of the population of orbital debris smaller than 1 mm can be made by
examining impact features on the surfaces of returned spacecraft, although to date this has been
limited to spacecraft operating in altitudes below 600 km.
The principal sources of large orbital debris are satellite explosions and collisions. Prior to 2007,
the principal source of debris was old upper launch vehicle stages left in orbit containing residual
stored energy sources in the form of propellants and high pressure fluids. Recently however, the
major source of large debris has shifted to intentional and unintentional catastrophic events. In
January 2007 China employed a land-based missile to destroy the 2,200-pound Fengyun-1C
weather satellite while it was orbiting 528 miles above the Earth. The impact left more than
100,000 new pieces of debris orbiting the planet, NASA estimated, with 2,600 of them more than
7 centimeters across. Similarly, in 2008 the U.S. Navy shot down an inoperable spy satellite.
The U.S. Navy AEGIS warship fired a single modified tactical missile, hitting the satellite
approximately 247 kilometers over the Pacific Ocean as it traveled in space at more than 17,000
mph. Finally, an accidental collision between an American Iridium satellite and a Russian
Cosmos satellite in 2009 greatly increased the number of large debris in orbit.
The relatively small sum of rocket bodies (approximately 2,000), non-operational spacecraft
(approximately 3,000), and other debris measuring over 10 centimeters across (approximately
5,000) is eclipsed by the estimated tens of millions of pieces of space debris that are composed
of small particles, less than one centimeter in any dimension. For example, smaller pieces
include dust from solid rocket motors, surface degradation products such as paint flakes, and
coolant released by the notoriously polluting past Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite
(RORSAT) nuclear powered satellites.
Figures 4-6. Artistic depictions of RORSAT (L & C), and coolant debris discharge (R).
10
RORSATs were launched between 1967 and 1988 to monitor North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and merchant vessels using active radar. Because a return signal from a target
illuminated by a radar transmitter diminishes as the inverse of the fourth power of the distance,
to operate effectively, RORSATs had to be placed in lower LEO. RORSAT also required higher
power radar and aerodynamic profile to compensate for those losses. Large solar panels were
ruled out in design because the low altitude orbit would have rapidly decayed due to drag
through the upper atmosphere. Further, the satellite would have been useless in the shadow of
earth. As a consequence, the majority of RORSATs were powered by nuclear reactors fuelled
by uranium-235. At the end of their useful lives most of the nuclear reactor cores were ejected
into a higher “disposal orbit." Unfortunately, there were several failure incidents, some of which
resulted in radioactive material re-entering the Earth's atmosphere. Although most nuclear cores
were successfully ejected into high orbits, they will only decay after several hundred years.
RORSATs were a major source of space debris in LEO. During 16 reactor core ejections,
approximately 128 kg of Sodium- Potassium Alloy (NaK-78) escaped from the primary coolant
systems of the reactors. The smaller droplets have already decayed, but larger droplets of up to
5.5 cm in diameter are still in orbit. The droplets will burn up completely in the upper
atmosphere on re-entry but in the interim the major risk is impact with operational satellites. The
problems posed by RORSAT debris are diminishing with time as they reenter. However, this
single example of natural mitigation over time pales with many other flawed designs, outright
failures, and careless operations that have caused the rate of debris growth to approach an
exponential today, as graphically displayed below:
Figure 7. Tracked orbital debris population catalogued by U.S. Air Force as of 2010.
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As for reentering debris, on average, reentering spacecraft break up at altitudes between 84-72
km due to aerodynamic forces that cause the allowable structural loads to be exceeded. Large,
sturdy, and/or densely constructed satellites generally break up at lower altitudes. Solar arrays
frequently break off the spacecraft parent body around 90-95 km because of the aerodynamic
forces causing the allowable bending moment to be exceeded at the array/spacecraft attach point.
Once the spacecraft body disintegrates, individual components that were housed in that parent
body will continue earthward as fragments and receive aero-heating until they either demise or
survive to impact the surface. Spacecraft components that are made of low melting-point
materials such as aluminum will usually evaporate at higher altitudes than objects that are made
of dense materials with higher melting points such as titanium, stainless steel, and beryllium.
Figures 8-11. Various debris seen from within spacecraft, aircraft, and from the ground.
If an object is enclosed in a substructure, the housing must first disintegrate before the internal
component is exposed to destructive heating. Many objects have such a high melt temperature
that they are able to survive reentry intact, although some of those are so light that they impact
the surface with a very low velocity. NASA has noted that as a result, the kinetic energy of such
light dense objects at impact is often under 15 Joules, a threshold below which the probability of
causing a human casualty is negligible. During the past 40 years an average of one catalogued
piece of debris fell back to Earth each day without causing serious injury or property damage. On
12
average, of those satellites that do reenter, approximately 10-40% of the mass of the object is
likely to reach the surface of the Earth.
Due to the Earth's surface being primarily water, most objects that survive reentry land in one of
the world's oceans. In fact, the chances that a given person will get hit and injured during his/her
one lifetime is estimated to be one in a trillion. Prominent cases of uncontrolled reentry include:
i
n 1978, Cosmos 954 reentered uncontrolled and crashed near Great Slave Lake in the Northwest
Territories of Canada. Cosmos 954 was nuclear powered and left radioactive debris near its
impact site. In 1979, Skylab reentered uncontrolled, spreading debris across the Australian
Outback, damaging several buildings and killing a cow. The re-entry was a major media event
largely due to the Cosmos 954 incident, but not viewed as much as a potential disaster since it
did not carry nuclear fuel. NASA had originally hoped to use a Space Shuttle mission to either
extend Skylab’s life or enable a controlled reentry, but delays in the program combined with
unexpectedly high solar activity made this impossible.
Figures 12-15. Orbital debris that have survived reentry and reached the Earth’s surface.
Debris distribution is not uniform in Earth orbit. Most orbital debris orbit within 2,000 km of the
Earth's surface, as this realm has hosted the preponderance of orbiting satellites since the dawn
of the space age. Likewise, within this spherical shell volume the amount of debris varies
significantly with altitude. The greatest concentrations of debris are found near 800-850 km. In
LEO (below 2,000 km), orbital debris circle the Earth at speeds of 7 km to 8 km per second.
13
However, the average impact speed of orbital debris in LEO with another space object will be
approximately 10 km per second as there will be an angle of convergence in a collision.
Consequently, collisions with even a small piece of debris will involve considerable energy.
Figure 16. Disproportionate object distribution across a random 180 degree panorama of LEO.
While the U.S. Space Shuttle was still operational, when it was in orbit U.S. Air Force Space
Surveillance Network (SSN) personnel regularly examined the trajectories of orbital debris to
identify possible close encounters. The same warning service is provided to the International
Space Station (ISS). If another object was projected to come within a few kilometers of the
Space Shuttle, the spacecraft normally maneuvered away from the object if the chance of a
collision exceeded 1 in 10,000. The ISS has been required to do the same.
Past on-orbit photographs of the now-deorbited Mir Space Station's exterior revealed evidence of
large numbers of impacts from small orbital debris and meteoroids. The most significant
damage was evidenced on the large, fragile solar arrays which could not be protected from small
particles. To date orbital debris have caused no loss of mission or capability on the ISS. This is
in no small part due to the fact that the ISS is the most heavily shielded spacecraft ever flown.
Critical components, such as habitable compartments and high pressure tanks, are designed to
withstand the impact of debris as large as 1 cm in diameter. Like the Space Shuttle, the ISS also
has the capability of maneuvering to avoid tracked objects. The risk of a critical ISS component
14
being struck by debris 1 to 10 cm in diameter is slight and ways to reduce this risk are being
investigated. Still, a rise in the rate of ISS maneuvers to avoid collisions is notable.
Exceptionally low altitude LEO systems such as Iridium, Orbcomm, and Globalstar do not
encounter debris problems. This is because debris at low LEO altitudes, whether caused by
others or themselves, tends to slow due to atmospheric drag and deorbit relatively quickly.
Often, upper stages and spacecraft are purposely placed in lower LEO after their missions have
been completed in order to insure that higher drag forces will accelerate their fall back to Earth.
As a general rule, the higher the altitude, the longer the orbital debris will remain in Earth orbit.
Debris left in orbits below 600 km normally fall back to Earth within several years. At altitudes
of 800 km, the time for orbital decay is often measured in decades. Above 1,000 km, orbital
debris will normally continue circling the Earth for a century or more.
As for geostationary orbit (GEO), our ability to detect orbital debris at near 36,000 km altitude
where many telecommunications and meteorological spacecraft operate is still somewhat limited.
However, studies indicate that the orbital debris population is probably less severe there than in
the aforementioned LEO altitudes. Since GEO is a special natural resource having limited real
estate and available “slots,” many spacecraft operators boost their old spacecraft into higher,
disposal orbits at the end of their mission. That orbit is said to be supersynchronous, and located
at an altitude approximately 300 km higher than GEO. Even without a debris problem at GEO,
the limited and therefore crowded real estate that so many satellites share in GEO can still lead to
collisions during maneuvers and the natural figure eight paths of satellites as they maintain
position. Such collisions can lead to loss of capability and new debris.
Because they share an identical orbital inclination, eccentricity, and altitude in order to remain
stationary with respect to terrestrial Earth, operational GEO spacecraft are rarely struck by
anything but very small debris and micrometeoroids, with little to no mission effect. Adding
debris shields can further protect spacecraft components from particles as large as 1 cm in
diameter. The probability of two large objects >10 cm in diameter accidentally colliding in GEO
is low.
LEO is a more hazardous regime, and collisions do occur. The worst such incident occurred on
10 February 2009 when an operational U.S. Iridium satellite and a derelict Russian Cosmos
satellite collided in which thousands of new debris were created, thousands large enough for
SSN detection. Viewed linearly, intuition dictates that in order to control the debris problem it is
merely necessary to stop the production of new debris. U.S. national policy recognizes this as a
requirement since 1988, and the most recent National Space Policy (31 August 2006) includes
the following statements concerning orbital debris:
Orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and
operations and to the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth. The United
States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-
government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for future
generations.
15
2.2 Kessler Syndrome
Unfortunately, there is a non-linear component to debris growth that calls for urgent international
action. In spite of significant improvements in spacecraft design and operations, there is a near
term threat that existing debris densities may lead automatically to an uncontrolled chain of
further collisions causing an exponential growth in debris density, even in the absence of further
contributions. This possibility is defined as the Kessler Syndrome.
In 1978 NASA scientist Donald J. Kessler proposed a scenario in which the density of objects
in LEO becomes high enough that collisions between objects could cause a cascade, with each
ensuing collision generating new debris, thereby increasing the likelihood of further collisions.
The theoretical scenario came to be called the Kessler Syndrome or Kessler Effect, brought on
by collisional cascading or an ablation cascade. One implication was and is that the distribution
of debris in orbit could render space exploration, and even the use of satellites, unfeasible for
many generations.
Kessler held that every satellite, space probe, and manned mission has the potential to create
space debris. As the number of satellites in orbit grows and old satellites become obsolete, the
risk of a cascading Kessler syndrome becomes greater. Fortunately, at the most commonly-used
orbits in low LEO, residual air drag helps keep the orbital zones free of debris. Collisions that
occur below this altitude are even less of an issue, since the energy lost in the collision results in
fragment orbits having perigee below this altitude.
At higher altitudes where atmospheric drag is insignificant, the time required for orbital
decay and reentry is much longer. Slight atmospheric drag, lunar perturbation, and solar
wind drag can bring debris down to lower altitudes over time where fragments finally re-enter,
but at very high altitudes this degradation can take millennia.
The Kessler Syndrome is especially insidious because of the "domino effect" and associated
"feedback runaway." Any impact between two objects of sizable mass spalls off shrapnel debris
from the force of the collision. Each piece of shrapnel now has the potential to cause further
damage, creating even more space debris. With a large enough collision or explosion such as one
between an active operational satellite and a defunct satellite, or the result of hostile actions in
space, the amount of cascading debris could be enough to render LEO effectively impassable.
There is growing consensus that this critical density has already been reached in certain orbital
bands, especially polar LEO orbits where orbiting objects of high inclination converge at the
poles dramatically increasing object density. A runaway Kessler Syndrome would render the
useful polar-orbiting bands difficult to use, and greatly increase the cost of space launches and
missions.
Richard Crowther of Britain's Defense Evaluation and Research Agency stated that he believes
the cascade predicted by Kessler will begin around 2015. The National Academy of Sciences,
summarizing the view among professionals, noted that there was widespread agreement that two
bands of LEO space, those at altitudes of 900 to 1,000 km (620 mi) and 1,500 km (930 mi), are
already past the critical density.
16
Figure 17. Kessler’s 1978 collision prediction curves superimposed with actual collisions.
In the 2009 European Air and Space Conference, University of Southampton, UK researcher,
Hugh Lewis predicted that the threat from space debris would rise 50 percent in the coming
decade and quadruple in the next 50 years. Currently more than 13,000 collision close calls are
tracked weekly.
Because of the power-law size distribution, debris in the 5-mm-to-1-cm regime are estimated to
represent about 80% of all objects larger than 5 mm. Therefore, if the objective of space faring
nations is to reduce the most significant mission-ending threat for most operational spacecraft,
efforts need to focus on the 5mm- to 1 cm debris, as well as more massive debris and objects
having greater cross-sections.
17
Figures 18-19. Depiction of Kessler Syndrome (L), and Iridium-Cosmos collision (R).
2.3 Comets, Asteroids, and Meteorites
Meteoroids are thought to originate from the asteroid belt. Meteoroids can range in size from
micrometers to about a meter in diameter, well within the dimensional and mass parameters of
man-made space debris. In terms of material constituency and velocity meteoroids and asteroids
are similar, with the exception that asteroids are larger, sometimes much larger. If a meteoroid
passes through the Earth’s atmosphere it is heated by friction, light, and perhaps an above ground
detonation. This object is called a meteor if it burns up above the surface of the Earth. However,
if a solid object lands on the Earth, it is classified as a meteorite.
Meteoroids, asteroids and comets are in orbits about the Sun and fly past the Earth at high
velocities. Individual meteoroids are generally too small to be tracked and designated, a problem
for smaller pieces of space debris as well. However, the arrival time of meteor streams, such as
the Leonids in November, can be predicted, and in the past NASA did not launch the Space
Shuttle or plan spacewalk during such meteor showers.
NASA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and other foreign space faring nations have long
acknowledged that near earth objects (NEO) such as asteroids and comets can pose localized,
broad geographic, or even global existential threats. It has also not escaped their attention that in
recent years the number of discoveries of new objects in both the professional and amateur
astronomy communities has increased dramatically. The increase is enabled primarily through
improvements in the quality and numbers of optical instruments and information technology (IT)
tools available to the science community and amateurs. The proliferation of discoveries of so-
called “minor planets” indicate that a larger number of natural objects exist, and potentially
threaten Earth’s orbital space, if not our planet itself.
Currently, naturally existent comets, asteroids and meteoroids are not classified as space debris,
since they are not man-made and are both omnipresent in the near Earth and outer space
environments. From a scientific standpoint the separate classification is justifiable. However
from a practical standpoint in the so-called “space age” the threat they pose to spacecraft and
18
terrestrial Earth is indistinguishable from the threats posed by man-made space debris. For the
intended purposes of the Space Team project meteoroids, asteroids, and man-made objects are all
classified as “debris” that contribute to the increasing density of objects in earth orbital space. In
the final analysis any improved space situational awareness, avoidance techniques, and kinetic or
electromagnetic techniques used to dispose of hazardous man-made objects be equally useful in
dealing with natural objects.
Figures 20-21. Asteroid (L) and meteoroid (R), both constitute spacecraft-threatening debris.
Gaps and Proposing Solutions: Orbital Space Debris Mitigation, Avoidance, and Removal
NASA has concluded that controlling growth of the orbital debris population must be a high
priority for the U.S., all major space-faring nations, and all nations that share an interest in
preserving the near-Earth space global commons for all humankind. Measures can take the form
of better space situational awareness to enable collision avoidance in the presence of debris,
mitigating the threat of creating new debris through careful spacecraft design and operational
procedures, and the development and employment of kinetic and electromagnetic tools for
orbital debris removal (ODR).
The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office [http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/] is the lead
U.S. center for orbital debris research, and is recognized world-wide for its initiative in
addressing orbital debris issues by taking the international lead in debris characterization and
mitigation. This includes conducting measurements of the environment and in developing the
technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment.
Concurrently, the NASA Ames Research Center space debris research activities are making
significant contributions to the larger NASA effort. These activities are being led and
coordinated by Chris Henze, Will Marshall, James Mason, Jan Stupl, and Creon Levit.
NASA has confirmed a general international consensus that Kessler’s predictions were correct,
and the conclusion that action must be taken is not controversial. In this light, it can be argued
that there are three general areas that must be addressed in order to interrupt or prevent the
Kessler Syndrome problem, namely: 1) space debris mitigation; 2), collision avoidance, and 3)
19
orbital debris removal (ODR). Each technique is clearly complementary of the others, and all
will need to play a part in preserving the safe traficability of the near-Earth space environment in
some fashion. Furthermore, it can be argued that these efforts should be a shared international
responsibility for all nations who have an interest in preserving the continued viability of the
orbital space global commons. Each area will be discussed in turn in the sections that follow.
2.4 Space Debris Mitigation
NASA defines space debris mitigation as “measures [that] can take the form of curtailing or
preventing the creation of new debris, designing satellites to withstand impacts by small debris,
and implementing operational procedures such as using orbital regimes with less debris, adopting
specific spacecraft attitudes, and even maneuvering to avoid collisions with debris.” Leading
from the front, NASA in 1995 was the first space agency in the world to issue a comprehensive
set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines. Two years later, the U.S. Government developed a set
of Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices based on the NASA guidelines.
In response to the global space environmental threat, in 1993 the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC) inter-governmental agency was formed with the specific aim of
coordinating international efforts to deal with Earth orbital debris. The IADC is comprised of 10
countries as well as ESA, IADC members today include: 1) Italy (ASI), 2) France (CNES), 3)
China (CNSA), 4) Canada (CSA), 5) Germany (DLR), 6) the European Space Agency (ESA), 7)
India (ISRO), 8) Japan (JAXA), 9) U.S. (NASA), 10) Ukraine (NSAU), 11) Russia
(ROSCOSMOS), 12) and England (UK Space Agency). Other countries in the IADC followed
NASA’s lead and created their own orbital debris mitigation guidelines. In 2002, after a multi-
year effort, the entire IADC adopted a consensus set of guidelines designed to mitigate the
growth of the orbital debris population.
In February 2007, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the United Nations'
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) completed a multi-year work plan
with the adoption of a consensus set of space debris mitigation guidelines very similar to the
IADC guidelines. The guidelines were accepted by the COPUOS in June 2007 and endorsed by
the United Nations in January 2008.
Manufacturers and operators of spacecraft and upper stages are generally aware of the hazards of
orbital debris and the need to mitigate their growth. Many global firms voluntarily adhere to
measures designed to limit the growth of orbital debris. The U.S. Government, NASA and the
Department of Defense (DoD) have also issued requirements governing the design and operation
of spacecraft and upper stages to mitigate the growth of the orbital debris population. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also consider orbital debris
issues in the licensing process for spacecraft under their auspices. While the U.S. was at the
forefront of these self-disciplining initiatives space faring nations have incorporated the same
standards voluntarily or as a function of the IDAC.
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2.5 Spacecraft Kinetic Protection
In acknowledgement that orbital debris will continue to pose a threat to the spacecraft
functionality, kinetic protection is generally being built into new spacecraft. Hypervelocity
impact measurements at NASA and other facilities worldwide are employed to assess the risk
presented by orbital debris to new spacecraft. New materials providing better protection such as
the “bumpers” can be integrated in designs with less weight penalty. Modeling and simulation as
well as hypervelocity impact testing data also help in the analysis and interpretation of impact
features on returned spacecraft surfaces. Clearly, physical protection can only be effective
against very small debris. Centimeter size fragments will devastate most spacecraft (see Figure
3), and fragments greater than 1 centimeter will threaten the habitability of the most heavily
protected spacecraft, namely the ISS. So, in the near-term protection represents a risk-accepting
band aid solution to the growing debris problem.
2.6 Controlled End of Life Satellite Disposal Practices
Part of NASA’s efforts focus specifically on reducing the number of large objects, such as non-
operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages orbiting the Earth. One method of post-
mission disposal is to allow the reentry of these spacecraft, either from natural orbital decay
(uncontrolled) or a deliberate controlled entry. Orbital decay can be accelerated artificially in
order to lower the perigee altitude of an eccentric orbit so that atmospheric drag will cause the
spacecraft to enter the earth’s atmosphere sooner. However, left to natural decay friction the
surviving debris impact footprint on Earth often cannot be guaranteed. To minimize
uncertainties, controlled entry is normally achieved by the burning of more propellant through a
larger propulsion system to cause the spacecraft to reenter the atmosphere at a steeper flight path
angle. The vehicle will then impact at a more precise latitude and longitude, and the debris
footprint can be positioned over an uninhabited region, generally into the oceans or other bodies
of water or onto sparsely populated regions like the Canadian Tundra, the Australian Outback, or
Siberia in the Russian Federation.
To minimize the chances of damage to other vehicles, designers of new vehicles or satellites are
frequently required to demonstrate that they can be safely disposed of at the end of their lives by
use of a controlled atmospheric reentry system or a boost into a graveyard orbit. In recognition
of the increasing number of objects in space, NASA has adopted guidelines and assessment
procedures to minimize the number of non-operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages
orbiting the Earth. One method of post-mission disposal is reentry of these spacecraft and upper
stage launch systems, either from orbital decay (uncontrolled entry) or with a controlled entry.
In order to preserve reentry options, launch and payload developers include reentry capabilities
in the designs and margins of new systems. Today these self termination capabilities include
sufficient fuel, larger propulsion, and system flexibility to insure that the means to fire engines
remain to achieve a lower altitude perigee. Once there repeated exposure to higher atmospheric
drag will accelerate the process of spacecraft reentry. Controlled entry normally occurs by
driving the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere at a steeper flight path angle. The object will then
enter at a more precise latitude and longitude, and the impact footprint will predictably occur in a
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nearly uninhabited region or in the ocean.
The so-called Spacecraft Cemetery is an area in the southern Pacific Ocean 3,900 km southeast
of Wellington, New Zealand where spacecraft such as the now defunct Mir Space Station and
waste-filled Progress cargo ships are and have been routinely deposited. While it is not the only
controlled reentry impact footprint, it has been chosen for its remoteness so as not to endanger or
harm human life.
Similarly, at an altitude approximately 300 km above GEO there exists a so-called GEO
“graveyard orbit.” Alternatively referred to as supersynchronous orbit, junk orbit, or disposal
orbit, it is an orbit significantly above GEO where many spacecraft are intentionally placed at the
end of their operational life. Graveyard orbit placement is a measure performed in order to lower
the probability of collisions with operational spacecraft which are tightly packed into GEO slots.
Otherwise the likelihood of collisions, failures and generation of new debris would be high. A
graveyard orbit is used when the delta-v required to perform a terrestrial de-orbit maneuver is too
high. Specifically, de-orbiting a GEO satellite requires a delta-v of about 1,500 m/s while re-
orbiting it to a graveyard orbit only requires about 11 m/s. One significant advantage of placing
defunct satellites in the GEO graveyard is that future salvage operations may be capable of
recycling and reusing old materials already preexistent on orbit. Considering the energy saved in
not needing to escape the Earth’s gravity well, salvaged materials will have significant value.
Figures 22-23. South Pacific Spacecraft Cemetery (L), and GEO Graveyard Orbit (R).
These space systems developer best practices of planning for termination will benefit future end
of life disposal. In the meantime, with many older systems and subsystems such capabilities
were not built in and those objects are subjected to uncontrolled decay rates and reentry
trajectories. Since the surviving debris impact footprint cannot be guaranteed to avoid inhabited
landmasses there can be risks to life and property. Fortunately, to date no instance of significant
damage or injury has been reported from an uncontrolled reentry.
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Space Debris Mitigation Conclusions
Considering the definition of space debris mitigation, the impact of ongoing international efforts
to curtail or prevent the creation of new debris will certainly bear fruits in the future. However,
new launch vehicles and satellites designed and operated to both minimize new debris creation
and withstand impacts by small debris will not help avoid collisions with or remove preexisting
debris. While debris mitigation measures can assume to be resourced by space faring members
of the IADC, removal cannot. This raises the issue of the limited membership of the IADC.
Non-member nations may not have had space faring ambitions when the IADC was first
convened, and may not even have active space programs today. Yet every nation shares a future
interest and stake in the space global commons. In this regard orbital and outer space are no
different than international terrestrial airspace and waters. In fact the orbital mechanics laws that
define operation in the domain lead to a ubiquitous and geographically non-specific shared
ownership of each and every region of the Earth orbital domain. Like Antarctica and the open
seas, all nations and peoples have rights and responsibilities in space even before they launch
indigenous space programs.
This presents an argument for opening up IADC membership to nations that aspire to found their
own formal space programs now or in the near future. At a minimum, potential aspirants might
include Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). Even before embarking on national space initiatives, space aspirants
could assist with currently unfunded and urgent near term aspects of the debris problem. For
example, a nation could resource the development and demonstration of enabling technologies in
support of orbital debris removal (ODR) (presented later in this paper). In addition to the global
prestige of developing such advancements in support of solving a vexing international threat,
such contributions could be exchanged for valuable space guarantees in the future.
For example, a space aspirant who develops an effective ODR capability could take the initiative
to clear particularly polluted LEO altitude regimes such as 800 km – 1,000 km or 1,400 km –
1,600 km. In exchange for cleaning those altitudes the contributing nation would be provided
U.N. enforceable rights to use the cleaned orbit that are at least proportional to the ODR
investment. This approach would over the longer term prove economical for the aspirant while
demonstrating a global commitment to interrupt the Kessler Syndrome in its infancy. Again, the
technological and international prestige gained for that space aspirant is immeasurable.
2.7 Space Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance
Global orbital space situation awareness (SSA) is a critical prerequisite to fully understanding
the advancing maturity of the Kessler Syndrome. Real time global SSA is also a critical
prerequisite for satellite and debris collision avoidance in all space systems operations. It is
intuitive that global SSA suggests a penetrating understanding of the three dimensional spherical
shell of Earth orbital space from the 100 km threshold of space to beyond GEO. However, SSA
also requires a precise understanding for the sake of planning and prediction. The ability to
precisely characterize our orbital space shell currently remains limited to a few nations. Those
nations are effectively limited to the U.S., Russia, and France, and to a lesser extent the ESA.
23
The SSA data sets of nation states are neither synthesized nor available to the global community
at a degree of precision at which they were collected.
Figure 24. High resolution-accuracy data provided earlier leads to superior collision avoidance.
Lacking SSA synthesis and precision is due to the fact that the most capable SSA systems are
compartmented national security systems of the U.S., Russia, and France. In the end, the
development of a globally accessible SSA common operating picture so urgently needed for
collision avoidance in a high density debris environment is stymied. This lack of integration and
cooperation is unfortunate and does not help the IADC to address the issues of space debris and
exchange information on research activities to identify debris mitigation options. Guidelines are
under development, which will forbid the intentional explosion of satellites such as the Chinese
ASAT test, and state that precautions must be taken against accidental events that may produce
space debris. IDAC guidelines will also suggest that decommissioned satellites must be de-
orbited and destroyed in the atmosphere, if this is impossible. This is usually the case for
defunct satellites in GEO, and increasingly for newer systems in LEO and MEO. Still, even the
IADC cannot compel higher accuracy data to be provided by the U.S. or any other space
surveillance capable nations for collision prediction and avoidance.
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Figure 25. Accurate data leads to superior collision avoidance decisions.
The foundation of global SSA goes back to the birth of the space age, during which the first
man-made space objects began to be numbered and catalogued. Today there are nearly 20,000
large objects in our Earth orbital system that are tracked, but only about 700 are operational
satellites. The rest constitute large, trackable debris at least 10 centimeters in one dimension of
the sort discussed throughout this paper. For all space users it is important to know the location
of all working satellites so that information, commands and other data can be transferred
between them and ground stations effectively. By the same token it is important to know where
the dead satellites and larger debris are so that collisions with working systems can be avoided.
Since the beginning of the space age, there have only been a handful of collisions between
tracked items (see Figure 17), however the rate of collisions is increasing with time, as Kessler
predicted. Even though the probability of a collision between two objects larger than about 10
centimeter diameter remains low, manned systems such as the ISS are directed to execute
avoidance maneuvers if there is a 1 in 10,000 possibility of hitting another object. Just as
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important as mitigating new debris creation and ultimately removing it from orbit, so too is
awareness of the environment to avoid collisions given debris pollution. Accurate numbering
and cataloguing orbiting objects for accountability is critical in this regard.
At the visibility level of the IADC, each man-made object that is known to be tracked in space is
assigned a unique International Identification Number (IIN), also called the International
Designator. Today, the international designation now consists of three parts consisting of the
year of the launch, the number of the launch in that year and a letter or letters for each object
resulting from that launch. The payload is often assigned the letter A. Any subsidiary scientific
payloads in separate orbits will be labeled B, C, etc. and then inert components, for example, the
burnt out rocket casing, are designated D, E, etc. The letters I and O are not used, to avoid
confusion with numbers. If there are not sufficient letters to label every piece of debris resulting
from a particular launch – such as from an explosion in orbit - then double letters are used
starting with AA–AZ, followed by BA–BZ, and so on, until ZZ is reached. For example, the
Vanguard 1 which was launched in 1958 is the oldest artificial satellite still in orbit, and has the
IIN 1958-002B, while the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) which was launched from a Space
Shuttle in April 1990, has the IIN 1990-037B.
A space catalogue is another comprehensive list of man-made objects in space. A catalogue list
includes the type of object, its orbit, and where it originated so that even larger objects whose
origin cannot be determined are accounted for and tracked. Catalogues are clearly more useful
for nations than IINs. The IIN of an object is useful in building a catalogue, but just as an input.
Recall that any object in the international catalogue will only benefit from the currency and
accuracy that nations are willing to share. Catalogues are real time comprehensive pictures of
space objects defined to the resolution of the sensors owned by the organizations that populate
the catalogues. The space faring nations that consider space a national security and potential
warfighting domain have their own compartmented catalogues. The currency and accuracy of
those catalogues will naturally remain privy to the owning nation’s defense network. As noted
earlier, what is provided to the IDAC catalogue is dumbed down and incomplete. In order to
understand existing capabilities the capabilities and limitations of the world’s most robust SSA
systems are introduced below.
2.7.1 U.S. Space Situational Awareness Capabilities
The U.S. collects the most comprehensive and accurate measurements of near-Earth orbital
space. Debris characterization using ground-based radars and optical telescopes, space-based
telescopes, and analysis of selected spacecraft surfaces that are returned from space intact
contribute to U.S. SSA. The set of sensors used for these measurements are primarily owned and
operated by the Department of Defense (DoD). The sensor system of systems is known as the
U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The SSN will be described later. Some
platforms and systems are primarily dedicated to the debris characterization task. They include
specialized radars such as the Haystack, and examination of returned surfaces from the Solar
Max, the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), and the
now-retired Space Shuttle fleet. However, all of the systems that are owned and operated by the
U.S. DoD have as their primary mission the production of real time SSA for U.S. national
26
security, severely restricting public data sharing.
Accordingly, U.S. national security space sensors capture the global debris picture. They permit
collision prediction and space traffic management that is superior to any other network in
existence. Yet, the high levels of object resolution, position accuracy, and orbital parameters are
not available to the public, commercial space entities, and much less the international
community. The data that is provided to users outside of the U.S. national security space
community is deliberately “dumbed down” to an inferior resolution and accuracy so that the
actual capabilities of U.S. systems are not compromised. While this is understandable from the
standpoint of protecting state secrets, it presents a vexing frustration for an international
community collectively threatened by the runaway proliferation of orbital debris.
2.7.1.1 U.S. Tracking and Monitoring of Launch Vehicles
Ideally, the tracking, identifying, and cataloguing of space debris should be an end-to-end life-
long object record that begins at the launch of a satellite into space and terminates with its
reentry or graveyard orbit storage. National security restrictions, deliberate events, and
unexpected accidents prevent and/or complicate this ideal degree of international debris
transparency. Nevertheless, many less sensitive commercial and scientific missions have utilized
cameras to track and monitor initial mission progress.
The now-retired Space Shuttle serves as a good example of superior initial tracking and
monitoring. Following the return-to-flight of the Space Shuttle in July 2005, the number of short
range tracking cameras based on the launch pad at the John F. Kennedy Space Centre in Florida
was increased to six. The images from those cameras were thoroughly examined after each
subsequent launch to ensure no damage occurred to the Shuttle. There were also separate
dedicated cameras for the top and bottom halves of the Shuttle and also for the hydrogen vent
arm above the external tank, the underside of the Shuttle’s left and right wings and also the area
between the external tank and the Shuttle. The short range cameras covered the launch from T-10
through to T + 57 seconds, after which the Shuttle was too far away for good quality images to
be produced. Seven medium range trackers were located outside of the launch pad and provided
data points for the calculation of the flight paths and also multiple views of the Shuttle during
launch, which were also examined later for possible damage. These cameras recorded everything
from T – 7 through to T + 110 seconds. Long range trackers recorded between T − 7 and T + 165
seconds and provided data points to track the Shuttle as it climbed into orbit. While the Shuttle
is retired, the best launch tracking practices continue to be followed in the U.S..
Following orbital insertion the depleted launch components of the Shuttle were designed to fall
back to Earth quickly. Once in orbit the Shuttle commenced to be tracked by the world-wide
NASA sensors and more significantly the distributed Space Surveillance Network (SSN) run by
the U.S. Air Force. This sensor hand-off is also done with all other U.S. satellites, and given
cues from other sensors also with SSN observations of foreign satellite launches. Conversely,
foreign surveillance systems such as those of Russia and France likewise track and monitor not
just their own launches but also those of others, such as the U.S. Unfortunately, the
27
comprehensive data sets available to select nations are not made available to the international
effort to track and monitor debris.
The methods used to track all objects orbiting the Earth, both manmade and natural, include
optical, radio, and radar techniques. For objects in LEO between about 200 and 2,000 kilometers
above the Earth radar is a useful method. At Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and out to and
including GEO at 35,880 kilometers altitude, optical telescope observations are able to detect
much smaller objects than radars, and so are the preferred ground to space sensors. For example,
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites fill a MEO constellation located at approximately
20,000 km altitude.
The sensors used by ground-based systems are categorized as either active or passive. Active
sensors, such as radar, send out energy and read the returned signal. Satellites or spacecraft that
include equipment that make them easily tracked by a specific method are called cooperative
objects. Dead satellites whose attitudes are no longer correct, and space debris are called non-
cooperative objects. Passive sensors are usually used to detect non-cooperative objects, although
if their geometry is suitable (10 cm today, <10 cm in the future) to reflect a signal, an active
radar sensor can still be used to track it so long as the object is in LEO. Passive sensors include
optical telescopes that detect the sunlight reflected from the satellite.
Due to non-periodic perturbations, orbits of satellites and space debris must be recalculated and
checked periodically. These perturbations result from gravitational variations of the moving 3
body Sun-Moon-Earth system and unpredictable changes in atmospheric drag due to
spontaneous ultraviolet light (UV) and particle flux from solar storm activity, and the effects of
high altitude winds on low altitude LEO orbits. To keep track of all that humankind has put into
space in real time, large portions of the sky must be observed in detail continuously. In fact, most
objects are tracked on a regular basis by at least one of the many systems around the world,
though single a high-granularity shared SSA picture for international use is still lacking.
2.7.1.2 U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network and Space Catalogue
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has maintained a database of satellite states since the
launch of Sputnik in 1957. As part of their space surveillance mission for the U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), the U.S. Air Force Space Command, located at the Space Control
Centre inside Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station in Colorado Springs, is responsible for
tracking all objects orbiting the Earth that are larger than 10 centimeters in any dimension.
Currently, the Air Force employs Very High Frequency (VHF) radar tracking systems in what is
known as the “Air Force Space Fence.” Higher resolution tracking is planned with Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) and other, shorter wavelength radar systems in the future. The Space Control
Center then monitors and updates the a space catalogue. A backup system, provided by the US
Naval Space Command, is called the Alternate Space Control Center, and is designed to continue
space surveillance if the Space Control Center were unable to function. The resulting catalogue
is still often referred to as the USSPACECOM Catalogue, or just the Space Catalogue. Data for
these objects is collected and updated continuously by the aforementioned Space Surveillance
Network (SSN). Two separate catalog databases are maintained under the U.S. Strategic
28
Command (USSTRATCOM): a primary catalog created and maintained by the Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC), and an alternate catalog by the Naval Space Command (NSC). The number
of cataloged objects is over 20,000. Different astrodynamic theories are used by AFSPC to
maintain these catalogs in order to achieve a time-averaged optimal synthesis of the different
results.
The SSN is also known as the “SPACETRACK” Program. It consists of an integrated set of
dedicated, collateral, and contributing electro-optical, and passive and active radio frequency
(RF) sensors that are distributed worldwide. The SSN is dedicated to detecting, tracking,
cataloging and identifying artificial objects orbiting Earth. These include active and
inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and fragmentation debris. Space surveillance
accomplishes the following: 1) predict when and where a decaying space object will re-
enter the Earth's atmosphere; 2) prevent a returning space object, which to radar looks like a
missile, from triggering a false alarm in missile-attack warning sensors of the U.S. and other
countries; 3) chart the present position of space objects and plot their anticipated orbital paths; 4)
detect new man-made objects in space; 5) produce a running catalog of man-made space
objects; 6) determine which country owns a re-entering space object; and 7)
inform NASA whether or not objects may interfere with satellites and ISS orbits.
In developing, improving, and updating the Space Catalogue AFSPC employs the so-called
General Perturbations (GP) theory for analytical solutions of the satellite equations of motion.
The orbital elements and their associated partial derivatives are expressed as series expansions in
terms of the initial conditions of these differential equations. Today, assumptions must be made
to simplify these analytical theories. These include truncation of the Earth’s gravitational
potential to a few zonal harmonic terms. Also, the atmosphere is usually modeled as a static,
spherical density field that exponentially decays, not a faithful reflection of non-periodic
anomalies such as those caused by extreme solar activity. Third body influences and resonance
effects are partially modeled. Increased accuracy of GP theory will require significant
development efforts. NASA maintains civilian databases of GP orbital elements, also known as
NASA or North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) two-line elements (TLE).
The GP element sets are "mean" element sets that have specific periodic features removed to
enhance long-term prediction performance, and require special software to reconstruct the
compressed trajectory.
The current U.S. SSN has difficulty in cataloging some space objects in highly elliptical orbits
(HEO) and low-inclination orbits. Objects in HEO are difficult to detect because they spend a
large fraction of their time at very high altitudes, while objects in low-inclination orbits are more
difficult to detect because of the relative lack of U.S. ground-based sensors at or dedicated to low
latitudes. Also, while there are an estimated 600,000 objects larger than 1 cm (0.4 in) in orbit,
the SSN only actively tracks space objects which are 10 centimeters in diameter (softball size) or
larger. The SSN does not monitor every object continually, but does spot checks to ensure that
the objects are where they are expected to be. This is due to the limitations of the network in
terms of geographic distribution, capability and availability. Nevertheless, well over 100,000
observations are made each day. It should be emphasized that these limitations and peculiarities
do not represent deficiencies in the way the SSN performs its mission of maintaining an object
29
catalog of relevance to U.S. national security. It does however highlight the fact that the U.S.
SSN, as the global state of the art in such networks, is not optimized to characterize the entire
global space debris population in support of an international environmental threat. What follows
are short descriptions of the various sensors and sensor sets that make up the U.S. SSN:
Figure 26. The SSN includes passive and active radar and optical sources distributed worldwide.
2.7.1.3 Optical Tracking of Satellites and Debris
Optical tracking is currently used by the SSN for tracking both space debris and satellites. It is
also used during the launch of space vehicles. In the U.S. optical tracking systems were first
developed in 1956 and fielded in 1958. This constituted a worldwide network of stations, whose
aim was to obtain enough accurate photographs of satellites to be able to determine highly
precise orbits. Special cameras, designed by James G. Baker and Joseph Nunn provided the
tracking information. The Baker Nunn system imaged satellites at an altitude ranging from
about 4,800 kilometers to 35,800 kilometers. The Baker Nunn system suffered from two major
drawbacks. First, as film was used as the detector, it had to be developed. This limited how
quickly the results were available. Second, in order to detect satellites personnel had to look for
streaks across the photograph as the film had to be scanned manually. This was time-consuming
and open to human error. As technology advanced, the Baker Nunn cameras have been replaced
by a new system known as the Ground based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance.
2.7.1.3.1 Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS)
GEODSS tracks objects in deep space, or from about 3,000 mi (4,800 km) out to beyond
GEO altitudes. Each GEODSS site has three telescopes each facing a different section of the
sky. Each telescope has a 40-inch (1.02 m) aperture and two special mirrors that form focused
30
images over a 2° field of view. In comparison, the full Moon is only about half a degree wide.
The visible wavelength telescope detectors are able to detect objects 10,000 times dimmer than
the human eye is capable of, down to a magnitude of about 16. GEODSS sensors can image
objects as small as a basketball located in a GEO. GEODSS is a vital part of the SSN, as it can
even detect Molniya satellites in HEO at apogee distances that even surpass the Moon (245,000
miles). Each GEODSS site tracks approximately 3,000 objects per night out of 9,900 object that
are regularly tracked and accounted for by the SSN.
There are three fixed-permanent GEODSS sites controlled from the U.S. Edwards Air Force
Base, California. They are located in Socorro, NM; Maui, HI; and Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean. A mobile telescope that contributes to the GEODSS system is located at Morón Air
Base, Spain. The GEODSS telescopes electro-optical sensors in that they employ low light level
TV digital cameras and a computer instead of film for digital, transferable images. Optics
sensitivity and sky background during daytime that masks satellites reflected light, dictate that
GEODSS sites operate at night. As with any ground-based optical system, full moons, cloud
cover, and local weather conditions directly influence its effectiveness. The telescopes scan the
sky at the same rate as the stars appear to move, thus keeping the stars in a fixed position in the
field of view. As the telescope is scanning, cameras take rapid snapshots. Computers then
overlay these images onto each other. As the stars have remained in the same position, they are
easily electronically erased, leaving only items moving with respect to the star background. This
includes man-made space objects, asteroids and comets, all of which appear as streaks across the
image. From measurements of the streaks, the orbits of the objects in space can be calculated.
The type of telescope is called a Ritchey–Chretien design and is also used for the Hubble Space
Telescope’s optical system.
Figures 27-29. GEODSS sites at Diego Garcia (L), Maui, HI (C), and Socorro, NM (R).
2.7.1.3.2 Space Based Surveillance System
The Space-Based Visible (SBV) sensor, an electro-optical camera that works in the visible light
band of the spectrum, provides useful data to the SSN. The SBV sensor can detect faint objects
near the sunlit limb of the Earth and also has the ability to scan large areas of the sky. Onboard
signal processing reduces the amount of data produced to a manageable size. SBV operates for
eight hours per day and gathers as many observations as the GEODSS ground based sites, and is
considerably more accurate than the GEODSS sensors. To replace the SBV sensor, the first of a
constellation of five satellites forming a Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) is currently
being built. SBSS will also be an integral component of the SSN. The constellation will operate
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in LEO but will look at objects up to a GEO using a visible-spectrum telescope. The SBSS aims
to survey an area of interest a few times a day as opposed to every few days with the current
SBV. Another program that was intended to compliment the SBSS was the Orbital Deep Space
Imager. It was to be a space telescope that would have produced high-resolution images of
objects in GEO; however, due to budget restraints an operational system is not currently being
developed.
Figures 30-32. SBSS artist rendition (L), in production (C), and notional operational system.
2.7.1.3.3 Air Force Maui Space Surveillance System
The Maui Space Surveillance System (MSSS) provides a satellite tracking capability using a
3.67-meter telescope known as the Advanced Electro-Optical System (AEOS). The MSSS is
also commonly referred to as the Air Force Maui Optical and Supercomputing (AMOS)
observatory. It is owned by the DoD, and is the U.S.’s largest optical telescope designed for
tracking space objects, . The MSSS is routinely involved in numerous observation programs in
support of the SSN. The MSSS also has the capability to project lasers into the atmosphere for
the purpose of characterizing a specific path in real time in order to adjust the adaptive optics of
the mirror aperture for optimization of imagery resolution. The MSSS is situated at the crest of
the dormant Haleakala volcano at an altitude of 3,058 meters. It is noteworthy that in the process
of accomplishing its primary mission to track and characterize man-made objects, the MSSS has
discovered a number of asteroids. Accordingly, through its primary mission for Air Force Space
Command, the MSSS has combined large-aperture tracking optics with visible and infrared
sensors to collect data on near Earth and deep-space objects.
The 75-ton AEOS telescope points and tracks accurately, yet is fast enough to track LEO
satellites, ballistic missiles, and selected debris. As noted, AEOS is equipped with an adaptive
optics system (AO), the heart of which is a 941-actuator deformable mirror that can change its
shape to remove the atmosphere's distorting effects. This permits scientists to get near
diffraction-limited images of space objects, including debris, by removing the effects of
scintillation from atmospheric turbulence. Other equipment at the MSSS site includes a 1.6-
meter telescope, two 1.2-meter telescopes on a common mount, a 0.8-meter beam
director/tracker, and a 0.6-meter laser beam director.
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Figures 33-34. Maui Space Surveillance System (MSSS) seen from above and from the side.
2.7.1.3.4 Starfire Optical Range
The Starfire Optical Range (SOR) is located at the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
on Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM. The primary mission of SOR is to research,
develop, and demonstrate optical wavefront control (i.e. AO) technologies that cancel the
distortions from atmospheric turbulence that interferes with laser beam integrity over long
distances. The range is a secure lab facility, and is a division of the Directed Energy
Directorate of AFRL. According to the Air Force, SOR's optical equipment includes a 3.5
meter telescope which along with MSSS is one of the U.S.’s largest telescopes. Like the Maui
MSSS, the SOR is equipped with adaptive optics designed for both its research mission and
satellite tracking, in fact SOR research improves MSSS’ performance. SOR also conducts
research into the use of lasers as a means for long-distance, high-bandwidth, free space
communications. Fidelity of the optical carrier in air-to-air laser connectivity is important for
data integrity. SOR also studies the effects of scintillation as it pertains to the development high
energy laser (HEL) weapons. The SOR is also an integral component of the SSN.
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Figures 35-36. Starfire Optical Range (SOR) seen from above (L) and from below (R).
2.7.1.3.5 Space Surveillance Telescope
The Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) program began as a Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) initiative to develop a ground based optical system for detection and
tracking of faint objects in space such as asteroids and orbital debris. It is also to be employed in
support of space defense missions. The program is designed to advance, or expand, space
situational awareness, and in this be able to quickly provide wide area search capability. The
large, curved focal surface array sensors of the SST are innovative designs that encompass
improvements in detection sensitivity, allow for a shorter focal length, a wider field of view, and
provide improvements in step-and-settle abilities. SST detects, tracks, and can discern small,
obscure objects, in deep space with a "wide field of view system." It is a single telescope with
dual abilities. First the telescope is sensitive enough to allow for detection, of small, dimly lit,
low reflectivity objects. Second it is capable of quickly searching the visible sky. This
combination is a difficult achievement in a single telescope design.
The SST is an F/1.0 aperture telescope with a 3.5 meter primary mirror like SOR’s that can
capture more light in a day than a conventional telescope can capture in a week. It is capable of
delivering wide-angle views of the Earth's firmament thanks to a curved, focal plane array/CCD.
Multiple searches can be conducted from the ground several times throughout the night. As a
telescope system, it can give precise locations of discovered objects, extrapolate the course of the
object, and indicate the objects stability, all crucial for SSN awareness. The telescope's primary
task will be to look for man-made space debris, microsatellites, meteors or other objects moving
at the same speed at which the Earth rotates, namely at GEO. The US Air Force has been
transitioning the capability and integrated the SST as a sensor set within the SSN. The system
developed its first images in early 2011, and the Air Force may place SSTs all over the world,
creating 360-degree surveillance coverage of GEO in order to keep U.S. spacecraft aware of
avoidable environmental hazards.
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Figures 37-38. DARPA Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) as rendition and operational.
2.7.1.4 Space Fence or US Air Force Fence
The Air Force Space Surveillance System (AFSSS) is an array of multistatic radar antennas
spread across the southern USA that is used as an interferometer to make precise measurements
of the path of satellites and other objects as they pass over the USA. It is the detection and
tracking foundation of the NSS. It is a VHF (30 - 300 MHz) Band capability to detect objects
down to 10 cm in LEO. An upgrade to the system is planned to replace the VHF transmitters
with S-Band (2 - 4 GHz) radar systems capable of detecting 5 cm to a range of 160–1,000 in
LEO. The S-band system will also allow faster revisit times and, as the radars themselves will
be distributed over a wider geographical area, it will also give a wider view of the sky, and
capable of detecting objects as small as 10 cm at altitudes up to 30,000 km. Today, the AFSSS
detects space objects originating from new launches, maneuvers of existing objects, breakups of
existing objects, natural objects such as meteorites and asteroids, and provides data to users from
its catalog of space objects. Orbital parameters of nearly 20,000 objects are currently maintained
in the catalog developed by the AFSSS, a critical resource which now has gained usage by
NASA, weather agencies, and even friendly foreign agencies.
The current VHF-based AFSSS includes 3 known transmitter sites. The master station is located
at at Lake Kickapoo, Texas, and two other transmitters are located at Gila River, Arizona and
Jordan Lake, Alabama. There are 6 known receiving stations, namely: San Diego, CA, Elephant
Butte, NM, Red River, AR, Silver Lake, MS, Hawkinsville, GA, and Tattnall, GA. The
receiving stations at Elephant Butte and Hawkinsville are considered to be "High Altitude"
stations with longer and more complex antenna systems that are designed to see targets at higher
altitudes than the other four receiving stations.
The future upgraded AFSSS will have S-Band radar stations spread out across the continental
U.S. at roughly the level of the 33rd parallel north, running from California to Georgia. As an S-
Band capability with ground-based transmitters and multiple receivers it is designed to perform
uncued detection, tracking and accurate measurement of smaller orbiting space objects.
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Figures 39-40. Legacy VHF fence transmitter (L), and future S-Band transmitter (R).
2.7.1.4.1 Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System PAVE PAWS
The United States Air Force Space Command Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array
Warning System (PAVE PAWS) is a system of ground-based ultra high frequency (UHF) phased
array radars that are located around the world. PAVE PAWS constitutes the heart of the U.S.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). The UHF band of PAVE-PAWs covers the
UHF radio frequency band from 300 megahertz to 3 gigahertz. Published site locations include
but are not necessarily limited to: Flyingdales, England; Beale AFB, CA, Cape Cod, MA,
Shemya Island, AK; Clear AFS, AK; Thule, Greenland; Cavalier AFB, ND; Eglin AFB, FL;
Robins AFB, GA; and perhaps other sites.
Traditionally, the primary mission of PAVE PAWS has been to detect and track sea-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) entering North
American air space, with a secondary mission to track satellites. Information received from the
PAVE PAWS radar systems pertaining to SLBM, ICBM, and satellite detection is forwarded to
the USSTRATCOM facilities at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Colorado. Beyond its early
warning mission and satellite tracking missions, PAVE PAWS now also serves as valuable
collection sources for the real-time refinement of the growing catalogue of detectable debris.
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Figures 41-42. A PAVE PAWS site (L), and phased planer array beam steering principles (R).
2.7.1.4.2 Haystack Radar
The Millstone/Haystack complex is owned and operated by Lincoln Laboratories of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Millstone/Haystack is part of the Lincoln Space
Surveillance Complex (LSSC), which consists of four large-aperture high-power radars: 1) the
Millstone Hill Radar (MHR) L-Band, 2) the MHR UHF, 3) Haystack Long-Range Imaging
Radar (LRIR), and 4) the Haystack Auxiliary (HAX) Radar. The LSSC sensors are contributing
sensors to the SSN. MHR and Haystack LRIR are both located in Tyngsboro, Massachusetts.
MHR is a deep-space radar that contributes 80 hours of space surveillance per week to the SSN.
Haystack is a deep-space imaging X-Band radar that provides wideband SOI data to the SSN one
week out of every six.
Measurements of near-Earth orbital debris are accomplished by conducting ground-based and
space-based observations of the orbital debris environment. As components of the SSN,
the Haystack X-Band Radar radiates at 22-25 GHz, 35-50 GHz, and 85-115 GHz frequency
bands to capture RF imagery of object details at 1-10 cm resolution. The Haystack Radar
currently operates in the 9.5 GHz to 10.5 GHz frequency band, and is scheduled to be upgraded
to a millimeter-wave (MMW) radar that operates in the 92 GHz to 100 GHz frequency band.
The new radar will use innovative transmitter design and signal processing to achieve image
resolution that is about 10 times better than what is currently available. The existing 37 meter
(120 foot) antenna will be replaced by a new dish, accurate to 0.1 millimeter (0.004 inch) over its
entire surface, which is a factor of 3 better than at present. The new antenna will also permit the
Haystack radio-telescope to operate in the 150 GHz range or higher, making it a premier radio-
astronomy facility.
2.7.1.4.3 Globus II Radar
The Globus II is an AN/FPS-129 radar station located at in Vardø, Norway, near the Russian
border. The site is administrated by the Norwegian Intelligence Service and is used for: 1) to
conduct space surveillance; 2) to conduct surveillance of areas of national interest abroad; and 3)
to gather information of interest to research and development. The radar was made by Raytheon
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to collect intelligence data against ballistic missiles. It was relocated to Norway from
Vandenberg AFB, CA where it had been titled “HAVE STARE.” The radar, which uses a
mechanically steered 27-meter dish antenna, is believed to have similar capabilities to the newer
U.S. X-band radar used in the sea-based anti-ballistic missile system. When the radar was built
the Norwegians stated that it was going to be used to monitor objects in space such as satellites
and space debris. This information was to be added to the Space Catalogue orbital database
provided by the US Space Command.
Today, it is believed that Globus II has important roles in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system
and the maintenance of space situational awareness. Located near the Russian border it is highly
capable of monitoring and building a signature database of Russian missiles. In addition, Vardø
is well placed for the radar to collect precision data on the warheads and decoys carried by
possible Russian, future Iranian missiles fired toward the U.S. While the radar is administered
by the Norwegian Intelligence Service, it is believed to be integrated within the U.S. SSN.
2.7.1.4.4 Kwajalein Island
The Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, previously referred to as the Kwajalein
Missile Range, is a missile test range in the Pacific Ocean. It covers about 750,000 square miles
(1,900,000 km2) and includes rocket launch sites on multiple islands within Kwajalein
Atoll, Wake Island, and Aur Atoll. It primarily functions as a test facility for U.S. missile
defense and space research programs, and is under the command of the US Army Kwajalein
Atoll, or USAKA. The mission control center, along with most of the personnel and
infrastructure, is located at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The test site includes
various tracking radars, stationary and mobile telemetry, optical recording equipment and a
secure fiber optic data network via undersea cable. The Reagan Test Site also serves as a
tracking station for manned space flight and NASA research projects. Launch activities at the
test site include ballistic missile tests, ABM interception tests, meteorological sounding
rockets, and a commercial spaceport for SpaceX at Omelek Island. The data received by the
space capable sensors at Kwajalein Island can be used to augment the space situational
awareness of the SSN.
Figures 43-45. Haystack Radar (L), Globus II Radar (C), and Kwajalein Radar Facility (R).
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2.7.1.4.5 Sea-Based X-Band Radar
The Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) is a floating, self-propelled, mobile radar station designed
to operate in high winds and heavy seas. It is part of the U.S. DoD Ballistic Missile Defense
System. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar is mounted on a fifth generation Norwegian-designed,
Russian-built CS-50 semi-submersible twin-hulled oil-drilling platform. It is nominally based
at Adak Island in Alaska but can roam over the Pacific Ocean to detect incoming ballistic
missiles. The platform is part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system being
deployed by MDA. Being sea-based allows the platform(s) to be moved to areas where they are
needed for enhanced missile defense. The primary task of SBX will be discrimination and
identification of enemy warheads from decoys, followed by precision tracking of the identified
warheads. The platform has a central, large dome that encloses and protects a phased-array,
1,800 ton X-Band radar antenna. Operating in the 7.0 to 11.2 GHz range, X-Band radar is also
capable of contributing to SSA and the SSN mission by detecting, tracking, and cataloguing new
LEO space objects.
Figures 46-47. Sea Based X-Band radar during transport (L), and underway on own power (R).
2.7.1.5 Infrared Tracking
Infrared (IR) sensors can detect objects that emit heat. As space is cold, on average about –200
C, most objects in space are also cold. This limits ground and airborne terrestrial sensors that
look up at ballistic missile payloads, satellites, and space debris from below with cold space as a
background to the cold objects. At best terrestrial IR sensors are limited to applications that
track missile launches and track objects during re-entry. To overcome this limitation of
terrestrial IR sensors the U.S. and other major military powers have constellations of space-based
IR sensors that look down in an effort to contrast the cold space objects against the hot terrestrial
background. These U.S. space based IR sensors are inputs to the integrated space situational
awareness achieved by the SSN.
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The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is a consolidated system intended to meet
the U.S.'s infrared space surveillance needs through the first two to three decades of the 21st
century. The SBIRS program addresses critical national needs in the areas of BMEWS early
warning, missile defense, terrestrial battlespace characterization, and space situational
awareness. SBIRS will include satellites with IR sensors in GEO, IR sensors hosted on satellites
in HEO, and ground-based data processing and control that ties SBIRS into the SSN.
The SBIRS High will consist of four dedicated satellites operating in GEO, and sensors on two
host satellites operating in a HEO. SBIRS High will replace the Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellite constellation and was intended primarily to provide enhanced strategic and theater
ballistic missile warning capabilities. The SBIRS Low program was expected to consist of about
24 satellites in LEO. The primary purpose of SBIRS Low is the tracking of ballistic missiles and
discriminating between the warheads and other objects, such as decoys, that separate from the
missile bodies throughout the middle portion of their flights. Its effectiveness comes again from
the ability of those cold objects to be contrasted from above by SIBRS Low sensors against the
background of a warm earth. Interestingly, SIBRS High and Low are both optimal for detecting
and characterizing cold space debris.
Figures 48-49. Artistic renditions of SBIRS Low (L), and SIBRS High (R).
2.7.2 Russian Space Surveillance
The Russian Federation Space Surveillance System (SSS) is a space situational awareness
acquisition system that includes 10 radars operating in a combination of UHF, VHF, and C-Band
of 4 to 8 GHz. In a similar fashion as the U.S. SSN, the SSS integrates in multiple (12) optical
and electro-optical facilities. The SSS radars are used to track objects in lower orbits, while the
optical and electro-optical facilities are used only for tracking objects in higher orbits.
Additional sensors are occasionally included in the system for important tasks and experiments.
The lack of a worldwide network of sensors results in some major discontinuities in observation
and some regions in Earth orbital space where objects cannot be observed at all. Observations
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are also provided to the SSS by two Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD) radars in the
Moscow region near Sofrino and Chekhov operating at 400 MHz in the UHF Band.
Data from the sensors comes from approximately 50,000 observations daily to maintain a
catalogue of nearly 5,000 objects, most in LEO, that are transmitted to the Russian Space
Surveillance Center. There they are processed, and the Russian Space Catalogue is updated and
refined. This includes updates on object identification, orbital elements, setting plans for future
observations, determination of orbital lifetimes, and distribution of information to interested
space programs. Owing to geographical limitations similar to those in the U.S., Earth satellites
at low inclinations are difficult or impossible to track. As a whole, the SSS radar sensors appear
to be limited to a range of about 4,000 km, not unlike the U.S. VHF Fence.
Today, two sites appear to form the heart of the SSS in Russia, namely the Okno and Krona
complexes. By means of Okno and Krona Russia maintains a significant space surveillance
capability independent of its Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW) assets. These combined
radar and electro-optical (EO) systems facilities have performed various military and civil roles,
including an analysis of the surface impact point of the Mir Space Station and identification of
space debris. The performance of Okno and Krona systems guarantees the Russian space
surveillance network will play a valuable part to in both national defense and international space
exploitation.
2.7.2.1 Okna Facility
The Okno system is a fully automated optical tracking station used for the detection, tracking,
and identification of satellites. Optical telescopes scan the night sky, while computer systems
analyze the results and filter out the stars through analysis and comparison of velocities,
luminosities, and trajectories. Satellites are then tracked with orbital parameters being calculated
and logged. Okno can detect and track satellites orbiting the Earth at altitudes between 2,000
and 40,000 kilometers. This increased altitude capability over earlier space surveillance radar
systems was necessitated due to the U.S. fielding surveillance satellites operating in high GEO.
The Okno system is situated near Nurek, Tajikistan, approximately 50 km southeast of the
capital of Dushanbe. The main facility consists of ten telescopes covered by large clamshell
domes. The telescopes are divided into two stations, with the detection complex containing six
telescopes and the tracking station containing four. Each station features its own control center,
with a central command and control center, likely also housing the detection and tracking
computer systems, located in the center of the facility. Also present is an 11th, smaller dome
mounted atop a much smaller building. It is not known what function this additional facility
performs. It may contain guide-star-like atmospheric measuring equipment used to assess
atmospheric conditions before activation of the system, such as that employed by the U.S. at the
SOR and MSSS facilities.
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Figures 50-51. Satellite image of Okno complex (L), and four tracking telescopes (R)..
2.7.2.2 Krona Facility
Like Okna, the Krona system combines long-range radar and optical tracking system designed to
facilitate radar slew to EO cue. Rather than simply identifying objects as artificial satellites, the
Krona system seeks to categorize satellites by type. The system consists of three main
components: 1) a large S-Band phased-array radar for target identification; 2) a system of five X-
Band parabolic radar antennae for target classification; and 3) an EO system combining a
telescope with a laser system. The Krona system has a range of 3,200 kilometers and can detect
targets orbiting at a height of up to 40,000 kilometers. Development of the Krona system began
in 1974 when it was determined that current space-tracking systems were unable to accurately
identify the type of satellite being tracked. Target discrimination was an important component of
any ASAT program. Preliminary design work for the Krona complex, designated 45J6, was
completed in 1976. Installation of S and X-Band radar systems followed as did the EO/laser
complex (designated as 30J6) with separate housings for the optical telescope and the laser
system.
The X-Band radar system incorporated into the 20J6 system was designed in part to provide
telemetry data to direct the 30J6 optical/laser system. The laser system was designed to provide
target illumination for the optical system, which would capture images of target satellites at night
or in clear weather. Favorable atmospheric qualities were one factor in determining the location
of the Krona systems. Construction of the first Krona facility began in 1979 near Storozhevaya
in southwestern Russia.
It was initially planned to construct three Krona complexes. The second Krona complex would
have been located near the Okno complex in Tajikistan, with the third complex being located
near Nakhodka in the Russian Far East.
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Figures 52-53. Krona tracking station (L), and 30J6 complex at Krona-Storozhevaya (R).
2.7.3 French Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial
The French Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial (GRAVES) is a space situational
awareness radar employed by France for national security purposes. Known in English as the
Wide Network Suitable for Space Surveillance, GRAVES is designed to detect and characterize
satellites operating in LEO. GRAVES development began in early 1990, with its primary
purpose being to provide France an autonomous capacity for the detection and/or identification,
and cataloguing of satellites and objects like the U.S. Air Force SSN and Russian SSS, and to do
so independently of those foreign systems. GRAVES was commissioned in December 2005 and
to date is the only operational satellite monitoring system in Western Europe. Only Russia and
the United States have similarly capable systems.
The French acknowledge the need to maintain space situational awareness continuously and in
real time from a national security perspective. The French recognized the utility of the U.S.
radar space fence composed of widely separated receivers across a distance between them that
spans the length of the U.S., with the result being an electromagnetic curtain. GRAVES serves a
similar purpose, though with a different geometry.
The GRAVES radar can detect satellites passing over France at orbital altitudes below 1000 km.
In a similar concept to the U.S. PAVE PAWS phased array, GRAVES is a bistatic radar with
electronic scanning and continuous emission active interrogation. The receiving system
measures the Doppler shift of the return signals. Like the U.S. Space fence, the GRAVES
transmitter site is located remotely from the receiver site. The transmitter site is located on
the former Broyes les Pesmes Air Base near the village of Broye-Aubigney-Montseugny. The
receiver site is located on the Plateau d'Albion roughly 400 km from the transmitter. According
to the Federation of American Scientists, the transmitting antennas of the GRAVES radar is
VHF, operating at 143 MHz.
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Figures 54-56. GRAVES transmitter site (Top) and GRAVES receiver site (Bottom L and R).
2.7.4 European Space Agency
The European Space Agency (ESA) Space Debris Telescope is located at the Teide Observatory
on the island of Tenerife, Spain. The telescope is ESA's Optical Ground Station forming a part of
the Artemis Experiment. A large fraction of the telescope observation time is dedicated to space
debris surveys, in particular the observation of space debris in GEO and in GEO transfer orbits.
It was due to this dedicated task that the term ESA Space Debris Telescope became used very
frequently. Space debris surveys are carried out every month, centered, around the time of the
New Moon. The telescope is a Ritchey-Chrétien telescope with an aperture of 1 m and field of
view of 0.7 degrees, and equipped with a cryogenically cooled mosaic CCD-Camera of 4k x 4k
pixels. The detection threshold is between 19th and 21st magnitude, which corresponds to a
capability to detect space debris objects as small as 15 cm in GEO.
The partially ESA-funded Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) global network of observation stations
measure the round trip time of flight of ultrashort pulses of coherent light to satellites equipped
with retro-reflectors. This provides instantaneous range measurements of millimeter level
precision which can be accumulated to provide accurate measurement of orbits and a host of
important scientific data. SLR is the most accurate technique currently available to determine
the geocentric position of an Earth satellite. The SLR network is also able to measure variations
in the Earth’s gravity field over time. SLR can also monitor the response of the atmosphere to
seasonal variations in solar heating. Finally, SLR provides a unique capability for verification of
the predictions of the theory of General Relativity, such as the frame-dragging effect. SLR work
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is carried out at several global locations including Herstmonceux in East Sussex, UK, and
Wettzell, Germany. The ESA funds SLR missions and the U.S. DoD has incorporated data
obtained from this laser ranging into the development of their world surveying and measuring
systems.
Figures 57-58. SDT on Tenerife Island, Spain (L), and SLR facility at Wettzell, Bavaria (R).
2.8 Conclusions About Space Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance
In the 2010 report by the RAND report titled Confronting Space Debris - Strategies and
Warnings from Comparable Examples Including Deepwater Horizon quoted earlier in this paper,
RAND also observed:
[Governments] argue that the problem is not severe enough now, though, to move to
remediation, or actively removing debris, given the lack of government and private
interest (particularly funding) for remediation efforts despite their increasing utilization
of space. “If debris were deemed to represent an unacceptable risk to current or future
operations,” they write, “a remedy would already have been developed by the private
sector.”
A few decision makers in government and industry say that there is still no current business case
for cleaning up space debris, and the lack or infrequency of any serious or damaging collisions is
evidence that debris concerns are overblown. The RAND report continues:
The authors [of the RAND report], though, do provide some lessons for any future
remediation efforts, using the saga of the Deepwater Horizon—the oil rig that was
destroyed in the Gulf of Mexico in April, creating the largest oil spill in US history—as a
case study. The biggest lesson, they argue, is that any remediation technologies need to
be tested first in actual operating conditions, as many of the efforts tested on the
Deepwater Horizon spill failed because they had not been previously used in deep ocean
conditions. The event also demonstrated the need to have multiple approaches to solving
the problem, as no single approach can work all the time.
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The RAND report observations encourage an acceleration of debris clearing efforts to avoid the
pitfalls of reacting to a disastrous forcing function. The space domain is increasingly a global
domain, just as international waters permit unrestricted access. The sole early entrants were
Russia and the U.S., and both continue to have the preponderance of operational space systems,
laying claim to and filling up the best orbital altitudes. With a focus on maintaining national
security and commercial advantages in space, the best U.S. space situational awareness picture is
not shared internationally. The Russian SSS and French GRAVES are similarly compartmented
for reasons of security. So long as the global space situational awareness picture remains
disintegrated serious gaps of coverage and object awareness will grow.
As noted earlier, space situational awareness (SSA) is a critical prerequisite to understanding the
advancing maturity of the Kessler Syndrome. Without real time global SSA the risks of
collisions are going to increase exponentially, in correspondence with the exponential rise in
debris. Collisions must be accurately predicted and avoided to preserve current and future
orbital space systems. “Conjunctions” (orbital intersections of space objects) must be calculable
with precision. Some advocates are calling for more accurate data, and suggest that
USTRATCOM should make available the un-degraded SSA data calculated by the U.S. SSN to
the global space community rather than the relatively inaccurate NORAD TLEs of today. They
echo the RAND report that in denying the larger space community more accurate data we risk a
catastrophic event, and point to other parallels in recent history.
One tragedy is noteworthy, as the combination of a threatening increase in object density in
orbital space and inferior SSA data can be compared to the environment that contributed to the
1983 shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. KAL 007 was a civilian airliner that was
destroyed by Soviet interceptors on 1 September 1983, over the Sea of Japan. It was intercepted
after it strayed widely off of its planned New York City to Seoul, South Korea course, and into
the restricted airspace of the Soviet Union near Sakhalin Island around the time of a planned
Soviet missile test. All 269 passengers and crew aboard KAL 007 were killed, leading to one of
the tensest confrontations of the Cold War. The Global Positioning System (GPS) existed at that
time, but its use was restricted to the DoD. As one consequence of the KAL 007 incident, on 16
September 1983 President Ronald Reagan ordered the U.S. military to make the GPS available
free of charge for civilian use so that navigational errors like that of KAL 007 could be averted in
the future. Unfortunately, this came as a result of tragedy and ensuing public outrage, not U.S.
foresight.
National security restrictions are realities we must live with. Space faring nations who are also
military powers will not want to compromise their secret advantages in SSA in spite of the rising
debris threat. In actuality, as little information as the U.S. Air Force shares regarding its SSN
data collection and catalogue, it actually provides more information than other national security
establishments. In contrast, the U.S. provides timely precision warning to the ISS and
commercial satellites that the SSN tracks. Also, the USSTRATCOM provides the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) two line elements (TLE) to the public and
industry for general purposes. If in a coordinated effort the U.S. and perhaps the Russians could
agree, perhaps USSTRATCOM could reduce the error probability in published TLEs by some
percentage the Russians could do similarly with their SSS TLEs as an initial step towards better
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SSA.
Still, such efforts to change national policies require time and do not guarantee useful outcomes.
Since NORAD TLEs contain large probabilities of error that prevent potential U.S. adversaries
from knowing the true precision of the SSN SSA capabilities strong resistance to change is
assured, in spite of the change in context. This decision to provide the public erred TLEs was
considered a risk worth taking when the Earth orbital space regime was less populated and less
polluted with debris. Collisions were highly improbable so decision makers were satisfied that
the public was not placed at risk. Unfortunately, today orbital space is a much more crowded
and hazardous environment, and all users of space are badly in need of higher precision data to
avoid collisions. Therefore, two efforts must proceed concurrently. First, the value of better
SSA must be articulated. Second, space users must independently develop a work-around to get
more accurate data now as the increasing risk of collisions represents a clear and present danger.
As for value, insurers are currently mixed in their evaluation of debris as a threat that requires
higher operator premiums. Some insurers tend to charge more for that threat than other.
However, it is generally accepted that the threat is increasing. In the future insurers of spacecraft
might welcome reduced risk to the space asset they underwrite. Even more so, space systems
operators might welcome a reduction in the insurance premiums that they are charged. As
evidence, on 18 March 2011 at the Congressional Aerospace Policy Retreat a presentation titled
“Space Debris and Insurance” was briefed by Chris Kunstadter, the Senior Vice President of XL
Insurance. On a slide titled "Basic Space Insurance Market Metrics" he stated:
[There are] 30-40 insured launches per year (~50% of total) carrying 20-25 GEO
satellites and 15-30 LEO satellites. Insured values range up to $400 million (up to $700
million for Ariane dual launches), typically $100 million to $250 million. Annual
premium ranges from $750 to $950 million. Annual claims range from $100 million to
$1.8 billion. Currently 193 insured satellites [are] in orbit [for a] Total insured value of
$19.8 billion. GEO: 175 satellites = $18.5 billion (~50% of total). LEO: 18 satellites =
$1.3 billion (~5% of total). Hundreds more insured for third-party liability.
At the same time, the space team has determined that there may be a monetary cost that can be
assigned to degraded data, specifically the cost that operators incur from debris-related damage
and destruction over the course of the lifetime of representative space system constellations.
Again, as evidenced at the aforementioned Congressional Aerospace Policy Retreat, in another
presentation titled “Orbital Debris: Human Created Barriers to Space,” Aerospace Corp.
analyzed projections of the cost of debris on representative satellite constellations for a 30
timeframe. The analysis found:
[1] A small constellation (5 satellites) of government weather satellites with a lifetime of
about 6 years. [2] A medium-sized (20 satellites) constellation of commercial Earth
imaging satellites with a lifetime of about 9 years. [3] A large constellation (70 satellites)
of commercial communications satellites with a lifetime of about 12 years. Increase of
between $700M and $1.2B in constellation replenishment costs for these hypothetical
constellations.
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Another cost would seem to be incurred from operators responding conservatively to error-filled
data, and consequently making unnecessary spacecraft maneuvers in a dense object environment.
Each maneuver expends fuel and shortens the operational lifetime of the satellite. When
calculated over the lifetime of the satellite individual maneuvers can cost millions of dollars per
event, particularly for massive satellites that need to maneuver in GEO.
Conversely, more accurate data has an inversely proportional value. More accurate data leads to
lower probabilities of error in predicted missed distances and fuel and system lifetime are
conserved.
In addition to the monetary value of better data the space team has identified a normative, better
said altruistic value. There should be a shared incentive to avoid a catastrophic tragedy,
especially when it can be predicted in advance, and is not acted on. The BP oil spill and KAL
007 flight path deviation are examples that led to public forcing functions that forced changes
based on public outrage rather than foresight. As for space, the collision between Iridium and
Cosmos satellites was a taste of the expensive possibilities. Loss of GPS and certain GEO
systems would be even more costly, perhaps seriously upsetting terrestrial civil capabilities in the
process. Blackouts and transportation interruptions cannot be ruled out, much less loss of
internet, navigation and other communications capabilities. At the extreme end of the spectrum
is the possibility for loss of life in orbit or on Earth.
As for an independent work-around, a catastrophe of the sort described above has not yet
happened, and it would appear that the space community still has a chance to get in front of the
issue in a preventative fashion. The story of Differential GPS is instructive as it has similarities
with the TLE accuracy dilemma.
Differential GPS (DGPS) is an enhancement to GPS that provides improved location accuracy,
from the 15-meter nominal GPS accuracy up to about 10 cm. When GPS was first being put into
service, the U.S. military was concerned about the possibility of enemy forces using the globally
available GPS signals to guide their own weapon systems. To avoid this, the precision signal was
encrypted. The publicly available signal was deliberately degraded, just as the NORAD space
TLEs are degraded today. The degraded GPS public signal was known as "Selective Availability
(SA)," and was useless for any serious navigation purposes. It even proved dangerous when
during the Gulf War widespread use of civilian receivers by U.S. forces causing position errors
of up to 100 meters. SA threatened to bring greater harm to U.S. forces than if it were turned off.
Government enforcement of SA persisted into the 1990s, so users in need of high position
location data turned to the independently available DGPS work-around to great satisfaction, as it
had evolved into a more accurate capability than the encrypted military signal. DGPS was a
positive forcing function that helped lead to President Bill Clinton’s decision to turn the military
encryption and SA signal off permanently in 2000.
Independently, experts at the NASA Ames Research Center have studied the deficiencies of
publicly available TLE data and asked the following questions: 1) Can we calculate more
accurate a more accurate real time SSA using the degraded public data, and 2) Can we predict
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conjunctions using only public TLEs well enough to make practical collision avoidance / space
traffic management decisions? On 11 February 2010 Creon Levit and Will Marshall of the
NASA Ames Research Center coauthored a paper titled Improved Orbit Predictions Using Two-
Line Elements. In the paper Abstract the authors stated in part:
This paper addresses collision avoidance, by describing a method that contributes to
achieving a requisite increase in orbit prediction accuracy. Batch least-squares
differential correction is applied to the publicly available two-line element (TLE) catalog
of space objects. Using a high-precision numerical propagator, we t an orbit to state
vectors derived from successive TLEs. We then propagate the fitted orbit further forward
in time. These predictions are compared to precision ephemeris data derived from the
International Laser Ranging Service (ILRS) for several satellites, including objects in the
congested sun-synchronous orbital region. The method leads to a predicted range error
that increases at a typical rate of 100 meters per day, approximately a 10-fold
improvement over TLE's propagated with their associated analytic propagator (SGP4).
Corresponding improvements for debris trajectories could potentially provide initial
conjunction analysis sufficiently accurate for an operationally viable collision avoidance
system.
The authors go on to discuss additional optimization and the computational requirements for
applying all-on-all conjunction analysis to the entire current TLE catalog, and to future catalogue
entrants. The authors conclude by outlining a scheme for debris-debris collision avoidance that
may become practicable given these developments.
The scientists at NASA Ames have also conceived of complementary efforts that can assist in
refining the SSA common operating picture with existing sensor technologies. Creon Levit has
suggested that amateur space enthusiasts and research institutions can be incentivized to
purchase small VHF receivers that capture the Air Force fence radar returns continuously and
directly. The fence transmission frequencies are known, and in a form of crowd-sourcing those
distributed inputs can be synthesized in real time for increased accuracy. Just as millions of
personal computers have participated as netted, parallel contributors to massive research
problems by conducting calculations invisibly in the background, the same can be done for SSA.
These 24/7 received VHF returns can, via internet contribute to an ever-more refined space
object data base that is not under the control of USSTRATCOM. Space systems operators and
insurers might subsidize or provide small receivers for free due to the commercial value of
superior SSA. The space team predicts that space enthusiasts can be predicted to benefit from
the great normative satisfaction of contributing to the future of space. A company such as Radio
Shack might be willing to assist with distribution as provision of the cheap or no-cost receivers
would draw many customers to their stores. NASA Ames noted that the much touted but long
delayed S-Band upgrade to the Air Force Fence may be unnecessary as the products of the batch
least-squares differential corrections may be superior to the higher resolution promised by S-
Band. Here again is a one-for-one analogous repetition of the DGPS example described above.
Finally, Creon Levit has noted there should be a concurrent software development effort to keep
pace with the improvements via TLE differential corrections. The corrections are admittedly
computationally intensive, although the NASA Ames super-computing capacity to do such
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processing is more than able to handle the increased load. Nevertheless, improved software
would permit even more efficient use of the computational resources.
Other groups outside of the national security space communities have also taken the initiative to
provide better data for collision avoidance. For example, “What’s Up” is the title of a useful
website at http://www.satellitedebris.net/whatsup/. What’s Up is a visual data base for satellites
and debris that combines database information from the U.S. SPACETRACK catalog and the
UCS Satellite Database, and presents it visually in Google Earth. It allows the user to display the
location of individual objects or sets of objects (both active satellites and debris) around the
Earth, as well as showing the orbit and technical information about each object. The user can
also change the color of sets of objects to distinguish them in the display. The location and orbits
of each object are updated every morning from the SPACETRACK catalog and are downloaded
to the user’s computer. Another example is the Space Data Association (SDA), which has a
website at http://www.space-data.org/sda/. The SDA is a non-profit association that brings
together satellite operators who value controlled, reliable and efficient data-sharing critical to the
safety and integrity of the space environment and the RF spectrum. The SDA was founded by
Inmarsat, Intelsat and SES, three of the leading global satellite communications companies.
2.9 Gaps in Space Situational Awareness and Debris Removal Efforts
Estimates on the number of human-made and potentially damaging space debris and objects
currently in orbit range from 500,000 1 cm or greater in size to tens of millions of objects less
than 1 cm. All are potentially damaging to satellites, many with predictably catastrophic results.
In spite of the SSA systems such as SSN, SSS, and GRAVES the objects between 1 mm and 10
cm escape detection. Increased resolution over time will improve certainty, but for the time
being exact locations cannot be determined. Scientists are in agreement that the debris field
continues to be populated faster than the rate of debris reentry.
Resolution and SSA issues aside, the growing danger of collisions between massive detectable
objects is a call to action for orbital debris removal (ODR) of those objects. There is also a
consensus that a single collision between two satellites or large pieces of “space junk” will send
(and have recently sent) thousands of new pieces of debris spinning into orbit, each capable of
destroying further satellites. Some scientists have speculated that the threshold of a runaway
Kessler Syndrome has already been crossed in polar orbits where satellites converge, and that
exponential debris self-proliferation / growth is underway.
A further aggravation of the problem is lacking international accountability. The dominance of
“clean orbits” in LEO and MEO, especially by legacy space powers, suggests responsibility be
assigned to them for the ODR from polluted orbits, orbits that they were solely responsible for
polluting in the past. Today many of those LEO orbits between 800 km and 1,000 km and
between 1,400 km and 1,600 km are nearly unusable due to the higher risk of collisions.
Clearing and opening up the polluted orbits would permit current and pending new entrants to
space to plan and execute missions of interest to their nations. In addition to existing space
faring nations who would appreciate new clean orbits, cash rich new entrants could include, but
are certainly not limited to the United Arab Emirates, and Brazil and Saudi Arabia in the future.
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In the U.S. NASA already has a program dedicated to understanding and mitigating space debris.
However NASA cannot do it alone. At a minimum the U.S. (Air Force) Executive Agent for
Space in DoD should demonstrate accountability, and fund technologies and systems to
eliminate debris in unusable orbits, the pollution of which the U.S. is partially or fully
responsible. This DoD initiative should be taken in the spirit of the U.S. demonstrating
international responsibility and cooperation in space matters. On the other hand if the U.S. DoD
does not take the initiative, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China, and other cash rich nations might
unilaterally fund efforts to clean up those orbits on their own, and for their own benefit and use.
The Japanese have already begun such work with a “fishing net” based concept, to be discussed
later. There are other several viable commercial technologies for debris collection and removal
that only lack funding for full realization.
In 1976, when NASA scientists first identified the debris risk, they predicted that space collisions
would happen once a century. Four occurred over the next four decades. Today the agency
predicts four collisions every 20 years. Former NASA scientist Don Kessler, who discovered the
debris amplification process with former NORAD senior analyst John Gabbard, foresees a
catastrophic collision once every 20 years. Even NASA recognizes that its existing rule, namely
that objects must have the capability to push themselves (or be pushed) out of orbit within 30
years of launch, isn’t enough anymore. Earlier this year, it published a paper showing that it
could make low-Earth orbit safe by removing five objects per year.
To collect ideas on how to achieve this, last year NASA and DARPA, the DoD’s research arm,
gathered hundreds of engineers and scientists for the first-ever International Conference on
ODR. Nearly all the solutions discussed there rely on finding some way to de-orbit the debris so
it burns up in the atmosphere. The conference also revealed that international cooperation is the
greatest hurdle. There is, for example, no official consensus on what constitutes space debris.
One country’s seemingly dead satellite might just be hibernating for future use. Governments
were also concerned that debris-removal systems could have military uses, and not every country
provides details about what they have in orbit.
Concurrently, NASA stood up an Orbital Debris Program Office. The office located at
the Johnson Space Center which has been assigned as the lead NASA center for orbital
debris research. Since its formation the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has taken the
international lead in conducting measurements of the environment and in developing the
technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment.
Work at the center continues with developing an improved understanding of the orbital debris
environment and measures that can be taken to control its growth. As noted earlier NASA Ames
Research Center has also begun to make significant contributions to NASA’s efforts. Orbital
debris research at NASA is divided into several broad research efforts, involving modeling,
measurements, protection, mitigation, and reentry of orbital debris. Protection and reentry were
discussed earlier in this paper. What follows is a discussion of the various kinetic and
electromagnetic avoidance and removal concepts that have been developed by NASA or
presented to NASA to-date.
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2.9.1 Orbital Debris Removal Concepts
Amateur astronomers and space enthusiasts worldwide can also contribute to collision avoidance
efforts. Specifically, amateurs can contribute by filling gaps and independently making and
reporting objects and phenomena of potential interest. Amateur discoveries of comets and
asteroids are reported in the media fairly routinely. As for space debris there is a significant
opportunity for amateurs globally to contribute to the shared picture of orbital Earth. Space
enthusiasts worldwide can potentially be incentivized to search NASA space imagery archives or
the night sky in real time in order to make new discoveries, and/or confirm previous
observations. Naming debris and asteroid objects after the discoverers, paying discoverers for
new object discoveries, and even X-Prizes for technological designs that lead to the actual
mitigation of debris to clean up the most polluted orbits are all worthy of consideration.
2.9.1.1 Electrodynamic Tethers
Electrodynamic tethers (EDTs) are long conducting wires which can operate on electromagnetic
principles as generators by converting their kinetic energy to electrical energy, or alternatively
converting electrical energy to the kinetic energy in the form of a motor. Electric potential is
generated across a conductive tether by its motion through the Earth's magnetic field. As part of
a tether propulsion system, crafts can use long, strong conductors to change the orbits of
spacecraft. It is a simplified, very low-budget magnetic sail. It can be used either to accelerate or
brake an orbiting spacecraft. When direct current is pumped through the tether, it exerts
a Lorentz force against the magnetic field, and the tether accelerates the spacecraft.
A motional Electromotive Force (EMF) is generated across a tether element as it moves relative
to a magnetic field. It is assumed the tether system moves relative to Earth’s magnetic field.
Similarly, if current flows in the tether element, a force can be generated that is orthogonal to the
path of both the direct current path through the conductor and the lines of magnetic force that the
tether crosses. In self-powered mode, this EMF can be used by the tether system to drive the
current through the tether and other electrical loads, to emit electrons at the emitting end, or
collect electrons at the opposite. The self-powered mode will cause the perigee of the spacecraft
to be lowered in altitude as the velocity slows. There atmospheric drag will take over and
rapidly de-orbit the spacecraft. Conversely, if the system is in boost mode, on-board power
supplies must overcome this motional EMF to drive current in the opposite direction, thus
creating a force in the opposite direction. This will increase the velocity of the spacecraft and
over time drive the system to a higher orbital altitude.
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Figures 59-60. Electrodynamic tether boost and de-boost forces (L), and deorbiting tether (R).
There are several tether developers who have made proposals and even conducted successful
experiments in support of NASA. One commercial proposal is employed here as a
representative concept. It has been selected for its public domain availability, and its inclusion is
not intended to indicate a preference for one concept over another. On 10 February 2010,
Jerome Pearson, Eugene Levin, John Oldson, and Joseph Carroll of Star Technology and
Research, Inc. and Tether Applications made a presentation titled “ElectroDynamic Debris
Eliminator (EDDE) for Safe Space Operations” before the 13th Annual FAA/AIAA Commercial
Space Transportation Conference. The presentation focused on the EDT product. For the
purpose of discussion below, “EDDE” has been replaced with “EDT” for neutrality, yet to
demonstrate the general maturity of existing EDT concepts by showing what one proposer has
presented.
The presentation began with the illustration of all the man made debris mass orbiting earth, 99%
of the mass and 98% of the surface area of all those debris is still concentrated in a mere 2,465
objects, each having a mass of 2 kg or greater. This concentration represents the possibility to
clean up LEO in the near term, given effective technologies. If the removal of all 2,465 objects
over 2 kg from LEO, future collision-generated LEO debris can be accomplished, it would be
reduced by 99%, effectively preventing the Kessler Syndrome debris runaway / proliferation
from occurring. The ideal technology must focus on capturing the 2,465 objects of >2 kg mass
and cause each to be de-orbited in a controlled de-boost. EDT generally, and EDT specifically
were introduced as hopeful technologies.
In the process of orbital cleanup operations, the EDT must actively avoid all tracked satellites
and debris. The EDT vehicle must also enable targeted precision re-entry if that is required.
EDT vehicles could eliminate the threat of future collision-generated debris in LEO over a period
of 7 years. This could also include the start of a regular service that removes all newly launched
upper stages and failed satellites.
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The electromotive force (EMF) that is imposed on the tether that can drive the EDT to higher
and lower orbital altitudes, and amounts to “Propellantless Propulsion.” The principle has been
demonstrated in practice in orbit by NASA-JSC on JSC’s Plasma Motor Generator (PMG) flight.
Each EDT is only 100 kg, and stows into 24” by 24” by 12” volume. In fact two EDTs fit into
one ESPA secondary payload slot. Each net manager holds 100 50 gram mesh nets. When the
EDT passes the target at 2-3 meters per second it can capture the object in the net, while
damping out capture dynamics.
Figure 61. EDT boost and/or de-boost vehicle (courtesy: Star Inc.).
EDT can perform 100’s of kilometers per day in altitude changes, and over one degree per day in
orbital plane changes. As an incremental approach, a “Mini-EDT” demonstration could be
performed first as a proof of concept. This demo system could be launched as a piggy back
payload on any flight with 100-kg margin. Once in space it could capture and drag down an
inactive U.S. object. For example, a Pegasus Upper Stage could serve as the captured object. A
scaled-down mission-capable EDT could also be employed to demonstrate orbit transfer and
rendezvous capabilities, again using a Pegasus Upper Stage as the sample object in place of an
operational satellite.
EDT is also capable of removing debris to higher, non-interfering graveyard orbits for storage in
anticipation of future recycling in salvage operations. Alternatively, EDT can lower debris to a
330 km altitude orbit for rapid natural decay, and with a “smart drag” device a controlled reentry
could better guarantee a precision and safe impact on land or at sea. Release to targeted reentry
point could use the momentum exchange between the EDT and the debris object. This principle
was demonstrated by SEDS-1 by the U.S. and by YES-2 during a joint ESA and Russian
mission.
The EDT capability fits well with emerging concepts and plans for international space traffic
control EDT is the first of a new class of space vehicles that is designed to roam over and
throughout LEO like a Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) in controlled air space. It is designed to
cross satellite orbits while avoiding collision, based on real time space situational awareness and
coordinated flight plans for safe navigation. During typical debris removal operations EDT
would drag each captured object below the 330 km altitude of the ISS, thereby reducing its orbit
life to a few months. In fact each EDT vehicle could remove 40 tons per year from LEO, or 400
times its own mass per year. In the end all of the 2,465 objects over 2 kg (2166 metric tons total)
currently in LEO could be removed by 12 EDTs over a period of just 7 years.
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Figures 62. Errand satellite with de-boost / de-orbiting electrodynamic tether attached.
2.9.1.2 Combining Kinetic and Electromagnetic ODR
EDTs from Star Inc. and other manufacturers appear to be sufficiently mature to be integrated in
all new space vehicles or components that find themselves in orbital space. As for existing
debris, it is critical to note that the economical role of tethers is primarily in de-orbiting larger
pieces of space debris, including non-operational satellites. These objects currently number in
the low thousands and can be located and characterized with great precision so that robotic
systems could approach them and attach de-orbiting tethers. As for smaller, less massive objects
such as those in the size range of 1 – 10 cm, those objects are better suited for other ODR
techniques, most notably high energy lasers (HEL). Tethers and lasers are therefore completely
complementary technologies with respect to addressing the orbital debris challenges. Directed
energy (DE)-enabled ODR is discussed in the next section.
2.9.1.3 High Energy Lasers
DE engagement of debris provides an instantaneous capability to protect spacecraft and satellites
55
from destructive hypervelocity collisions with debris. In LEO debris is closing with spacecraft at
up to 10 km per second and poses the greatest threat to spacecraft today according to NASA.
There are several advantages to high energy laser (HEL = / > 1 kW average power) ODR and
collision avoidance techniques: 1) the momentum of laser beam photons imparted to the object at
the speed of light can be used to produce thrust on the debris directly. While this photon
pressure would be miniscule, it may be enough to nudge small debris into new orbits that do not
intersect those of working satellites, achieving collision avoidance. 2) another laser induced
cause of thrust can come from debris out-gassing when that object is thermally loaded during
prolonged exposure to a high average power laser; 3) finally, high energy pulse lasers are
capable of ablating the surface of the engaged debris causing momentary acceleration from high
velocity plasma jet forces.
One proposed concept that NASA has considered is the “Laser Broom.” The laser broom
concept is based on a powerful multi-megawatt ground-based HEL designed to ablate the front
surface off of debris and thereby produce a rocket-like thrust that slows the object. With a
frequently repeated application the debris will eventually decrease in altitude enough to become
subject to atmospheric drag. In the late 1990s, US Air Force worked on a ground-based laser
broom design under the name "Project Orion” as a means to remove fragments from 1 - 10 cm in
size is the laser broom, a proposed multi-megawatt land-based laser that could be used to target
fragments. When the laser light hits a fragment, one side of the fragment would ablate, creating a
thrust that would change the eccentricity of the remains of the fragment until it would re-enter
harmlessly. A laser broom is a proposed ground-based laser beam-powered propulsion system
whose purpose is to sweep space debris out of the path of other artificial satellites such as the
International Space Station. Lasers are designed to target debris between one and ten
centimeters in diameter. Even small-sized debris can cause considerable damage in extremely
high-speed collisions. The laser broom is intended to be used at high enough power to punch
through the atmosphere with enough remaining power to ablate material from the debris for
several minutes. Intensive laser energy would also would impart a small thrust to alter
the orbit of orbital debris, ostensibly dropping the perigee into the upper atmosphere, thereby
increasing drag so that the debris would eventually burn up on entry into the Earth atmosphere.
Recent NASA research (2011) indicates that firing a lower power HEL beam at a piece of space
junk could alter velocity by 1.0 mm per second. Keeping it up for a few hours per day could
alter its course by 200 m per day.
In 2011 scientists at NASA Ames Research Center proposed that lower power ground-based or
space-based HELs could also perturb orbits and nudge small debris to higher or lower altitudes
so they would de-orbit quicker, or avoid a predicted collision. Again, the NASA Ames concept
targets smaller space debris that are not suited physically or economically for removal by kinetic
means. The advantages of the lower power HEL its immunity from being classified as an anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapon and a lower likelihood of unintended damage to functional space
systems. The most promising laser concepts for ODR are discussed below:
2.9.1.3.1 Laser Orbital Debris Removal
In a 2 February 2002 presentation titled “Laser Orbital Debris Removal (LODR),” the President
of Photonic Associates discussed the Photonics LODR concept. The presentation noted that a
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LODR concept engineering validation study was funded by NASA in 1996. Based on that study
NASA concluded that: “The capability to remove essentially all dangerous orbital debris in the
targeted size range is not only feasible in the near term, but its costs are modest relative to the
likely costs to shield, repair or replace high-value spacecraft that could otherwise be lost due to
debris impacts for debris particles greater than about 1cm in size.” The study concluded that in
1996 dollars less than $200M was required to field a LODR system capable of clearing 80% of
LEO debris over a period of two years.
By employing LODR, target access is speed-of-light, multi-tasked, redundant and agile. Unlike
kinetic ODR concepts, new debris created by LODR are microscopic. The ablation depth per
pulse is a few monolayers, so the total mass removed is small, however with a jet velocity of
10.7 km/s. LODR also exhibits system multi-applicability, as it can address challenges in LEO,
MEO and GEO in the form of divert-to-protect applications. By causing the ablation jet to push
“back” or “up” on the object will cause the object to enter a lower perigee by slowing or
distorting the eccentricity of the orbit. The objective is to cause the object to be forced into a
lower perigee of 200km or less. For LEO objects this is typically achieved by adding a ∆V of -
150 m/s. By employing LODR many small objects in LEO can be forced to re-enter in one
pass. The ablation plume is normal to the heated surface of the debris, independent of laser
beam incidence angle. Also, targets at altitude are tumbling, and stationary objects will be
caused to spin by laser strike. However, the time-average plume thrust vector of a rotating target
over many shots of a 100 Hz pulse train favors the direction from which the laser beam arrived
over time.
LODR engagement is a three step process. In Step 1 SSN data provides sufficient cuing
information so that wide field-of-view (FOV), solar-illuminated survey instruments can optically
capture the object and establish ephemerii. In step 2 a precision, active day or night optical
tracker having a narrow FOV system takes over to allow range-gating & parallel processing.
The MSSS and SOR LIDAR capabilities are good representatives of this capability. In Step 3
the target debris is handed off to the LODR short pulse “pusher laser” for engagement multiple
close succession engagements (100 Hz typical). Post engagement measurements are then taken
using SLR and engagements are repeated on subsequent orbital passes as required until the
object has been satisfactorily “nudged” in such a way as to avoid an otherwise predicted
collision.
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Figure 63-64. Large beam director (L) projecting short pulse laser for surface ablation (R).
2.9.1.3.2 Free Electron Laser
In December 2009, R. Whitney & G. Neil of Thomas Jefferson Lab, S. Biedron and J. Noonan
Aargon National Lab, and J. Lewellen of the Naval Postgraduate School presented a concept for
orbital debris removal at the International Orbital Debris Removal Conference titled Directed
Energy –Orbital Debris Removal. The purpose of the presentation was to introduce the 100 kW
– MW class average power Free Electron Laser (FEL) as a candidate capability to rapidly clean
all LEO altitudes of orbital debris. Much of the following discussion is derived directly from the
referenced presentation. The use of a 100 kW – MW-class Free-Electron Laser (FEL) based
Directed Energy (DE) source for high energy laser Orbital Debris Removal (ODR) has many
general advantages which make it conducive to integration with short pulse LODR:
Figure 65. Free Electron Laser generates coherent light from undulating electron beam.
The most important FEL advantage is the tunability of a single FEL DE source in real time and
across an operationally significant band of the mid IR, near IR, visible light, and near ultraviolet
(UV) spectrums. Due to FEL tunability a single FEL source can be optimized in real-time for
maximum atmospheric transmissibility during debris engagements, based on local ground-to-
space propagation windows at the time of engagement. When combined with adaptive optics
58
that compensate for atmospheric turbulence the high average power FEL provides the most
efficient means of transmitting laser energy to space in support of ODR. The FEL can also serve
to act as a guide star laser in support of a coaxial high energy short pulse laser, such as the
LODR in the previous discussion.
The FEL micro pulse train couples with debris more effectively. Another benefit of the FEL
over other laser sources is the unique optical beam structure. The FEL beam, as a function of the
unique manner in which the optical beam is generated, is composed of a long, yet variable train
of micro pulses having a pulse duration of approximately 500 to 1,000 femtoseconds at the
aperture at a rate of up to 75 MHz. During transmission to space those pulses will elongate to a
pulse duration of approximately one nanosecond each and upon arriving at the debris object will
be quasi-CW. In addition to exerting photon pressure, the FEL can thermally load the target,
cause propulsive out-gassing, and potentially vaporize the material. Together these FEL counter-
thrust generating effects will slow the velocity of debris.
The FEL design is free of these lasing medium thermal management issues, and the FEL can
therefore lase continuously, as necessary. The FEL optical resonator is a vacuum and has
significant advantages when compared to other all-electric alternatives. Solid State lasers must
dissipate accumulated heat efficiently if they are to achieve sustained short pulse operation
without suffering damage due to an unsuitable duty cycle. A cryoplant is required to cool
Helium for the operation of the linear accelerator (LINAC) that is integral to the FEL, however
this too is electricity powered. During operation the only cooling that is required is for the
resonator mirrors, to prevent their distortion. One can turn the FEL on and leave it lasing
indefinitely as long as the precision and endurance of the cooled resonator mirrors hold out - this
is why high average power FELs are suited to power beaming.
For these reasons the FEL and solid state LODR systems are ideally suited for integration into a
single, combined effects LODR that exhibits the best qualities of both. Two variations of high
average power FEL generation are pictured below, namely the recirculating oscillator and
amplifier designs.
Figure 66-67. FEL light generation using oscillator design (L), and amplifier design (R).
59
FEL technology today is mature, and now scalable from 10kW to 100kW for early
demonstrations and iterations of LODR. If power beaming is desired as a future additional
capability of a FEL-LODR site, FELs will have MW-class capabilities within a decade.
2.9.1.3.3 Combining LODR Short Pulse and High Average Power FEL in Single System
The proposed LODR short pulse ODR laser and the FEL high average power ODR laser are well
suited to complimentary integration within a single ground-based LODR system. The high peak
power short pulse system is better suited to the debris surface ablation/counter thrust capability
that has always been the touchstone of LODR. Likewise the FEL is perhaps better suited to
LIDAR imaging, longer dwell time for thermal loading and vaporization, guide-star operation,
ranging, and dual functionality for power beaming, perhaps for relay mirror-equipped high
altitude airships or for powering orbital robotic tugs during periods of darkness. Systems
integration would permit them both to be projected through the same large beam director
aperture. Both lasers and the selected optics can be optimized for the best ground to space
wavelength in the range of 265-nm to 4 μm. Together the two distinctive lasers could combine
their advantages cover the spectrum of ground to space applications is support of ODR.
Combined LODR systems could be located at relatively high elevations in Arizona, Hawaii,
Atacama Chile, Australia, the Mideast, and / or other suitable sites near the South and North
Poles to minimize atmospheric disturbances for the light. All LODR sites would be
internationally manned, and each engagement of sequence of engagements would be coordinated
through relevant national Laser Clearinghouses, most importantly those of Russia, China, and the
U.S. With respect to research and development, high average power FEL can leverage the U.S.
Navy investment in scaling up the average power capability of FEL. Likewise, short pulse
LODR can leverage the extensive funded short pulse R&D being conducted at the U.S.
Departments of Energy and Defense (DoE and DoD).
In support of LODR, another critical R&D effort that can be conducted concurrently is laser
effects experimentation. The DoE has exceptional user FEL user facilities at which FELs and
short pulse lasers could be experimented with side-by-side. Measurements related to LIDAR
performance, vapor thrust from out-gassing, jet thrust from surface ablation, glint,
melt/vaporization rates and other factors could be taken. Both laser types could engage
magnetically or electrostatically floating coupons that are representative of real debris floating in
vacuum.
60
Figure 68. Combining high average power FEL and high energy short pulse lasers in LODR.
2.9.1.3.4 NASA 10 kW Average Power Solid State Laser
On 10 August 2011 the GSP-11 Space Team received a presentation coauthored by NASA
employees Chris Henze, Will Marshall, James Mason, Jan Stupl, and Creon Levit of the Ames
Research Center. The title of the brief was “Space Debris Research Activities at NASA Ames
Research Center.” The brief began by asking what technique is most hopeful for slowing or
stopping the runaway Kessler phenomenon that may have already begun in polar orbits. The
brief questioned whether the publicly available Two Line Element (TLE) data is sufficient for
calculating the risk of collisions for practical global collision avoidance / space traffic
management. The brief concludes that kinetic mitigation means such as timely reentry and
removal of non-functional satellites to graveyard orbits is not enough in the near term. The
number of actual major collisions in 2011 follows an even more severe curve than the average
predicted by Kessler in 1978. Also, Active Debris Removal (ADR) by kinetic means such as
tethers, tugs, etc. did not appear to be economical, and conceptually failed to keep pace with the
rate of debris proliferation. The brief went on to look at remaining options to prevent a runaway
reaction that would make LEO unusable over time, and lasers were identified as a hopeful
solution.
61
The presenters looked at various ground, space, and airborne laser concepts that have been
proposed over the years. These included a ground-based high peak power LODR concept
discussed earlier, as well as a dual use function / mission for the Air Force’s Airborne Laser
(ABL). Both ABL and LODR systems were multi-megawatt continuous wave and pulse laser
designs. The objective of LODR is to achieve surface ablation and jetting, -∆V, and early
deorbiting. ABL sought target destruction through thermal loading and vaporization. Both were
found to be suboptimal when compared to an economical 10 kW industrial solid state laser (SSL)
combined with a modest 1 meter diameter beam director.
Figure 69-70. 10 kW SSL from IPG Photonics (L), & 1.5 meter beam director from L3 (R).
The presentation further observes: “Given high accuracy predictions, we may be able to use
medium power lasers to prevent the Kessler Syndrome by nudging objects to avoid collisions –
at much lower cost than ADR.” The success of the lower power alternative is dependent on
higher accuracy data. Better data on par with the accuracy currently only available to national
security space operators will permit future collisions to be predicted with greater accuracy.
Longer lead times that allow repeated engagements to nudge objects out of the path of other
objects to avoid potential collisions without the need for ADR.
NASA has concluded that given lower probability of error and longer lead times, modest
photonic pressure during engagements that apply approximately10 x solar constant for 20
minutes will be sufficient. There is no threshold intensity necessary for photonic pressure to
work, however a favorable area-to-mass ratio is crucial to practicality. In the end the NASA
Ames team recommended a 10 kW laser combined with a 1.5 meter beam director, one that
benefited from guide star corrected adaptive optics (AO). The ideal location for such a system
was determined to be Antarctica.
62
Figure 71. Architecture of an AO-aided, 10kW industrial SSL.
The space team concludes that the NASA Ames Research Center proposed laser debris nudging
capability is the best first step in demonstrating the operational utility of SSL LODR, and FEL
LODR, and combined LODR systems. Modest funding would enable the integration of a 10kW
industrial SSL with a small diameter director to study basic phenomenology of LODR. In
coordination with a major tracking site capable of LADAR can assist the small NASA prototype
in acquiring and engaging a representative piece of orbital debris. Subsequent orbital
measurements can determine the extent to which photonic pressure influenced the debris position
and behavior. Concurrently, one or a few inexpensive “cubesats” equipped with SLR retro-
reflectors and limited active telemetry can be developed and launched as piggy back payloads of
one or more scheduled LEO missions. This would permit a precise quantification of the effects
of photonic pressure, in an effort to demonstrate value for collision avoidance.
2.9.1.3.5 Proof of Effects Experimentation
Experimentation that involves the engagement of representative debris in a vacuum chamber
could be the first step in such an initial program. The Thomas Jefferson Lab FEL user facility in
Newport News, VA is ideally suited to conducting not only experiments related to the 10kW
NASA proposal, but also the SSL LODR and FEL testing, with the FEL serving as a surrogate
for all. In the lab, FEL sub-picosecond duration pulses can simulate the plasma jetting effects of
the high power LODR SSL. At the same time the FEL can with longer macro pulse
engagements represent itself with respect to thermal loading, out-gassing, and possible
vaporization of targeted debris. At lower power levels and the precise desired wavelength, the
FEL can simulate the quasi-CW power densities on target that NASA predicts with their
industrial SSL and small beam director. In order to achieve a representative target environment,
a small vacuum chamber can be tailored to include a capacity to suspend the “debris coupon”
magnetically or electrostatically to detect even miniscule accelerations one might anticipate in
LEO.
63
This experimentation could be done particularly cost-effectively if included in a single
comprehensive experimentation plan. Our organization could plan, coordinate, execute /
supervise, and analyze such experimentation given seed funding for that purpose.
2.9.1.4 Space Mist
Another promising idea that has been proposed is titled “Space Mist.” First proposed by
researchers at NASA’s Ames Research Center in 1990 and recently resurrected, the concept
proposes to use frozen mist to drag an object out of orbit. In practice, a rocket would launch a
tank filled with liquid gas, such as carbon dioxide. Thrusters would position the tank far ahead
of the targeted object though directly along the calculated path that object. Thousands of miles
forward of the debris, the tank would spray a cloud of frozen mist. The droplets would then slow
down and de-orbit anything they encounter such as the fast-approaching targeted object.
According to George Sarver, the idea’s originator at Ames, a spaceship emitting a 220-pound,
62-foot-diameter cloud of frozen mist could de-orbit dense objects such as steel nuts. Larger
clouds could stop less-dense items like insulation. Once the mist dissipates, nothing remains in
orbit along that orbital path. The tank would then fall back into the atmosphere and avoid
becoming or causing more debris by its very presence. , which means less clutter that could
otherwise create more debris. Creon Levit, the chief scientist for debris programs at Ames has
stated that NASA could test the concept within 18 months if it were funded.
64
Figure 72. NASA Ames Space Mist ODR concept proposal.
2.9.1.5 Robots
One type of robotic spacecraft that has been proposed is designed specifically to deorbit space
debris with lasers. These advanced systems could seek out debris that becomes evident when
sunlight reflect off of it. Alerted to the presence of the object, the “debris deorbiting” robotic
satellite would track the debris a low power laser. Once the debris comes within range, it would
be engaged by a second and more powerful laser that nudges the debris out of orbit so that it
burns up in the atmosphere.
Another robotic concept proposes a satellite fitted with robotic arms that can grab and release
debris, essentially tossing them earthwards, again in order to burn up in the atmosphere. Such
spacecraft would have the capability to remove multiple pieces of debris, and advocates say that
such a system could be tested in space within five years of receiving developmental funding.
65
2.9.1.6 Tether-Secured Nets
Space tugs could have an additional function of policing up debris in their space vicinity. These
tugs could be equipped with conventional chemical propulsion or all electric ion engines and
have remotely operated or fully autonomous arms equipped to grab, manipulate, and or propel
larger pieces of space debris. Specially-designed vehicles could intercept old rocket bodies, for
instance, and attach a propulsion system or so-called drag augmentation device onto the object.
The result would quicken the debris' descent to Earth. Alternatively, the tug vehicle could attach
a drag augmentation device to several objects moving at identical velocity in close proximity,
and perhaps a third. Once a reasonably sized set of objects have been lassoed together the tug
could drag them to a preferred orbit.
As an example, the aerospace company Tethers Unlimited proposes a system called Rustler (for
Round Up Space Trash Low Earth-orbit Remediation). Once launched into low-Earth orbit, the
satellite releases an EDT, a 1.5-mile-long cable that conducts electricity as discussed earlier. The
conductivity allows the tether to wrap a net around any piece of debris that it encounters, which
it then drags into the atmosphere where the object either falls into the ocean or burns up on
reentry. The net secures even small objects tumbling in space, a challenge for other systems.
Tether-based solutions have been tested by NASA, including a 1996 experiment with a 12.5-mile
cable in space. The Rustler system has been tested on a zero-G flight and could launch on a real
mission within five years of receiving funding.
In the plan, two teams plan to launch a satellite carrying a long, thin metal net known as an EDT
and attach the tether to a dead satellite (or other large space debris) using a robotic arm. Once the
EDT becomes charged with electricity while it orbits the Earth, it will create drag that pulls the
dead satellite down to the atmosphere where it will burn up on re-entry.
Figure 73-74. Laser (L) and EDT (R) equipped satellites dedicated to ODR.
66
A giant space debris net several kilometers in size has been proposed as a collaboration between
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and Nitto Seimo Co, a 100-year-old Japanese
maker of fishing nets in an effort to collect debris from orbital space. Nitto Seimo is a 100-year
old fishing net maker notable for inventing the world's first machine to make durable knotless
fishing nets in 1925 and capturing half of the fishing net market in Japan. It hopes its expertise in
catching fish will translate to catching space debris.
The Japanese plan will see a satellite attached to a thin metal net spanning several kilometers
launched into space. The net is then detached, and begins to orbit earth, sweeping up space waste
in its path and then pulling them down to Earth. After catching the debris for several weeks, the
scientists back down on Earth will activate the electrical charge of the net which will have the
net move towards Earth due to the planet’s magnetic fields attraction of the electrified net.
Both the net and its catch will then burn up in the atmosphere. It is likely the nets will target the
orbital paths of space shuttles which are constantly monitored for debris. By remaining in orbit
collecting rubbish for several weeks the trip will become financially worthwhile, before sending
another net into space.
Inspired by a basic fishing net concept, the super-strong space nets have been the subject of
extensive research by Nitto Seimo for the past six years and consist of three layered metal
threads, each measuring 1mm diameter and intertwined with fibres as thin as human hair. Nitto
Seimo started development of the net in 2005 and has created a usable tether material composed
of three layers of metal threads, each layer measuring 1 millimeter in diameter, combined with
very thin fibers.
Figures 75-76. JAXA (L), teamrd with Nitto Seimo Co. co-developed debris capturing net (R).
2.9.1.7 Solar Sails
The sun’s radiation can be harnessed to exert photon-induced force on solar sails composed of
ultra-thin fabric material that is cheap and portable. The photonic pressure of solar light acts on
the solar sail much like wind propels a sailboat. These sails can clean up orbit by slowing debris
enough that it de-orbits. For example, an expandable 97-square-foot sail can be launched as a
secondary payload on even a small 110-pound satellite, and an onboard system or ground control
triggers its deployment. Conductive coils embbeded in the sail control its angle of incidence to
67
the sun so that it can maneuver a satellite so as to force it to deorbit. The sail and the satellite
would disintegrate together in the atmosphere. Solar sail technology is mature and has existed
for decades. This includes sail-equipped spacecraft in the mid-1970s that was intended to ride
along with Halley’s Comet; however the spacecraft was never launched. Another example
involves the large solar arrays that are currently affixed to the Messenger spacecraft, which are
helping steer the spacecraft to the planet Mercury. Most recently, JAXA launched a solar-sail-
propelled “space yacht” called Ikaros. But the solar sails precisely controllable enough to remove
debris are still years away.
2.9.1.8 Orbital Spheres
Adhesive Synthetic Trash Recovery Orbital Spheres, or “ASTROS” are essentially large sticky
balls/shells or “space flypaper.” The balls consist of a layer of metallic foam (such as silicon
carbide) and an outer shell of adhesive (such as aerogels or resins). They attach themselves to
debris and once a mass of debris has been collected, then deorbit into the atmosphere where both
are incinerated. The large shells would spanning a mile (1.6 km) in diameter. As small particles
pass through the foam-like contents of the internal volume of the ball they would lose energy.
Those that pass through would lose velocity and reenter the Earth’s atmosphere more rapidly.
The debris that does not pass through the ball completely would likely adhere to it internally or
externally. Since the ball itself would lose velocity over time due to its lightweight relative to its
large LEO cross-section, and the countless energy-depleting impacts with counter-orbiting
debris, it too would reenter the atmosphere fairly quickly, dragging with it captured debris that it
had not already deorbited. Another version of this is a similarly sized “NERF Ball” that would
deflect debris entirely thereby absorbing their energy, slow their velocities, thereby lowering
their perigees to increase atmospheric drag for quick reentry.
Figures 77-78. Solar sail propulsion for ODR (L), and adhesive shells dragging debris (R).
68
2.10 Potential Orbital Debris Removal X-Prize
The X Prize Foundation addresses the world’s Grand Challenges by creating and managing
large-scale, high-profile, incentivized prize competitions that stimulate investment in research
and development worth far more than the prize itself. It motivates and inspires brilliant
innovators from all disciplines to leverage their intellectual and financial capital. On the X Prize
Foundation website at http://xprize.org/about/who-we-are under “concepts under consideration,”
“Orbital Debris Removal” is discussed as a potential candidate prize:
Millions of pieces of debris are currently orbiting Earth at altitudes that pose a danger to
satellites and human spacecraft. The threat from such debris is predicted to rise 50% in
the coming decade and quadruple in the next 50 years. Large object collisions are
particularly dangerous, due to the ensuing creation of additional debris. Teams competing
in the Orbital Debris competition must select a target piece of orbital debris and either de-
orbit the debris or move the debris in a predicted and accurate fashion to a new orbit
deemed non-threatening by a panel of expert judges. The first team to complete this task
will be determined the winner.
The Space Team believes that if the urgency of the space debris can be communicated to a large
public and private audience in the near term, that the X Prize Foundation will make a decision to
activate the Orbital Space Debris prize by announcing and funding it.
69
Chapter 3:
The Proposed Sustainable Organization
3.1 The Space Team concludes that in the near term organization dedicated to removing debris
from Earth orbit in order to preserve the viability of orbital space is sustainable. Our
organization’s expertise centers on research, technology analysis, project management, and
government-industry coordination. The team constitutes a first iteration with the potential to
evolve later.
3.2 The team believes that space systems insurers and operators will identify a value in lowering
the risks of debris collisions with the systems they operate and insure and pay for our services in
helping to get it done. Insurers and operators will pay for our research, down-selection analysis,
project management, and coordination services in support of ODR technology development and
demonstration.
3.3 The team also believes that cash rich non-space faring nations will identify a value in
increased influence over space related high technology development and playing a larger role in
the future of space. Nations such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil might therefore pay for
our organization’s services in facilitating their full inclusion in United Nations space bodies such
as the IADC. The team likewise believes those same wealthy nations will fund industry to
support the development and demonstration of ODR capabilities, as a global contribution that
garners high technology access and national prestige.
3.4 The space team concludes that the NASA Ames Research Center proposed laser debris
nudging capability is the best first step in demonstrating the operational utility of SSL LODR,
and FEL LODR, and combined LODR systems. Modest funding would enable the integration of
a 10kW industrial SSL with a small diameter director to study basic phenomenology of LODR.
In coordination with a major tracking site capable of LIDAR and SLR, such as MSSS (AMOS)
or ESA SLR, NASA Ames can prototype acquisition and engagement of orbital debris.
Concurrently, one or a few inexpensive “cubesats” equipped with SLR retro-reflectors and
specialized active telemetry developed at Ames can be launched as piggy back payloads on one
or more scheduled LEO missions so that the precise quantification of the effects of photonic
pressure and be observed in an effort to demonstrate value for collision avoidance.
3.5 Experimentation that involves the engagement of representative debris in a vacuum chamber
could be the first step in such an initial program. The Thomas Jefferson Lab FEL user facility in
Newport News, VA is ideally suited to conducting not only experiments related to the 10kW
NASA proposal, but also the higher power SSL LODR and FEL testing, with the FEL serving as
a surrogate for all. In order to achieve a representative target environment, a small vacuum
chamber can be tailored to include a capacity to suspend the “debris coupon” magnetically or
electrostatically to detect even miniscule accelerations one might anticipate in LEO. This
experimentation could be done particularly cost-effectively if included in a single comprehensive
experimentation plan. Our organization could plan, coordinate, execute / supervise, and analyze
experimentation given seed funding as a first funded task.
70
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Figure 40. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/SBandAdvancedRadar/index.html
Figure 41. http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Sov-FOBS-Program.html
Figure 42. http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2010/05/active-phased-array-radar.html
Figure 43. http://www.flickr.com/photos/52471863@N02/5558389790/
Figure 44. http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101570
Figure 45. http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/measure/radar.html
Figure 46. http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/ubbthreads.php?ubb=showflat&Number=1199279
Figure 47. http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/gmd/gallery/sbx001.html
Figure 48. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space-Based_Infrared_System
Figure 49. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/SpaceBasedInfraredSystemHigh/
Figure 50. http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html
Figure 51. http://mt-milcom.blogspot.com/2008/02/russian-space-surveillance-sourcebook.html
Figure 52. http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html
Figure 53. http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html
Figure 54. http://www.thelivingmoon.com/45jack_files/03files/GRAVES.html
Figure 55. http://www.thelivingmoon.com/45jack_files/03files/GRAVES.html
Figure 56. http://www.thelivingmoon.com/45jack_files/03files/GRAVES.html
Figure 57. http://lfvn.astronomer.ru/report/0000048/004/index.htm
Figure 58. http://www.qwiki.com/q/?_escaped_fragment_=/Satellite_laser_ranging
Figure 59. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Fig12_Tether_System.PNG
Figure 60. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_tether
Figure 61. Star Inc. presentation
Figure 62. http://www.popsci.com/node/22487
Figure 63. Claude Phipps - Laser Role in Planetary Defense
Figure 64. Space Team Short Pulse (internet image background no reference available)
Figure 65. http://www.ar15.com/forums/t_1_5/1152415_.html
Figure 66. http://www.4gls.ac.uk/ERLP.htm
Figure 67. http://www.lanl.gov/science/1663/june2010/story4b.shtml
Figure 68. http://www.geekwithlaptop.com/tag/nasa-laser-debris
Figure 69. Henze, Marshall, Mason, Stupl, Levit - Ames Space Debris Research
Figure 70. Henze, Marshall, Mason, Stupl, Levit - Ames Space Debris Research
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Figure 71. Henze, Marshall, Mason, Stupl, Levit - Ames Space Debris Research
Figure 72. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 73. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 74. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 75. http://space.azzopardi.info/
Figure 76. http://www.yahind.com/fishing-net-to-collect-debris-from-space_18104.html
Figure 77. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space
Figure 78. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-07/cluttered-space